Democracy, judicialisation and the emergence of the 

Supreme Court as a policy-maker in Mexico by Saavedra-Herrera, Camilo
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy, judicialisation and the emergence of the 
Supreme Court as a policy-maker in Mexico  
 
Camilo Emiliano Saavedra-Herrera 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, London, August 2013
 1 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my 
own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of 
others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by myself and 
any other person is clearly identified). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not 
be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 73,214 words. 
 
 
2 
Abstract 
In 1994, four days after taking office, Ernesto Zedillo, the last president to 
govern Mexico emerging from the once hegemonic National Revolutionary 
Party, promoted a major redesign of the Supreme Court of Justice that 
substantially expanded its constitutional review powers and reduced its size 
from 26 to 11 members. The operation of this more compact and powerful 
body was left in charge of 11 justices nominated by Zedillo. During the period 
1917-1994, the Supreme Court adjudicated only 63 constitutional cases of its 
exclusive jurisdiction. In contrast, since the reform came into force in 1995, it 
has been the arena in which more than two thousand constitutional cases 
have been ultimately settled.  
Why do courts established under authoritarian rule become effective 
policy-makers as democracy develops? Using Mexico as a case study and 
drawing on the strategic approach for the study of courts, this thesis argues 
that the Supreme Court turned into an effective policy-maker as a result of the 
convergence of three factors: institutional change (from judicial reform), 
political fragmentation (from democratisation) and an unprecedented internal 
stability. Judicial reform set a new institutional framework; political 
fragmentation triggered the use of constitutional review by political actors; 
and stability enhanced experience within the Court and prompted justices to 
more proactively engage in policy-making.  
Through an appealing case study, a novel research strategy and original 
evidence consisting of four original datasets and thirty-five elite-interviews, 
this thesis contributes, first, to the comparative analysis of courts by offering a 
systematic and comprehensive account of judicial rulings and precedents and 
their impact both within and beyond judicial boundaries; second, to the 
judicialisation literature by highlighting the effects of the delegation of power 
to courts on judicial performance; and third, to the Mexican politics 
scholarship by providing a re-assessment of the role of the Supreme Court in 
regime dynamics.  
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1. Introduction 
“They have already plundered us. But Mexico has not ended. And they shall 
not plunder us again”, said President Jose Lopez Portillo after announcing the 
expropriation of fifty-one private banks during his sixth and last address to 
the nation given three months before leaving office, on the first of September 
1982 (Adams, 1997). The combination of presidencialismo with the hegemony 
of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI, for its Spanish abbreviation) 
allowed presidents in post-revolutionary Mexico to make and enforce such 
discretionary, far-reaching decisions. Yet, to eliminate the chance of losing in 
the judicial arena, Lopez Portillo promoted a constitutional reform to specify 
in the charter that the provision of public banking services was of the 
exclusive competence of the state (Elizondo Mayer-Serra, 2001).  
Expropriation played a major role in the construction and maintenance of 
the undemocratic hegemonic-party regime that ruled Mexico from 1929 to 
2000. It was the tool presidents employed to execute a virtually permanent 
land-redistribution program and later, as the country became urbanised, to 
conduct an equally enduring land regularisation policy (Varley, 1998). In 1938 
President Lazaro Cardenas issued the decree that expropriated from foreign 
private owners the facilities and assets of the oil industry. This event has ever 
since been celebrated as a national civic holiday and epitomised as one of the 
most relevant symbols of Mexican nationalism. As of 2012, the public-owned 
oil industry provides 40% of the government’s revenue (Segal, 2012).  
The Supreme Court has not been left out of the conflict emerging from the 
use of expropriation. In 1939, justices ruled the oil nationalisation decree as 
constitutional and established that the right to prior hearing was inapplicable 
in cases of expropriation. In 1982, the Supreme Court again endorsed the 
nationalisation of the banking system, dismissing the demand submitted by 
twenty-one bank owners on the grounds established by Lopez Portillo’s 
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constitutional reform (Elizondo Mayer-Serra, 2001). The saga that came about 
in 1982 proved that political actors no longer conceived the Supreme Court as 
an unproblematic arena, thus announcing the more active role the Supreme 
Court would soon play in Mexico’s political system.  
The more fragmented political environment that democratisation 
gradually established set a new scenario for expropriations. Two decades after 
the bank nationalisation, Vicente Fox, the president that marked the end of 
fourteen consecutive PRI administrations, resorted to expropriation to 
advance his own nationalisation enterprise, the expropriation of the sugar-
mill industry, as well as to obtain the land needed for the development of his 
government’s most important infrastructure project: a new airport for Mexico 
City. The mobilisation of the peasants, owners of the 10,000 expropriated 
acres, along with the high prospects of losing in the Supreme Court compelled 
President Fox to repeal the decree and cancel the project (Azuela, 2010). 
The Supreme Court has gradually abandoned its traditionally restrained 
role for a more proactive engagement in the making of policy and law. In 
2006, justices ruled unconstitutional the expropriation of sugar mills and 
established as binding precedent –known in Mexico as jurisprudencia1- that 
1 In Mexico, jurisprudencia alludes to both the precedent that certain courts create and 
becomes binding for lower courts and to the precedent that plays a persuasive role but is not 
binding in formal terms. Therefore, jurisprudencia is more related to the concept of case law 
(although the precedent created by judges are formally binding only within the judicial 
realm) than to the notion of jurisprudence as the theoretical study of law. As Zamora et al 
put it, “[…] there exists a general misconception that the doctrine of stare decisis, adherence 
to established precedent, play no role or only a de minis role in the Mexican legal system. 
While it is true that the term stare decisis is not used in Mexico and has none of the 
talismanic effects that the doctrine had in the early common law, in fact Mexican judges at 
administrative tribunal level routinely adopt, follow and feel themselves bound by prior 
judicial rulings. This practice occurs in Mexico at two levels, one formal and the other 
informal. In the formal sense, Mexican law expressly authorizes certain courts to issue 
decisions that are binding upon judges in subsequent cases, through the issuance of 
jurisprudencia obligatoria by federal courts of appeals. In such instances, the latter have no 
choice but to adhere to precedent. In the informal sense, Mexican judges often follow prior 
rulings of other courts and judges voluntarily, not because Mexican law or legal doctrine 
mandates that they do so but because doing so serves other purposes. These other purposes 
may include a desire on the part of judges to build security and certainty into Mexican law 
or the desire to ensure self-preservation or promotion within the judiciary” (2004: 83).  
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public authorities must guarantee the protection of the right to prior hearing 
when using expropriations. Since then, eight out of the thirty-two states 
composing Mexico’s federation2 have passed reforms to adapt their local 
expropriation rules to the precedent. The impact of the Supreme Court’s 
rulings and precedents has had far-reaching consequences not restricted to 
expropriation matters. For instance, after justices confirmed in 2008 the 
constitutionality of Mexico City’s first-trimester abortion legalisation and held 
that legislating on ordinary criminal matters, abortion included, is the 
competence of state-level authorities, seventeen states also amended their 
local constitutions to explicitly determine that the right to life is protected 
from conception (GIRE, 2012). 
The emergence of more proactive judges has taken place at a global level. 
Courts have progressively become more influential players at the expense of 
executive and legislative institutions (Tate and Vallinder, 1995). The legal 
status of abortion in Colombia and Poland (Kulczycki, 2011), the protection of 
gay rights in Canada, South Africa and India (Siegel, 2012), or the 
confirmation of general-election results in the United Sates and Italy (Newell, 
2005), are all issues that, as in Mexico, have been ultimately defined inside the 
courtroom for the last two decades. Judicialisation, as this expansion of 
judicial power has come to be known (Vallinder, 1994), has implied that courts 
and judges deal in a more critical way with an increasing number of more 
complex cases (Koopmans, 2003). 
Judicialisation has been linked to a diverse array of factors, from the 
dissemination of human rights discourse (Epp, 1998; ten Kate and van Koppen, 
1994) and the creation of supra-national judicial institutions (Stone Sweet and 
2 In formal terms, Mexico’s federal system is composed of thirty-one states plus the Federal 
District of Mexico City. The Federal District is not officially a state but in recent years its 
autonomy has considerably increased, for example, through the re-establishment of direct 
elections as the method for choosing the local executive and legislative authorities. Although 
it does not have a proper local constitution, it has been given autonomy for creating its own 
local regulations on a vast array of legal matters.  
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Brunell, 1998), to judicial activism itself (Smithey and Ishiyama, 2002; Holland, 
1991), to name just a few of the more prominent factors. The literature on 
comparative judicial politics has particularly underlined the role that the 
adoption of stronger constitutional judicial review mechanisms has played as 
an institutional source of judicial empowerment at the domestic level (Couso 
et al., 2010; Epstein et al., 2001; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2003; Ginsburg and 
Moustafa, 2008; Hirschl, 2008; Shapiro, 2002; Sieder et al., 2005; Stone Sweet, 
2000). Yet, substantial differences distinguish the experiences of consolidated 
democracies from those of countries undergoing processes of democratisation.  
Although under different constitutional judicial review systems, courts 
and judges have traditionally played an influential role in consolidated 
democracies. In the United States, for instance, the Supreme Court arrogated 
the power of judicial review in 1803 (Knight and Epstein, 1996), and has 
employed it to shape policy and law ever since (Dahl, 1957; Whittington, 
2009)3. Likewise, under the centralised design providing them with a 
monopoly over constitutional review, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
and the French Conseil Constitutionnel have both also been relevant players in 
the creation and implementation of national policies such as the liberalisation 
of abortion in the case of the former, and the nationalisation of industry in the 
case of the latter (Stone Sweet, 2007).  
In some third-wave democracies, on the other hand, judicialisation has 
particularly been linked to the establishment still under authoritarian rule of 
broader constitutional review powers (Ginsburg, 2003; Hirschl, 2004). 
Certainly, a piece of research published in 1978 found that provisions for 
conducting constitutional review existed in only 26% of the constitutional 
texts of the world (Van Maarseveen and Van der Tang, 1978 cited in Ginsburg 
2003). The spread of constitutional judicial review has been especially 
3 In the United States a backlash of forty-three states adopted stricter expropriation 
regulations after its Supreme Court held in 2005 that it is possible to employ eminent 
domain to transfer property from a private owner to another private owner for the purpose 
of promoting economic development (Somin, 2008).  
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noticeable in Latin America, a region in which sixteen countries modified 
their constitutional review systems between 1981 and 2001. As of 2005 
seventeen countries in the region had at least one constitutional review 
procedure, but eleven of them had three (Navia and Rios-Figueroa, 2005).  
The research devoted to the analysis of courts in the region has 
significantly flourished in the last fifteen years (Kapiszewski and Taylor, 
2008). The optimism about the positive effects on the rule of law of fostering 
judicial independence through judicial reform that distinguished the seminal 
works on the subject (Mendez et al., 1999; Prillaman, 2000; Ungar, 2002), has 
gradually translated into a growing and more problematizing corpus of 
research focused on the empirical study of courts. This literature has shown 
that judicial institutions have indeed become more autonomous as democracy 
has developed (Rios Figueroa, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2003; Taylor, 2008; 
Helmke, 2005; Iaryczower et al., 2002). Taken altogether, this body of 
scholarship has made it evident that in this region judicialisation has 
paradoxically converged with democratisation: as democratisation has 
fostered the development of genuine representative institutions, 
judicialisation has simultaneously expanded the authority of judicial power 
over them.  
Do courts established under authoritarian rule become effective policy-
makers as democracy develops? Although prolific and increasingly 
sophisticated, the scholarship on Latin American courts has not yet provided a 
comprehensive account of the way they engage in policy-making focused not 
only on the institutional and contextual determinants of decision-making but 
also on the effects and implications of judicial policy outcomes. For instance, a 
study sponsored by Inter-American Development Bank recently explained 
that the regulations on the effects of judicial rulings allow judiciaries to 
perform four different roles in the policy-making process: veto player, policy 
player, impartial referee and societal representative (Sousa, 2010). This piece 
of research, by underlining the relevance of institutional design, provided an 
14 
interesting framework for approaching the problem of policy-making by 
courts in the region, but failed in developing a substantive systematic analysis 
of the effects produced by both contextual conditions such as political 
fragmentation and internal factors like stability and experience on the way 
courts engage in policy-making.  
Drawing on the separation-of-powers approach for the study of courts 
(Epstein and Knight, 1998; Ferejohn et al., 2004; Magaloni et al., 2011; Rios 
Figueroa, 2007) and by using Mexico as a case study, this dissertation aims to 
explain why courts established under authoritarian rule have become more 
effective policy makers as democracy has developed. Certainly, this thesis 
builds upon the strategic approach for the study of courts to analyse the 
Mexican experience. The notion of judges as strategic policy-seekers 
performing in a given institutional context posed by the separation-of-powers 
approach allows accounting for the effects of both judicial reform and 
democratisation, but also for the specific institutional mechanisms permitting 
them to advance their policy goals.  
In particular, building upon a multivalent conceptualisation of judicial 
decisions (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Stone Sweet, 2002), this dissertation 
distinguishes between policy-making in terms of arbitration, essentially 
displayed in the dispositions whereby a court defines the party that prevails in 
a legal dispute; from policy-making in terms of normative-creation (rule-
making), manifest fundamentally in the precedent that emerges from the 
reasoning supporting such dispositions. Accordingly, this research is focused 
on explaining both arbitration and rule-making; therefore it conducts an 
examination of judicial rulings, but also of precedents and their effects on the 
legislative production of norms.   
Mexico was selected as a case study because of the convergence of several 
contextual and institutional factors. First, unlike what has occurred in most 
Latin American countries, in Mexico democratisation came from a hegemonic-
party civil regime that never collapsed and was neither preceded nor followed 
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by the promulgation of a new constitution. Second, also in contrast to the 
regional trends, judicial reform preceded alternation and was controlled by 
former rulers that opted neither to create a constitutional court (or a 
specialised chamber within it) nor to reconfigure the court of last resort 
without expanding its adjudicative powers. Instead, judicial reform established 
a powerful body, head of the judiciary and with exclusive constitutional 
review powers. Third, a hegemonic party controlled the integration of the 
original court but established staggered terms in office coinciding with 
changes in the congress and in the presidency. Fourth, despite judicial reform 
replacing lifetime tenure with a 15-year fixed term for justices, it led to the 
first eight-year period without renovation in the Supreme Court’s 
composition. Finally, the formal and informal rules governing the creation of 
case law provide judicial precedents with an authority atypical to civil-law 
systems.  
The hypothesis guiding this research is that the emergence of effective 
policy-making by the Supreme Court resulted from the convergence of 
institutional change (from judicial reform), political fragmentation4 (from 
democratisation), and stability in the bench (which led to a substantial 
increase in the experience of justices holding unprecedented constitutional 
review powers). Institutional change set a new framework for the activity of 
the Supreme Court; political fragmentation triggered the use of constitutional 
review by political actors; and stability prompted more experienced justices to 
more proactively seek to advance their policy goals.  
4 Ferejohn (2002) explains that political fragmentation is a complex concept that can emerge 
in different forms. Federalism fragments political power horizontally, opening space for 
judicial action. Political power could be horizontally fragmented for example by establishing 
a presidential regime. Furthermore, political fragmentation can also be produced by non-
institutional means such as divided governments or the multiplication of the political forces 
represented within a legislative body.  
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The evidence employed to test this hypothesis consists of three main 
components: four datasets expressly integrated for this thesis5 -one of them 
comprising more than two-thousand constitutional cases filed in the Supreme 
Court in the period 1995-2010-; thirty-five interviews with key actors involved 
in both the judicial reform process and the application of the Supreme Court’s 
new powers; and an in-depth analysis of the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
performance in two policy areas, abortion and expropriation, through a 
systematic examination of the effects of judicial rulings on these subjects on 
subnational-level regulations.  
Overall, a novel research strategy, the selection of an appealing case study 
and the use of original evidence allows this study to contribute with relevant 
insights to both the comparative study of courts and the literature on Mexican 
politics. In the first place, by emphasizing the relevance of the interrelation of 
legal institutions (i.e. constitutional review and precedent) and contextual 
factors (i.e. political fragmentation and stability) as well as by underlining the 
centrality of researching the aftermath of judicial decisions, the theoretical 
and methodological strategy employed in this thesis constitutes an innovative 
approach for the systematic study of policy-making by courts. Second, this 
research provides relevant evidence regarding both the effects of 
democratisation on judicialisation and the impact of judicialisation on the 
regime dynamics in democratising countries. Finally, this thesis contributes to 
the Mexican politics literature by providing re-assessment of the role the 
Supreme Court plays in the political system.    
5 One of the datasets registers information for more than two-thousand judicial judgements 
handed down by the Supreme Court in the period 1995-2011; a second one includes data of 
constitutional litigation at state level along the same period; a third contains data for all the 
justices appointed to the Supreme Court in the period 1917-2011; and a fourth one includes 
information for every expropriation law passed by the legislature in every state of the 
federation, as well as for every precedent established by the Supreme Court in the same 
matter, also in the period 1917-2011 
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1.1 Democracy, Judicialisation and Courts 
“Why, for instance, would two individuals want to form a legal marriage 
instead of simply cohabiting?” asks Elster (1988: 8) to illustrate the tension 
implied in the pre-commitment constitutionalism represents for democracy. 
Based on the rule of majority, democracy is a method of government 
envisioned to maximise popular participation in government. 
Constitutionalism, on the other hand, is a system of pre-established rules 
intended to guarantee the protection of individual rights as well as to restrict 
majorities from changing such well-entrenched norms. Constitutionalism 
provides democracy with stability by protecting a set of founding rules from 
the dynamics of everyday politics. The protection of constitutional supremacy 
is guaranteed through the establishment of complex standards that prevent 
the constitution from being easily amended, but also through the delegation of 
this responsibility in independent institutions like courts.  
Constitutional judicial review, that is, “the power of courts to strike down 
incompatible legislation and administrative action” (Ginsburg, 2008: 81), 
implies the delegation of a considerable amount of political power to non-
elected institutions with a legitimacy that is not founded in elections. This 
lack of representative legitimacy makes courts, in democracy, face what has 
been described as ‘the counter-majoritarian difficulty’ (Bickel, 1962). In 
undemocratic regimes, on the other hand, the ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ 
can be conceived as a condition that courts share with the executive and 
legislatives branches of government. In an undemocratic context, it is highly 
feasible that constitutionalism and the protection of constitutional supremacy 
through constitutional review can be more related to the preservation of 
authoritarian rule than with expanding the prospects of a majoritarian 
government to emerge.  
Over the last thirty years the world has witnessed the emergence of two 
processes, one that has extended democratic institutions and values to 
countries traditionally governed under authoritarian rule (Huntington, 1991); 
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and another that has transferred a considerable amount of power to courts 
and judges at the expense of legislative and executive institutions (Tate and 
Vallinder, 1995). This convergence of democratisation and judicialisation has 
paradoxically implied a diffusion of political power and the establishment of 
more legitimate representative institutions but, at the same time, it has also 
implied a re-centralisation of this political power in courts, institutions with a 
more complex connection to political representation. In the dynamic 
environment that the convergence of democratisation and judicialisation 
implies, courts are also subject to a transformation of their role in the political 
system.  
From the 1970s to the 1990s a trend towards the establishment of more 
competitive political regimes took place at the global level. The third wave of 
democratisation brought about thirty new countries transiting from 
authoritarian rule to establish stable forms of democracy, including free 
elections and institutions able to check-and-balance the exercise of political 
power (Huntington, 1991). The consolidation of democracy or, at least, the 
advent of such stable forms of democracy has been attributed to different 
factors, such as social mobilisation (Collier and Mahoney, 1997) or divisions 
within the authoritarian regime from which transitions occurred (O'Donnell et 
al., 1986).  
The literature on democracy and democratization has underlined the role 
that economic factors have played either in the emergence or maintenance of 
democracy across the different regions of the world (Geddes, 1999)6. Among 
the factors considered in this literature –perhaps due to the link it has to 
economic development- the rule of law has also had specific prominence (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996; O'Donnell, 2004)7. As an influential comparative scholar 
6 The works of Londregan and Poole (1996), Przeworski et al (2000), Haggard and Kaufman 
(2012) exemplify the relevance the specialised literature has conceded to economic 
development as a factor particularly linked to the advent and maintenance of the democracy.  
7 According to Fallon (1997) the concept of the rule of law has itself become a discourse and 
employed in different and even mutually inconsistent ways. Rios Figueroa and Staton (2009), 
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mentioned, even though third wave democracies could be labelled as what 
Robert Dahl (1971) once considered ‘polyarchies’, they cannot be portrayed as 
consolidated because of their lack of instruments guaranteeing political power 
not only to be vertically accountable through elections, but horizontally 
accountable through genuine representative institutions and effective checks 
and balances (O'Donnell, 1998). 
Judicial independence has been regarded by a significant corpus of 
research as the pillar for building the rule of law in third wave democracies 
(Diamond, 1994; LaPorta et al., 2003; Larkins, 1996; Prillaman, 2000; Ungar, 
2002). Establishing independent courts with real capacities for checking the 
other branches of government as well as for securing and enforcing citizen 
rights has been conceived by some scholars as the decisive factor to enhance 
the rule of law and, thus, to increase the prospects for a democracy to become 
consolidated. Accordingly, the establishment of wider constitutional review 
powers has been a central piece in the promotion of institutional 
arrangements more favourable for constructing judicial independence 
(Hammergren, 2002; LaPorta et al., 2003; Laver, 2011).  
The global spread of constitutional review has, like democratisation, gone 
through three different waves (Ginsburg, 2008). The first occurred in the late 
eighteenth and during the nineteenth centuries, and was especially inspired 
by the creation in the United States of judicial review as a result of the 
landmark decision its Supreme Court rendered in Marbury v. Madison8. The 
analysing different approaches developed to capture the concept, have proposed to abandon 
a broad, multidimensional notion of rule of law and replace it with individual concepts from 
which it is constituted.  
8 The origins of Marbury v. Madison go back to 1800 when Thomas Jefferson defeated 
incumbent John Adams in the presidential race. Lame-duck Adams nominated in December 
of that year John Marshall, his Secretary of State, as Chief Justice to the Supreme Court. 
Although the Senate ratified the nomination, Marshall remained in his administrative 
position until Jefferson’s inauguration. Later on, the lame-duck Congress passed the 
Judiciary Act of 1801, which created new courts and gave the president the right to appoint 
the corresponding new judges. During his last day in office, Adams appointed a group of 
federal judges but not all the appointments were delivered before the new administration 
came into office. Under the rules established by the 1801 Judiciary Act, William Marbury, 
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second wave took place particularly in Europe as a result of the adoption of 
the Austrian- Kelsenian model of abstract constitutional review (Kelsen, 1942). 
The third coincided with the wave of democratisation that started at a global 
level in the 1970s and has been the one specifically fostered by the promotion 
of judicial reform. As mentioned above, this expansion of constitutional 
review through judicial reform has been particularly noticeable in Latin 
America, where the institutional design of sixteen different countries was 
modified in the years comprising the period 1981-2001 -in 2005, seventeen 
countries in the region had adopted at least one constitutional review 
procedure, eleven of them three, four countries two, and only Argentina and 
Uruguay had just one (Navia and Rios-Figueroa, 2005).  
The analysis of the underpinnings of judicial reforms in countries in 
transition to democracy has provided evidence challenging the existence of an 
automatic connection between judicial independence and the rule of law 
(Helmke and Rosenbluth, 2009). Recent studies have pointed out that the 
origins of judicial reform in certain third wave democracies were more related 
to attempts by former rulers to establish friendly courts that might allow them 
to preserve their control over the most relevant aspects of law and policy 
processes, than with a genuine intention for contributing to the establishment 
of the rule of law (Ginsburg, 2003; Hirschl, 2004; Finkel, 2008).  
one of the judges whose appointments was not delivered, sued the new Secretary of the 
State, James Madison, provoking the Supreme Court presided by John Marshall to have 
jurisdiction upon the case. In February 1803, the Supreme Court handed down a decision 
written by Marshall that denied Marbury’s request asking the judicial body to issue a writ of 
mandamus ordering its nomination to be delivered. Nonetheless, the most relevant outcome 
of that ruling was a reasoning determining that the Supreme Court has the duty of 
reviewing the constitutionality of the legislation. Therefore, while invalidating the specific 
provisions included in the Judiciary Act of 1801 that provided the Supreme Court with the 
capacity to issue a writ of mandamus, Marbury v. Madison established the power of judicial 
review in the United States. As Graber puts it, this was the “the first case in which the 
Supreme Court explicitly declared a federal law unconstitutional and explained why the 
Constitution vested the federal judiciary with that authority” (1999: 28). 
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The notions of ‘insurance policy’ and ‘hegemonic preservation’, proposed 
by Ginsburg (2003)9 and Hirschl (2004)10 respectively, have provided 
persuasive arguments to understand why former rulers decided to promote 
reforms to limit themselves by giving courts wider constitutional review 
powers. According to these authors, the introduction of stronger forms of 
constitutional review through judicial reform has been possible in scenarios 
where both authoritarian rulers and opposition forces have chances to get 
benefits: the former securing the emergence of a friendly court, which could 
be determinant in protecting their interests in the case of a future defeat; 
while the latter gaining a new arena for advancing their agendas and policy 
goals.  
Broadly, judicial reform as ‘insurance policy’/’hegemonic preservation’ 
implies a logic where courts are tools for achieving stability and protecting 
certain policies and laws from majorities: those established under 
9 Tom Ginsburg, noticing that “it is not sufficient to describe constitutional review as a 
device to protect citizens from future politicians without explaining why it serves the 
interests of present politicians who serve as a veto gate for the constitutions” (2004: 23), 
explains that “by serving as an alternative forum in which to challenge government action, 
judicial review provides a form of insurance to prospective electoral losers during the 
constitutional bargain. Just as the presence of insurance markets lowers the risks of 
contracting, and therefore allows contracts to be concluded that otherwise would be too 
risky, so the possibility of judicial review lowers the risk of constitution making to those 
drafters who believe they may not win power. Judicial review thus helps to conclude 
constitutional bargains that might otherwise fail” (Ibid: 25).  
10 Ran Hirschl proposes the notion of self-interested ‘hegemonic preservation’ to explain the 
reasons that led to judicial empowerment through constitutionalisation. He explains that his 
explanation is based on four particular assumptions: “(1) the expansion of judicial power is 
an integral part and an important manifestation of the concrete, social, political and 
economic struggles that shape a given political system and cannot be understood in isolation 
from them; (2) the political origins of constitutional reform cannot be studied in isolation 
from the political origins of constitutional stalemate and stagnation; (3) other variables being 
equal, prominent political, economic and judicial actors are likely to favour the 
establishment of institutional structures that will benefit them the most; and (4) 
constitutions and judicial review hold no purse strings and have no independent 
enforcement power, but nonetheless limit the institutional flexibility of political decision 
makers (2004; 11). Accordingly, Hirschl asserts that “[T]he most plausible explanation for 
voluntary, self-imposed judicial empowerment is therefore that political, economic and legal 
power-holders who either initiate or refrain from blocking such reforms estimate that it 
serves their interests to abide by the limits imposed by increased judicial intervention in the 
political sphere” (Ibid).  
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authoritarian rule. This scenario, however, instead of being static is subject to 
the changes that the dynamics of democratisation produce. Certainly, judicial 
reform and the expansion of constitutional review have created a context 
more favourable for judicialisation to develop in third wave democracies. 
Judicialisation, or the process whereby courts and judges have gained an 
unprecedented capacity for shaping policy and law at the expense of 
legislative and executives (Ferejohn, 2002; Guarnieri and Pederzoli, 2002; 
Vallinder, 1994) has been attributed to different causes, from the rise of 
judicial activism (Smithey and Ishiyama, 2002) to the establishment of supra-
national judicial bodies (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998). 
In emerging democracies though, institutional and political factors seem 
to have been decisive to the advent of judicialisation. On the one hand, the 
adoption of broader constitutional review powers established by judicial 
reform has expanded the jurisdiction of courts to areas that were previously 
considered the exclusive realm of the so-called representative branches 
(Koopmans, 2003; Shapiro, 2002). On the other, democratisation caused 
political power to become less centralised, thus creating more complex 
scenarios for the creation and implementation of law and policy (Ferejohn, 
2002). 
In the case of Latin America, different studies have tested the ‘insurance 
policy’/’hegemonic preservation’ and the ‘democratisation’ hypotheses. Finkel 
(2008), in a piece of research analysing the judicial reforms processes in 
Argentina, Mexico and Peru, found that former rulers did promote changes to 
the judicial system as a hegemonic preservation strategy. A different strand of 
research, focused on the operation of courts rather than the underpinnings of 
judicial reform, has regarded the political context as a decisive factor fostering 
the development of more independent judiciaries (Ansolabehere, 2007; 
Domingo, 2000; Scribner, 2010; Magaloni and Sanchez, 2006; Rios Figueroa, 
2007).  
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The field of comparative judicial politics has substantially developed over 
the last two decades providing a more robust understanding of judicial 
independence and, in general, the performance of courts in democracy. This 
evolution has permitted researchers working in this field to produce 
persuasive and increasingly sophisticated explanations about independence as 
autonomy from the other branches of government, and as impartiality from 
the parties involved in the cases justices have at hand (Rios Figueroa, 2006). 
Nonetheless, as Kapiszewski and Taylor (2008) have underlined, there is still a 
lack of research devoted to analysing the role of legal institutions on the 
performance of courts and judges, the aftermath of judicial decisions, as well 
as on the changes in regime dynamics judicialisation and the new role of 
courts might be producing. Moreover, despite the special attention the 
literature has paid to tenure as source of judicial autonomy (Feld and Voigt, 
2003; LaPorta et al., 2003; Rios Figueroa and Staton, 2008), there still exists the 
need to develop a more in-depth understanding of the effects of formal legal 
rules on high courts’ judges performances.   
The purpose of this research is to provide a systematic and comprehensive 
account of why courts established under authoritarian rule become effective 
policy-makers in democracy by analysing the case of Mexico in-depth. To 
provide this comprehensive explanation, this research seeks not only to assess 
the effects of democracy and institutional change on the performance of 
courts, but also to provide an explanation of how legal institutions such as 
precedent and the rules of standing determine decision-making, as well as 
how these institutions are employed by judges to produce both short and 
long-term outcomes. Overall, this research aims to gather solid, original 
evidence and reach robust findings in order to contribute to the debate 
regarding how policy-making courts are influencing regime dynamics in 
countries where judicialisation and democratisation have converged.   
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1.2 Constitutional Judicial Review and Policy-Making  
In The Federalist No. 78 Alexander Hamilton described the judiciary as the 
‘least dangerous branch’ since, unlike the executive and legislatives, “[it] has 
no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution 
whatever” (Hamilton, 2008 [1788]: 380). It is true that the absence of direct 
control over the sword or the purse limits the enforcement power of courts 
but this, as this section will explain, by no means indicates that they do not 
have the capacity for exercising political power and creating rules that 
become of general application.  
The understanding of courts as policy-makers has been the subject of a 
significant debate about whether they are institutions limited to arbitrate 
conflict by simply interpreting law or, as legislators and executives, principals 
with powers for developing public policy (Gerhardt, 2008). This debate is 
linked to other discussions, from the abstract examination of the very nature 
of law and its impact on the activity of judging (Cardozo, 1921; Dworkin, 1978; 
Hart, 1965; Posner, 1993), to more practical considerations about whether 
judicial rulings have the efficacy needed to constitute policies (Feeley and 
Rubin, 2000; Schubert and Shapiro, 1974; Tarr, 2009).  
Among all issues involved in this debate, there are two particularly 
relevant to this thesis: the divergence in the conceptualisation of policy itself 
and the controversy surrounding the capacity of courts to produce effective 
policy decisions. In social science literature the term ‘policy’ is employed to 
denote a collection of different questions: government measures, legal 
dispositions, ideological orientations, to name just a few. This problem of 
conceptualising ‘policy’ is present in the judicial politics literature and is 
particularly linked to a debate regarding the empirical analysis of the policy 
content implied in judicial rulings.  
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In order to provide a more detailed conceptualisation of policy, this thesis 
relies on the distinction developed by Page (2008) that, by differentiating 
between ‘policies’ as ‘intentions’ from ‘policies’ as ‘actions’, proposes four 
levels of abstraction from which the concept can be comprehended: a) 
‘principles’, or general views regarding how public issues should be 
conducted; b) ‘policy lines’, or the strategies related to such specific public 
issues; c) ‘measures’, or the concrete instruments that display policy lines; d) 
‘practices’, or the behaviour of the officials in charge of putting into effect 
policy measures. The four levels distinguished by Page underline the degree of 
specificity of the action/intention needed as what ‘policy’ refers to is a crucial 
aspect to understanding its meaning. It can at the same time refer to either an 
ideological perspective towards public affairs or to a very specific measure 
created to deal with a concrete, narrowly defined issue. This distinction 
proves particularly enlightening for this thesis as it provides a plausible 
framework to explain in what ways judicial rulings involve making a policy 
decision.  
The second issue is the controversy regarding the capacity of courts to 
produce effective policy decisions. On one hand, it has been claimed that 
courts lack real enforcement powers, so they have to rely on other public 
institutions to have their decisions complied with (Rosenberg, 2008). On the 
other hand, it has been considered that the scope of action for courts to make 
policy is restricted by the judicial process design, where the rules determining 
agenda-setting, monitoring and information capacities are established 
(McGuire, 2006).  
Certainly, courts do rely on other authorities to make their decisions 
enforceable. However, as they have the capacity to establish authoritative 
rules, for example through declarations of unconstitutionality and precedents, 
they are also in a position to establish formal and persuasive policies that 
encourage social and political actors to follow them in order to avoid further 
inconveniences such as constant legal battles over repeated matters. 
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Furthermore, courts are able to track the evolution of law in a series of cases; 
they also have competences -like certiorari11- which, by allowing judges to 
select cases and thus the policy areas where they want to get involved, grants 
them substantial agenda-setting capacities; finally, they frequently gain access 
to relevant information that reduces uncertainty in their decision-making 
processes.  
Courts are policy-makers in the sense that they do have the capacity to 
exercise political power to benefit one of the parties involved in a legal 
conflict but also to establish rules susceptible to becoming binding not just for 
the parties in a specific conflict. As policy-seekers, judges employ the different 
tools they have available to minimise political costs, simultaneously seeking to 
maximise the effects of their decisions (Epstein and Knight, 1998). The 
relevant question, thus, is to determine how judicial policy-making is 
materialised through the decisions courts render to the cases at hand.  
According to Dahl, a policy decision is “an effective choice among 
alternatives about which there is, at least initially some uncertainty” (1957: 
279). The essence of adjudication –the primary function of courts- is to settle 
specific disputes and define the party that prevails (McGuire, 2006). In this 
sense, judicial rulings constitute policy decisions insofar as they involve 
making effective choices among alternatives that constitute specific measures 
to which the parties in conflict are bound to follow. Furthermore, the ways 
legal systems operate determine the possibility for judicial rulings to produce 
effects that transcend the parties in conflict and become generally applicable 
rules (Stone Sweet, 2002).  
The judgements courts render to constitutional review cases produce two 
main policy outcomes: a specific disposition settling a legal dispute and a 
reason supporting such a disposition. By establishing a concrete, particular 
11 The writ of certiorari is the procedure in the United States that allows the parties involved 
in a trial to request the Supreme Court to bring a case before its jurisdiction (Thompson and 
Wachtell, 2009). 
27 
                                              
and retrospective rule (a disposition), courts define between the parties 
involved in the case the one that prevails; whereas by justifying the reasons 
that support such dispositions courts create another rule, this one of an 
abstract, general and prospective nature (Hansford and Spriggs, 2006). Hence, 
constitutional review allows court to perform two core policy-making roles: 
arbitration through the dispositions they establish, and rule-making through 
the rules founding such dispositions that become of general application.  
In the case of courts performing the arbitration and rule-making roles 
constitutional review allows for them to have the capacity to make three 
levels of policy decisions. The dispositions established in the cases at hand 
constitute measures binding for the parties implied in those specific legal 
cases. Dispositions therefore are the most blatant evidence of a courts’ policy-
making role. However, under certain institutional frameworks judicial 
decisions have the potential of turning into principles -such as establishing 
that right to life must be protected from conception - or policy lines –such as 
determining that the protection of the right to hearing in expropriations has 
to be guaranteed before the consummation of the taking.  
Consider for example, three landmark decisions by the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Marbury v. Madison, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
and Roe v. Wade12. In all these three cases, the most relevant outcome was not 
the short-term disposition but the long-term, generally applicable rule that 
emerged from them (i.e. the creation of judicial review and invalidation of 
both de jure racial segregation and performance of induced abortions). The 
judicial process in the United States allows the Supreme Court to make such 
far-reaching decisions, first, because the regulations regarding the access to 
courts (standing) permit the extensive use of litigation in a vast array of legal 
12 Marbury v. Madison was already explained in supra note 7. In Brown vs. Board of Education, 
the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional all state laws establishing public 
schools for black students and others for white students (Kluger, 2011), while in Roe v. Wade, 
it disallowed the establishment of certain state and federal restrictions on abortion matters 
(Epstein and Kobylka, 1992).  
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matters; and second, because the formal and informal rules governing the 
effects of judicial rulings gave the precedent the authority required to do so.  
The institutional design of constitutional review is decisive for judicial 
policy-making because it shapes both the scope of action of courts over 
specific policy issues and their power to generate effects beyond concrete 
cases. In particular, two elements are more relevant to explain at this stage of 
this work (chapter two develops a more detailed analysis on this matter): the 
access to courts implied in the rules of standing, the allocation of 
constitutional review of courts in one or multiple jurisdictions, and the 
capacity of their rulings to produce general effects. The possibility for courts 
to make policy decisions depends on the cases presented to their jurisdiction, 
so they largely rely on the use of litigation to assume a position of producing 
outcomes of a rule-making nature. In like manner, the capacity of their rulings 
to produce policy effects largely leans on the capacity of their interpretations 
of constitution and law to turn into generally applicable rules.  
In the first place, to clarify the relevance of legal standing, consider again 
the case of the United States. In that country the de-criminalisation of 
abortion resulting from Roe v. Wade was possible only after a constant, 
gradual and strategic use of litigation (Epstein and Kobylka, 1992). The 
relevance of litigation and its relationship to the rules of standing has been 
interpreted as decisive for the consolidation of the United States Supreme 
Court as a national policy-maker. In his study of the role of the Supreme 
Court during the nineteenth century, Gillman explained the Republican Party 
employed federal courts “to promote and entrench a policy of economic 
nationalism during a time when the agenda was vulnerable to electoral 
politics” (2002: 511). By the same token, Whittington has also shown that in 
the United States “when current elected officials are obstructed from fully 
implementing their own policy agendas, they may favour the active exercise 
of constitutional review by a sympathetic judiciary to overcome those 
obstructions and disrupt the status quo” (2005: 583). 
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In the case of Latin America, recent studies have suggested that changes 
in the rules of standing have, in the last decades, fostered the use of courts by 
civil society in matters as different as public health (Langston, 2006), housing 
(Cook, 1993), indigenous rights (Sieder, 2007) and gay rights (Undurraga and 
Cook, 2010). Both the evidence regarding the United States and Latin America 
illustrate that not only does judicial policy-making rely on inputs from social 
and political actors, but also on the incentives these actors have for resorting 
to courts. Certainly, litigation can be employed by public authorities to 
delegate controversial policy decisions to judicial institutions, but also by 
social and economic actors to either promote or contend the application of 
equally relevant policies.  
In the end, the capacity of courts to make policy largely depends on 
contextual and institutional factors like those which democratisation and 
judicial reform create by implying, respectively, a process whereby political 
power becomes less concentrated and more accountable, and the 
incorporation of a new framework for the use of constitutional review. On 
one hand, democratisation has not only increased the incentives political and 
social actors have for introducing political conflict into the courtroom, but 
those of judges composing courts in charge of constitutional review to engage 
in more proactive policy-making decisions (Helmke, 2005; Iaryczower et al., 
2002; Rios Figueroa, 2007). On the other hand, judicial reform has established a 
new framework that has produced effects within and without the judicial 
realm.  
For instance, using game theory both Vanberg (1998) and Shipan (2000) 
argue that the capacity to litigate at the constitutional level has provoked 
legislators to change their behaviour in legislative bargaining processes under 
the assumption that they have stronger tools for reacting to eventual majority 
decisions. In the same vein, Stone Sweet (2000) has concluded that the 
expansion of constitutional review has strengthened courts as it has also 
empowered those actors holding the legal standing to submit constitutional 
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claims. From a different perspective, in an analysis of the case of the United 
States, Smith has underlined that “members of Congress strategically 
manipulate statutory rules governing the role of courts in regulatory 
policymaking to help their political supporters and to advance their own 
policy goals” (2005: 139). By the same token, Howard (2007) has claimed that 
in more conservative times the congress of the United States has also 
encouraged taxpayers to sue in the courts.  
Turning to the generalizability of judicial rulings, it is important to bear in 
mind that in constitutional review cases they have the capacity to establish 
two interrelated outcomes in rule-making terms. First, judicial rulings can 
produce inter partes (‘between the parties’) or erga omnes (‘towards everyone’) 
effects, meaning that formal dispositions established in case can be applicable 
just to the actors involved or to the society in general. In constitutional review 
cases, however, courts are confronted with cases that involve two parties in 
conflict, but which also imply a question over the constitutionality of a 
specific piece of legislation or government act. Hence, when courts can render 
erga omnes rulings they have the power to act as negative legislators defining 
whether a legal act or norm is compatible with the constitution as supreme 
rule. This power gives them considerable influence over the rule-making 
processes undertaken in given polity and thus an equal chance to play a 
meaningful policy-making role.  
The effects of judicial rulings, however, are not only restricted by the 
dispositions defining that they can be either inter partes or erga omnes. They 
also depend on the formal and informal rules establishing the authority of 
judicial precedents. In common law systems, the principle of stare decisis 
determines that, in order to guarantee equality before the law and legal 
uniformity, similar cases must be solved according to the precedent 
established in previous cases (Bankowski et al., 1997). In practice, stare decisis 
enhances the authority of precedent, expanding their scope of influence 
beyond the specificities of a given case (Shapiro, 1972).  
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Over the last decades, however, the convergence of civil and common law 
systems (Del Duca, 1991; Markesinis, 1994; Merryman, 1985) –which has 
included the aforementioned global expansion of constitutional review- 
contributed to vanishing the difference in the way judicial precedents operate 
in either of them. In spite of the formal rules governing the effects of judicial 
rulings, precedents in civil law systems have in practice gained an authority, 
which in some cases resembles the way precedents operate in common law 
countries. The relevance of precedents and, in general, the significance of the 
effects of judicial rulings, contrasts with the lack of empirical research that 
has been produced on the subject. In the case of Mexico, this thesis 
particularly seeks to test if, together with the invigoration of constitutional 
review from judicial reform, precedent has become a tool employed by the 
Supreme Court to more proactively get involved in the making of policy.  
To sum up: courts are policy-makers as they have the capacity to exercise 
political power to determine the parties that prevail in legal disputes but also 
to advance the policy goals of the judges composing them. Constitutional 
review expands their scope for making policy because it does not only imply 
for them the ability to establish a disposition determining the winner of a 
legal case but to define whether legislation and government action is 
compatible with constitutional norms. By deciding constitutional review 
cases, courts interpret the constitution and establish rules founding the 
dispositions established in the cases they have at hand. Such rules have, under 
certain institutional arrangements, the power to produce general effects and 
become norms of general application. Altogether, courts with constitutional 
review powers have the capacity to play two interrelated policy-making roles: 
arbitration and rule-making. The way they play such roles in practice largely 
depends on institutional factors such as those that judicial reform have 
substantially modified in Latin America; and also on contextual factors like 
those that democratisation has been transforming in the polities where this 
process has taken place.  
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1.3 Decision-Making and Policy-Making by Courts 
In the last century, legal and social science scholarship has extensively 
researched law and courts. From this empirical endeavour persuasive 
conclusions challenging the description of the judiciary as ‘the least 
dangerous branch’ that Alexander Hamilton delivered by the time the 
Constitution of the United States was in the process of drafting have emerged. 
Courts might have no direct control over the sword or the purse but, as the 
previous section explained, they do have the capacity to accomplish policy 
goals.  
The influence and visibility the Supreme Court enjoys in the United States 
has encouraged different generations of political science scholars to dedicate 
considerable efforts to examine from an empirical perspective the role courts 
play in the political system. Seminal works within this field, approaching 
judging as an inherently political task rather than as an exclusively law-
applying activity, provided relevant insights for the comprehension of courts, 
for instance, revealing judges as policy-seeking and ideologically-oriented 
players (Pritchett, 1948), which interact with each other and hand down 
decisions in strategic ways in order to achieve self-interested goals (Murphy, 
1973).  
The evolution of political science as a discipline has shaped the way 
courts and, in general, all the institutions of law are conceived and empirically 
surveyed (Epstein and Knight, 2000; Smith, 1988; Whittington, 2000). The 
‘behavioural revolution’ the discipline experienced in the 1950s (Almond, 
1989) influenced judicial politics scholars to change the focus from the 
examination of courts as institutions, to the analysis of judges as individuals 
(Baum, 1994; Graber, 2005). This shift in the development of judicial studies 
fostered the emergence of methodologically more sophisticated approaches 
that shed light on ideological and strategic factors determining individual-
level decisions but that failed to provide an account of the role of formal and 
informal institutions on judicial decision-making (Gillman, 2001). The 
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reassessment of the formal and informal rules new-institutionalism brought 
about in social sciences (Peters 2003), led to the consolidation of three 
dominant explanations of judicial decision-making: the attitudinal, strategic 
and legal models (Baum, 1997; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006; Maltzman et al., 
2000). 
The first one, drawing on Herman Pritchett’s study of the United States 
Supreme Court (1948), has in general been characterised by advancing a 
conception of judicial decision making as the product of individual decisions’ 
aggregation based on personal values and ideological orientations (Segal and 
Spaeth, 1992). By employing game theory and inferential statistics, attitudinal 
scholars have, for example, claimed that the justices’ perceived ideology 
before confirmation processes is highly correlated with their votes once they 
come to the bench (Jeffrey A Segal and Cover 1989). Attitudinal scholars do 
not completely deny the effects of the environment on decision-making, but 
they do consider it is primarily and fundamentally driven by ideology (Segal 
and Spaeth, 2002).  
The strategic model shares with the attitudinal a conception of judging as 
a self-interested and utility-maximizing activity but differs on the role of 
institutions in shaping decision-making. Strategic scholars consider that 
judges’ own policy preferences do explain judicial behaviour but that they are 
also constrained by both the institutional context where they interact and by 
the environment surrounding courts. Accordingly, judicial decisions are 
shaped by the rules governing the interaction among justices, the assessments 
they make regarding external factors such as public opinion (Mishler and 
Sheehan, 1993), or the correlation of forces in the other branches of 
government (Epstein and Knight, 1998).  
The legal model is less decision-centred than the attitudinal and strategic 
ones, but more connected to political regimes’ dynamics (Clayton and May, 
1999; Gillman, 2001) and historical institutionalism (Smith, 1988; Whittington, 
2009). Legal principles established in constitutions, statutes and precedents 
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constrain behaviour, providing judges with a limited scope for deciding the 
cases at hand. Legal-model scholars do admit strategy is a force behind 
decision-making, but interpret it as a tool judges use to enhance coherence in 
the law (Baum, 2006).  
Despite the theoretical and methodological differences among these three 
models, they all depart from the same premise: explaining judicial decision-
making is fundamental because the outputs of courts are equally relevant in 
policy terms. Indeed, as Dahl (1957) put it in a seminal work focused on the 
United States experience, to conceive of courts as mere legal institutions is to 
underestimate the role they play as policy-makers. Researching the policy-
making by courts implies the challenge of determining where exactly the 
policy content is located in lengthy and technical judicial rulings. Instead of 
dealing with this issue and constructing reliable and valid measures of policy 
content, judicial politics scholars have predominantly opted to employ the 
ideological direction of courts’ rulings as a proxy for the rationale of the 
decision (McGuire et al., 2009). In the end, the emphasis that the judicial 
politics literature has made in explaining the process of judicial decision-
making rather than its outcomes turns out to be paradoxical, to say the least.  
Comparative judicial politics is a subfield that, as mentioned earlier, has 
flourished in the last twenty-five years (Ferejohn et al., 2004; Kapiszewski and 
Taylor, 2008). As the literature focused on the study of judicialisation has 
made evident, among the results of this comparative quest is a reinvigoration 
of research on the policy outcomes by courts. Although primarily devoted to 
explaining the process rather than the outcome, the judicial decision-making 
literature has delivered important theoretical and methodological insights for 
the emerging comparative study of courts. For the purpose of this thesis the 
theoretical foundations of the strategic model are particularly illuminating 
because they allow for three intriguing elements that may have had an effect 
in the Mexican case to be accounted for: the influence of individual-level 
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factors, the effects of formal and informal institutions and the impact of the 
political environment.  
The first element is implied in the premise mentioned above: courts are 
important in policy terms because their decisions produce effects on society. 
Judges are policy-makers because, regardless of the forces determining their 
decisions, they are aware of their influence. This thesis in particular agrees 
with the strategic model and the premise that judges make decisions seeking 
to advance and maximise their own policy goals (Epstein and Knight, 1998). 
They behave strategically in order to attain such goals, but in the end 
individual-level features are factors that vitally determine their behaviour and, 
thus, shape judicial outcomes. Nonetheless, rather than focusing on 
ideological orientations, this dissertation embraces the idea that experience 
(from a more stable composition) constitutes a factor that greatly affects the 
behaviour of judges. Judges as members of collegial decision-making bodies 
become more prone to proactively seek to advance their own policy goals as 
they gain more experience on the bench13.  
Second, under the influence of new-institutionalism (Peters, 2001), the 
literature on decision-making has paid special attention to formal and 
informal rules (Clayton & Gillman, 1999). Among all the institutional features 
this corpus of research has raised, the notion of law as indeterminate that is 
implicit in several strategic studies, and the centrality conceded to the rules 
governing adjudication, both contribute to the theoretical and methodological 
foundations in this thesis. In the first place, strategists advance a concept of 
law as an element exogenous to decision-making; the studies embracing this 
approach tacitly concede that judges have a great deal of autonomy from legal 
norms when deciding a case. Strategists tacitly embrace a conception of law as 
an element essentially indeterminate. In other words, in this literature law is 
13 The goal of this thesis, however, is not to conduct an individual-level analysis of Mexico’s 
Supreme Court Justices but to provide an account of the way factors such as experience and 
stability shape the performance of the Supreme Court as institution.   
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indeterminate in the sense that norms do not provide a univocal response to a 
legal dilemma, but also that such norms do not fully explain why judges 
decide in the ways that they do (Leiter, 2005) 14.  
The indeterminacy hypothesis is pertinent for this thesis because it 
establishes a connection between the evidence that this study seeks to provide 
with a wider discussion not only regarding courts but also about the very 
nature of law and its effects. This element is particularly interesting because, 
as will be analysed in the final chapter, judicial politics is distinguished for 
being a field prolific in empirical terms but one that has faced obstacles to 
develop a robust theoretical framework, particularly regarding its 
foundational concepts and premises (Graber, 2002).  
Studies developed using a strategic framework have highlighted the 
relevance that the rules of the game have in decision-making and thus in the 
outcomes that courts produce. Within this strand of research, separation-of-
powers approaches have paid remarkable attention to the institutional design 
of constitutional judicial review because the rules it establishes greatly 
determine the capacity the different branches of government have for 
overriding the decisions of the others (Dahl, 1957; Eskridge Jr, 1991; Ferejohn 
and Weingast, 1992).  
The separation-of-powers approach has been successfully applied in 
studies analysing Latin American courts, such as those by Helmke (2005) and 
Iaryczower et al (2002) regarding the Argentinean experience, and by Scribner 
(2010) and Rodriguez-Raga (2011) respectively devoted to the study of 
14 The concept of legal indeterminacy, proposed and endorsed by critical legal theorists, 
considers that “in any legal dispute with some social significance, whether that significance 
arises from the legal rules at issue or from the problem generating the dispute, the legal 
resources available in any reasonably well-developed legal system were sufficient to justify 
any socially significant outcome, where justify refers to practices of justification generally 
regarded as available to a person well-trained in the system’s methods of legal argument” 
(Tushnet, 2005: 81-82).  The relevance of raising this notion originated in legal theory is that 
the analysis of courts from political science still lacks solid discussion regarding the 
implications of its claim in connection to the more general debates in legal theory.  
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constitutional courts in Chile and Colombia. The utility of this approach is 
that it allows researchers to consider the influence of different rules operating 
in the changing political environment which democratisation implies. In other 
words, the separation-of-powers approach does not only offer a good 
framework for understanding the effects of institutional change (i.e. judicial 
reform) but also for determining those created by the political environment 
(i.e. democratisation).  In the case of Mexico, this framework is particularly 
useful to account for the effects of different forms of political fragmentation 
(from democratisation) in both the use of litigation by actors interacting in a 
more competitive environment and the policy-making by the Supreme Court.  
To sum up: The relevance of courts as policy-making institutions has 
motivated different generations of scholars to research them. Ironically, 
however, instead of focusing on the policy outcomes produced by them, the 
judicial politics literature has concentrated its efforts on explaining decision-
making in these collegial bodies. The literature on judicial decision-making 
has provided significant contributions for the study of courts, particularly 
related to the role of institutions and political environments as determinants 
of judicial decisions. Although originally intended to explain behaviour, the 
ideas advanced by the scholars explaining decision-making from a strategic 
approach have advanced persuasive arguments susceptible to be adapted to 
explain policy-making by courts. This thesis builds upon this literature to 
explain why the Mexican Supreme Court has turned into a more effective 
player in policy-making terms.  
1.4 The Supreme Court and Policy-Making in Mexico 
Mexico has significantly changed since the nationalisation of the banking 
system. It has gradually become a democratic regime with competitive 
elections, alternation in national and state governments, and an increasing 
pluralism within federal and state congresses (Lujambio, 2000). For instance, it 
passed from having a hegemonic-party system to become a competitive three-
38 
party system with alternation in the presidency as well as in more than half of 
the 32 states. The PRI lost in 1988 the two-thirds qualified majority required to 
pass constitutional amendments, creating the first scenario where the 
declining hegemonic party was required to negotiate with the opposition to 
promote their policy agenda. The political system underwent an equally 
substantial transformation in 1997 when the PRI lost the majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies. Since then no single-party has managed to gain the 
majority in Congress and, as a result, presidents and their parties have had no 
other option but to negotiate legislation with opposition parties. 
Democratisation inaugurated a new era for representative executive and 
legislative institutions as genuine sources of policy and law, prompting 
political actors to legislate on issues as controversial as abortion for example. 
As political power became more fragmented, the mechanisms of 
presidencialismo for processing political conflict became less effective. In this 
context the Supreme Court has emerged as a more visible political referee in 
charge of solving the legal disputes arising among an increasing number of 
more influential political players. This new role has certainly deserved 
renewed attention from social science. Still, there has not been a systematic 
and comprehensive account of its emergence as a source of policy and law.  
On the 5th of December 1994, four days after taking office, Ernesto Zedillo, 
the last of the thirteen consecutive presidents to govern Mexico emerging 
from the PRI15, promoted the complete redesign of the Supreme Court of 
Justice that reduced its size from 26 to 11 justices and provided it with 
unprecedented wide-ranging constitutional review powers (Cossio Diaz, 2002; 
15 The Revolutionary Institutional Party was created in 1929 as the National Revolutionary 
Party. Under this name it participated in the general elections of 1930 and 1934. In 1938 the 
National Revolutionary Party became the Party of the Mexican Revolution and eight years 
later, in 1946, it finally became the Revolutionary Institutional Party. The count of the 
presidencies began with Pascual Ortiz Rubio, the first president elected after the creation of 
the National Revolutionary Party, and concluded with Zedillo, who took office in 1994.  
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Fix-Fierro, 2003)16. Zedillo, however, left the operation of this body in the 
hands of 11 justices nominated by him and appointed by a Senate controlled 
by his party17. The Supreme Court gained the power to strike down legislation 
with general effects when the reform came in to force on the first day of 1995. 
However, the Supreme Court only employed this new power in June 1997, in 
the 78th case filed since its renovation, the first one submitted by president 
Zedillo.  
The 1994 judicial reform significantly expanded the scope of 
constitutional review in Mexico, a function until then primarily carried out 
through the juicio de amparo, a procedure intended to enforce fundamental 
rights, which allows only individual petitions and that produces only inter 
partes effects (Zamora et al., 2004). In the first place, the reform created the 
action of unconstitutionality as the procedure whereby political actors could 
challenge the constitutionality of the laws passed by federal and legislative 
bodies (standing was given originally to legislative minorities and the 
Attorney General. Political parties and federal and state human rights 
commissions gained this ability in 1996 and 2006, respectively). Secondly, the 
reform also undertook a significant renovation of the constitutional 
controversy, a procedure intended to settle the disputes proper of the federal 
system. In particular, the reform expanded legal standing, which under the 
16 The Bill of Reforms to the Organs of Federal Judicial Branch submitted by President Zedillo 
to the Senate on the 5th of December of 1994 explicitly stated that “a Supreme Court of 
Justice free, autonomous, strengthened and of excellence, is essential for the complete 
validity of the Constitution and of the rule of law enshrined in it (…) The strength, 
autonomy and interpretative capacity of the Supreme Court of Justice are essential for the 
adequate operation of the democratic regime and of the whole justice system (…) To 
consolidate the Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court requires the provision of more 
authority to its decisions; to expand its jurisdiction to issue declarations of 
unconstitutionality with general effects in order to solve controversies among authorities 
from the thee levels of government and become the guardian of federalism”. Translated from 
Spanish from Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996).  
17 In 1994, the PRI was in control of 94 out of the 128 seats of the Senate, nine more than the 
minimum needed to meet the two-third majority required for appointing justices. In spite of 
this fact, according to the information published in Magaloni et al. (2011), 7 out of the 11 
justices were appointed with the support of the 25 senators from the PAN.  
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original 1917 Constitution was exclusive of national and subnational public 
institutions, to municipal authorities.  
The Supreme Court emerged from the 1994 judicial reform as a more 
compact and powerful decision body, combining functions of last resort courts 
with others typical of constitutional courts. Only 63 constitutional 
controversies were filed in the Supreme Court before the reform came in to 
force on the first day of 1995 (Cossio Diaz, 2008); since then, a vast array of 
political actors have submitted more than two-thousand constitutional 
demands. As a result, a judicialisation process emerged creating a context 
more suitable for the emergence of a policy-making Supreme Court.  
The literature on Mexican judicial politics has traditionally depicted the 
Supreme Court as a discreet political actor. Although some studies have 
claimed that the performance of the Supreme Court and in general of the 
federal judiciary had a certain degree of autonomy in Mexico’s contemporary 
history (Gonzalez Casanova, 1967; Schwarz, 1972) the dominant perception of 
the role the Supreme Court played in the authoritarian period is of a weak 
institution, subordinated to presidential power (Magaloni, 2003; Magaloni, 
2008), that lacked the appropriate tools to become an influential policy-maker 
(Cossio Diaz, 2002; Zamora and Cossio Diaz, 2006) and which was, most of the 
time, a source of legitimacy of the undemocratic regime (Domingo, 2000).  
As in the case of other emerging democracies, the literature on Mexican 
judicial politics has in recent years addressed the question of why 
authoritarian rulers undermined their own power by strengthening the 
Supreme Court with stronger constitutional review powers. In the case of 
Mexico there has been some debate about the suitability of ‘insurance 
policy’/’hegemonic preservation’ as explanation of what occurred in 1994 with 
the judicial reform. Whereas some authors have argued that instead of being 
an insurance policy the 1994 judicial reform was intended to promote 
confidence in political and economic sectors, particularly after the signing of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (Domingo, 2000; Inclan, 2004); 
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other scholars have disputed this perspective claiming that Zedillo and the PRI 
endorsed the reform in order to set up a powerful but loyal judiciary (Finkel, 
2008; Magaloni and Sanchez, 2008; Magaloni and Sanchez, 2001)18.   
The literature that has been focused on the analysis of the consequences 
rather than on the underpinnings of the 1994 judicial reform has 
predominantly explored the relationship between the changes in the political 
environment and the decision-making process in the Supreme Court. The 
positive effect of political pluralism on the development of a more active court 
has been a common conclusion in this corpus of research. In an article 
analysing the constitutional cases adjudicated between 1995 and 2003, Rios 
Figueroa (2007) shows that the probability of the Court ruling against the PRI 
has increased as political fragmentation at the federal level –in terms of 
divided government and alternation in the presidency- has also increased. 
This analysis allows this author to conclude that political fragmentation was 
decisive for the Supreme Court to emerge as an effective decision making 
body in Mexico.  
On the other hand, in a study also analysing constitutional cases but in 
the period 1995-2006, Magaloni and Sanchez (2006) found that both before and 
after alternation in the presidency the Supreme Court has been inclined to 
rule in favour of the PRI, particularly in highly salient cases, and, on the 
contrary it has tended to strike down laws by non-PRI-controlled institutions. 
18 The 1994 judicial reform was certainly related to an insurance policy / hegemonic 
preservation strategy, but as will be explained in more detail in chapter 2, it was also linked 
to factors of other kind. The interviews conducted for this thesis provided evidence 
confirming that, as authors like Inclan (2004) have claimed, economic factors and the search 
for legitimacy were also determinants for the emergence of the reform. In particular, two 
privileged actors of the process mentioned that there was also an interest within the 
Supreme Court to acquire stronger tools to deal with its increasing number of more complex 
cases. According to these key actors, by the time the reform was being analysed, high-
ranking judicial officials approached members of the by then hegemonic Institutional 
Revolutionary Party in order to extend the influence of the judicial branch on the nature and 
scope of the reform.  
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In a 2011 article that employs virt10ually the same evidence, these authors -
now in collaboration with Magar - provide a more detailed account (Magaloni 
et al., 2011). First, they argue that from 2000 the probability of the Supreme 
Court invalidating by means of the action of unconstitutionality procedure 
has considerably increased. Second, they hold that for constitutional 
controversies the Supreme Court has continued being biased in favour of the 
formerly hegemonic PRI. Third, through an individual-level analysis of non-
unanimous decisions they argue justices’ preferences have gone through an 
important realignment along a legalism-interpretativism dimension.  
To some degree, there is a consensus in the scholarship devoted to the 
analysis of Mexican judicial politics about the effects of democratisation on 
the Supreme Court’s decision-making. However, this consensus has not been 
accompanied by an agreement around partisan bias and autonomy. Besides, 
little attention has been paid to the effects of the transformation within the 
Supreme Court on its own decision-making processes. Additionally, in 
methodological terms there has been a reductionist conception of judicial 
rulings as sum-zero outcomes that affect only the parties in conflict. 
Altogether, the literature on Mexican judicial politics has fallen in to the same 
paradox as the one analysing the United States case: it has researched the 
Supreme Court because it is important in policy terms, but has not provided 
an in-depth account of its policy-making role.  
As mentioned above, by using Mexico as a case study, this thesis aims to 
provide a comprehensive account of why courts established under 
authoritarian rule become effective policy-makers. In so doing, it does not 
only seek to assess the effects of democracy and institutional change on the 
performance of courts, but also to provide an explanation of how legal 
institutions such as precedent and the rules of standing determine decision-
making, as well as how these institutions are employed by judges to produce 
both short and long-term outcomes. Building upon the comparative judicial 
politics literature -particularly the one targeting Mexico – this research seeks 
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to explain how the convergence of institutional change (from judicial reform) 
with political fragmentation (from democratisation) affected the Supreme 
Court so as to emerge as the effective policy-maker it has become.  
To achieve such a goal, this thesis aims to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of policy-making by courts, including an examination of the 
different elements courts have to arbitrate political conflict as well as to 
establish long-term rules. Overall, this research aims to contribute with 
original evidence to the debate regarding how policy-making courts are 
influencing regime dynamics in countries where judicialisation and 
democratisation have converged.   
1.5 Research Strategy 
Why do courts established under authoritarian regimes become effective 
policy-makers in democracy? The hypothesis this thesis aims to explore is 
that the emergence of an effective policy-making court results from the 
convergence of institutional change (from judicial reform), political 
fragmentation (from democratisation), as well as from the experience gained 
by justices holding unprecedented constitutional review powers. The 
arguments supporting this hypothesis are that institutional change set a new 
framework for the activity of the Supreme Court; political fragmentation 
triggered the use of constitutional review by political actors; and experience 
prompted justices to more proactively seek to advance their policy goals.  
In order to address the explanatory nature of the question and hypothesis 
guiding this research, it is fundamental to clarify the choices made about its 
scope and breadth, as well as of the methodological approach and tools 
employed to gather and analyse evidence regarding the performance of courts. 
This section explains why such specific choices were made and how they 
provide this research with the internal and external validity required for this 
research to deliver, by using descriptive and causal inferences, robust 
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conclusions and insightful contributions not only to the subfield of 
comparative judicial politics but also to the Mexican politics literature (Collier 
et al., 2004; King et al., 2001).  
First, the objective of this thesis is to provide an in-depth explanatory 
account of judicial policy-making by courts in new democracies, so it opted to 
undertake “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of 
understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004: 342). The 
decision to select a case study to address the research question relies on the 
fact that, albeit making more complex its external validity (generalisation), 
this method allows one to conduct an in-depth understanding of the factors 
and causal mechanisms involved in a research problem, thus enhancing the 
internal validity of a research study. Following Gerring (2007), this research 
conducts a diachronic within-case analysis by researching different subunits 
(constitutional cases) across different periods, each of them distinguished by 
different degrees of political fragmentation. Accordingly, the use of this type 
of approach permits one to account for time-variable contextual factors 
operating in a constant institutional arrangement.  
The selection of the case study is building upon the procedure proposed 
by Seawright and Gerring (2008) to distinguish a deviant case, that is, a case 
that allows one to seek for new explanations. Mexico, like other Latin 
American countries, underwent a process of democratisation that brought 
new rulers to the national government. Nonetheless, unlike the regional 
trends, in Mexico democratisation occurred from a hegemonic-party civil 
regime that never collapsed and was neither preceded nor followed by the 
promulgation of a new constitution. Secondly, and also in contrast to the 
regional pattern, judicial reform, and therefore the establishment of stronger 
forms of constitutional review, preceded alternation and was controlled by 
former rulers that neither created a constitutional court nor reconfigured the 
court of last resort but instead, judicial reform established an extremely 
powerful body, a head of the judiciary with exclusive constitutional review 
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powers. Third, a hegemonic party controlled the integration of the new court 
but established staggered terms of office coinciding with changes in the 
presidency. Fourth, in Mexico the formal and informal rules governing the 
creation of case law gave judicial precedents an authority atypical to civil-law 
systems that raised their capacity to establish generally applicable laws.  
The strategy chosen to conduct this diachronic within-case analysis 
resorts to ‘triangulation’, that is, to increase the explanatory leverage of the 
research design by employing a mix of quantitative and qualitative tools (Jick, 
1979; King et al., 1995; Olsen, 2004; Tarrow, 1995). As this study aims to 
present an in-depth analysis of policy-making by the Mexican Supreme Court 
in terms of arbitration and rule-making, it employs quantitative tools 
(descriptive as well as cross-sectional and longitudinal logistic and negative-
binomial regression analyses) to provide a comprehensive and systematic 
view of how this decision-making body carries out both functions, but also to 
determine the influence of contextual (political fragmentation from 
democratisation) and personal-level (experience from stability in the 
composition of the Supreme Court) factors on its performance. Additionally, 
this study relies on qualitative techniques (process-tracing and elite 
interviewing) in order to gather further and more detailed evidence regarding 
specific aspects linked to judicial policy-making and its effects in Mexico. 
The sources of the evidence employed in this study are integrated by the 
next main components:  
1. Constitutional review judgements dataset: dataset registering the 2001 
judgements handed down by the Mexican Supreme Court to constitutional 
cases of its exclusive competence in the period 1995-2011. The integration 
of this dataset was based on three different sources (Appendix I provides a 
more detailed explanation of the sources and procedures followed for its 
integration):  
a) @lex (SCJN, 2012): the judicial statistics website by the Supreme 
Court of Mexico compiles information for every judgement 
rendered in cases originated from constitutional controversies 
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(concrete review procedure) and actions of unconstitutionality 
(abstract review procedure) petitions. It was the source of the 
judicial information analysed (file, dates, parties, decisions, and 
votes, among others).   
b) IUS (SCJN, 2011a): this is an electronic compilation also published 
by the Supreme Court in Mexico that registers all the texts 
considered as binding and persuasive case law in Mexico. The 
information of this compilation was cross-referenced with the data 
included in the statistics website, in order to have complete data 
regarding the decisions and precedents which have emerged from 
constitutional review cases.  
c) Local Congresses Dataset (CIDAC, 2008): this dataset, which was 
created by Mexico City-based thin-tank Centro de Investigacion para 
el Desarrollo, provided the information regarding the political 
affiliation of the organs of government, at federal and state levels, 
and was employed for cross-referencing the information included 
in the Supreme Court’s dataset, as well as for the calculations 
employed to calculate different indices of political fragmentation. 
As this source includes information up to 2008, it was 
complemented with data from the electoral agencies and local 
congress of every state of the federation.  
2. State/year constitutional litigation dataset: an original dataset compiling 
political and litigation-related variables for every one of the 32 states of the 
Mexican federation in the period of this study 1995-2010. The elaboration 
of this dataset was based on the information provided by @lex and the 
Local Congresses dataset.  
3. Mexico Supreme Court Justices Dataset 1917-2011: an original dataset 
registering information of appointments and career paths of the 212 people 
appointed as justices to the Supreme Court in the period 1917-2011. For the 
elaboration of this three sources of information were employed: the 
biographical compilation published by the Supreme Court (SCJN, 2011b); 
the information regarding judicial appointments included in Fix Zamudio 
and Cossio Diaz (1996); and the data registered in Mexican Political 
Biographies 1935-2009 (Camp, 2011).  
4. State Expropriation Laws and Precedents Dataset 1917-2011: this dataset 
registers every law passed by the legislature in every state of the 
federation, as well as every precedent established by the Supreme Court. 
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The information included in this dataset has its origins in two sources: in 
the case of the legal disposition it is based on a revision of the state-level 
reforms as secondary sources; while the data regarding judicial precedents 
relies on the compilation elaborated by Herrera (2006). 
5. Interviews: thirty-five in-depth open-ended interviews were carried out 
with key actors, including justices and former justices to the Supreme 
Court, law-clerks, legislators, former members of the cabinet, among 
others (Appendix II provides a detailed list of the interviewees).   
The information that these different sources provide is employed to 
achieve different specific objectives linked to the general question and 
hypothesis. In the first place, the state/year litigation dataset is utilized in the 
analysis of the relationship of political fragmentation, in the use of litigation 
by political actors. The utility of this analysis is twofold: it provides evidence 
about judicialisation as an effect of the diffusion of power from 
democratisation, but at the same time it contributes to explain why the policy 
outcomes of the Supreme Court are determined by the inputs implied in the 
way political actors use litigation.  
Second, the constitutional review judgements dataset allows this thesis to 
present an analysis of the way political fragmentation and the development of 
a more stable an experienced Supreme Court shape the outcomes of this 
decision body in terms of arbitration and rule-making. This perspective is 
particularly useful because it makes it possible to elucidate whether or not 
there have been modifications in the patterns followed by the Supreme 
Court’s policy performance and, if so, whether these patterns have been 
related to democratisation and the experience gained by the justices 
composing a more stable body.  
Third, as this study aims to present a thorough analysis of the policy 
effects of the Supreme Court’s decisions, it selected two policy areas 
particularly relevant: abortion and expropriation. Whereas in the case of the 
former the analysis is based on secondary sources, in the case of the latter the 
State Expropriation Laws and Precedents Dataset 1917-2011 provides the 
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evidence needed to trace the effects that judicial decisions are producing in 
subnational regulations. In other words, the analysis of these two policy areas 
allows this dissertation to offer specific evidence of the policy consequences 
judicial rulings produce beyond the judicial realm.  
Finally, interviews constitute an equally important source of evidence for 
this thesis. The information provided by key actors is particularly useful not 
only because it allows us to assess the plausibility of quantitative findings, but 
also because it contributes significant insights in to the mechanisms whereby 
the Supreme Court displays its power to make policy. The information from 
the interviews is employed throughout the text in order to support, with 
original evidence, the arguments this dissertation makes regarding the 
emergence of the Supreme Court as a substantial policy-maker in Mexico.  
To summarise, this thesis develops a diachronic within-case analysis of 
Mexico as a deviant case in terms of democratisation and judicialisation in 
Latin America. The strategy defined to undertake this analysis comprises both 
quantitative and qualitative tools in order to enhance its explanatory power. 
The evidence employed by the thesis is based on interviews, as well as in 
three original datasets elaborated from primary and secondary sources. The 
objective in the design of this strategy is to provide this study with the 
methodological foundations needed to provide robust conclusions based on 
objective and solid evidence.  
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured in seven chapters including this one, which outlines 
its theoretical and methodological foundations. Chapter 2 analyses the 
institutional design of constitutional review in Mexico to explain how its 
evolution led to the adoption of a particularly powerful institutional design 
combining the most influential elements of both the United States model of 
judicial review and the European system of centralised control of 
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constitutionality. Building upon the elements explained in this introductory 
chapter, the second one argues that the Court tempered its lack of effective 
policy-making tools by enforcing the authority of judicial precedents, 
particularly through the creation of jurisprudencia, Mexico’s own case law 
system. Additionally, it also claims that the Supreme Court did not actively 
engage in policy-making until the constitutional review system was reinforced 
with wide-ranging constitutional review procedures.  
Chapter 3 provides an account of why since 1995 Mexico has undergone a 
judicialisation process whereby the Supreme Court has gained an 
unprecedented influence over policy issues. The argument advanced in this 
chapter is that a more democratic context has fostered political fragmentation 
and so increasing the incentives political actors have to actively use standing 
in the Supreme Court to litigate provided by the 1994 judicial reform. The 
explanation offered in this chapter constitutes the basis for explaining why 
judicialisation triggered the development of more proactive policy-making by 
the Supreme Court.  
Chapter 4 is intended to explain how the institutional change from the 
reform, political factors from democratisation, and the experience gained by 
justices under a more stable composition, have fostered the development and 
consolidation of the Supreme Court as a national policy-maker in Mexico, an 
actor with the capacity to perform as Mexico’s political system’s ultimate 
arbitrator, as well as a more effective source of rules of general application. In 
order to do so, this chapter presents, first, a schematic account of the Supreme 
Court’s decision-making process to explain that there are different phases 
along which the Court displays its arbitration function. Second, it examines 
the different patterns followed by the decisions rendered by the Supreme 
Court to constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality cases. 
Finally, by resorting to inferential statistics it provides an explanation of what 
have been the determinants of the Supreme Court’s policy-making, 
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particularly testing to what extent fragmentation and stability have indeed 
altered the performance of the Supreme Court.  
Chapter 5 provides evidence to support the idea that the Supreme Court 
has become a more effective policy-maker by analysing the effects of its 
resolutions on a specific policy area. Using abortion, this chapter presents an 
evaluation of the Supreme Court’s policy-making role at the micro level based 
on research strategy and combines the following elements: a review of 
abortion law transformation over the last forty years; interviews with key 
actors including law clerks and civil society organisation leaders; and an in-
depth analysis of the Supreme Court’s decisions in landmark abortion cases 
and their effects on state level regulations.  
Chapter 6 addresses the question of to what extent the Supreme Court has 
left behind the legacy from authoritarian times. In particular, this chapter 
examines the determinants of the overriding of precedent by the Supreme 
Court, as well as the effects that legal changes like this have produced in the 
legal system. The objective, hence, is to provide an understanding of how the 
Supreme Court has explicitly sought to make policy and law by modifying 
specific rules established in precedents.  
Chapter 7 presents a summary of the conclusions emerged from the 
empirical analysis of Mexico as case study. Additionally, it provides a 
discussion of the contributions of this thesis to the relevant literature.  Lastly, 
it assesses both conclusions and implications in the light of future research.   
To summarise: the purpose of Chapter 1 was to set the theoretical and 
methodological framework of this thesis. Chapter 2 presents a historical 
revision of constitutional review in Mexico to explain why the institutional 
design created by the 1994 judicial reform set a new scenario for the advent of 
a policy-making Supreme Court. The objective of Chapter 3 is to elucidate 
how political fragmentation from democratisation has fostered the use of 
litigation, promoted the emergence of a judicialisation process of legislation 
and government action, and therefore expanded the scope of action for the 
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policy-making of the Supreme Court. Chapter 4 seeks to provide a systematic 
large-n account of the way the Supreme Court performs as a policy-maker by 
arbitrating political conflict and creating rules of general application through 
precedent in a more fragmented political environment and under an 
unprecedented internal stability.  The purpose of Chapter 5 is to illustrate by 
analysing the issue of induced abortion how the Supreme Court has 
strategically employed strike down decisions and precedent as policy tools to 
pursue long term policy goals. Chapter 6, through the analysis of 
expropriation law, explains why the Supreme Court has overridden 
precedents and how such legal transformations have produced substantial 
transformations beyond judicial boundaries in subnational regulations. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the findings of this thesis and discusses their 
implications in the context of present and future research.  
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2. The Institutional Design of Constitutional 
Review in Mexico 
The Supreme Court of Justice has played a restrained political role during 
most periods of Mexico’s history. In the decades following independence, in a 
context of prolonged instability, the judiciary was the most stable branch of 
government, which, for instance made a decisive contribution to the 
restoration of federalism in the late 1840s (Arnold, 1996). However, political 
struggles, first, and later the establishment of a dictatorial regime led to the 
development of formal and informal mechanisms that helped the executive 
branch to subordinate the judiciary. The 1917 Constitution made no 
substantial change to the competences and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
so it continued to lack effective tools for checking executive and legislative 
authorities. Later, the consolidation of Mexico’s one-party presidential regime 
reinforced the unbalanced executive-judicial relationship.  
The research explaining the absence of judicial independence in Mexico 
indicates that the convergence of two elements made possible the 
subordination of the judiciary: a weak institutional setting and 
presidencialismo (Domingo, 2000; Magaloni, 2003; Rios Figueroa, 2007). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the first component of this formula 
drastically changed in 1994 as a result of a wide-ranging constitutional reform 
implemented to strengthen the Supreme Court through wider constitutional 
review powers and the reduction of its size from 26 to 11 justices. The 1994 
judicial reform established a new framework for the intervention of the 
Supreme Court in the political arena, which, this thesis argues, along with an 
increasingly competitive political system and an unprecedented internal 
stability, encouraged justices to more proactively engage in policy-making.  
This chapter analyses the institutional design of constitutional review in 
Mexico to explain how its evolution gradually led to the adoption of a 
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particularly powerful arrangement combining the most influential elements of 
both the United States model of judicial review (i.e. binding precedent) and the 
European system of centralised control of constitutionality (i.e. centralised 
jurisdiction and abstract review with erga omnes effects). Drawing on the 
discussion regarding policy-making by courts developed in the previous 
chapter, this one argues, first, that the Supreme Court tempered its lack of 
effective policy-making tools enforcing the authority of judicial precedents, 
particularly through the creation of jurisprudencia, Mexico’s own case law 
system. Second, the Supreme Court did not actively engage in policy-making 
until the constitutional review system was reinforced with a wide-range of 
constitutional review procedures.  
The chapter is structured as follows: the first section develops a 
framework for explaining why, in general, constitutional review allows courts 
to perform two complementary functions: arbitration (the settlement of a legal 
dispute between two parties) and rule-making (the establishment of rules 
supporting such settlements). The second section provides a review of the 
major changes to constitutional review design experienced in the eighteenth 
century to show that judicial subordination is a legacy from that century.  The 
third section explains that the combination of a weak design with an 
authoritarian regime hindered the emergence of an effective and autonomous 
Supreme Court. The fourth section presents a detailed analysis of the 1994 
judicial reform to clarify why it meant an institutional revolution that 
constituted the basis for a transformation in the role of the Supreme Court in 
the political system. Finally, the fifth section provides a review of the way the 
1994 judicial reform affected the administrative operation of the Supreme 
Court.  
2.1 Constitutional Review and Policy-Making 
The first chapter provided an analysis of the different notions of judicial 
policy-making existent in the judicial politics literature, concluding that the 
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judgements rendered by courts on constitutional review cases contain two 
different policy outcomes: a disposition settling a dispute and a reason 
supporting such a disposition. On the one hand, by establishing a concrete, 
particular and retrospective rule (a disposition), courts define between the 
parties involved in a dispute by the one that prevails. On the other, by 
justifying the reasons that support such dispositions courts create another 
rule, one of an abstract, general and prospective nature (Hansford and Spriggs, 
2006; Stone Sweet, 2002).  
According to this distinction, policy-making by courts is twofold and 
allows them to perform two different but complementary functions: 
arbitration (by resolving a concrete dispute) and rule-making (by setting a rule 
affecting the normative structure of a particular polity). Using the two 
paradigmatic models of constitutional review –judicial review in the United 
States and the European system of centralised control of constitutionality- as 
ideal types this section sets the framework that will be employed for 
explaining how changes in the design of constitutional review have affected 
the performance of the Supreme Court as a policy maker.  
The United States Constitution does not grant judges constitutional 
review powers. Judicial review is a by-product of the decision rendered in 
Marbury v. Madison where the Supreme Court held that federal courts could 
review the constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature as a mechanism 
to guard the supremacy of the constitution. This judgement established a 
model of judicial review where any court could rule over the constitutionality 
of any law (decentralised jurisdiction), but only in those cases in which a 
material conflict regarding its constitutionality exists (concrete review). Under 
this model, the rulings rendered by courts only affect the parties involved in 
the case at hand (inter partes effects), but due to the authority of stare decisis 
principle, which establishes that “courts are bound to follow their own prior 
decisions and […] the precedents of higher courts in the same jurisdiction” 
(Cappelletti, 1970: 1041), the judgements virtually produce erga omnes effects.  
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The European model, created under Hans Kelsen’s influence and first 
established in Austria by the Enactment of its 1920 Constitution, was designed 
for parliamentarian regimes with the objective of protecting the coherence of 
the legal system (Kelsen, 1942). Under this premise, the power of 
constitutional review was granted to a single-court not belonging to the 
judiciary and entitled to review the constitutionality of laws in the absence of 
concrete conflicts. Since abstract review, as this type of constitutional review 
is called, implies a potential invalidation of the laws under review, it is 
accompanied by judgements with erga omnes effects but which do not 
formally become case law.  
Different institutional designs produce different policy outcomes. Among 
the different elements particular to each model there are four that have had a 
greater impact on the way courts engage in policy-making: standing, (which 
actors have the right to present cases before the Supreme Court?); jurisdiction 
(is the constitutional review centralised in a single-body or can it be carried 
out by different courts?); generalizability (do the dispositions of courts affect 
only the parties in conflict or are they intended to be of general application?); 
precedent (are courts or other actors bound to follow their previous decisions 
or those of higher courts?)1. 
First, standing refers to the rules governing the access to the Supreme 
Court of different actors. Where certain actors have privileged access to courts 
(e.g. political parties or government authorities) they are also given an 
important veto power that most of the time is strategically employed seeking 
to block the application of certain policies. The rules of standing affect the 
way political actors behave in different arenas, legislative bargaining for 
example (Vanberg, 1998); and they are also determinant in the salience of the 
1 The decision to highlight the relevance that in policy-making terms have all these four 
elements was inspired by the analysis regarding the structure of judicial review in Brazil and 
Mexico, conducted by Rios Figueroa and Taylor (2006) in their text about the judicialisation 
of policy in both countries.  
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cases being brought into courts. The extent to which a court gets involved in 
policy-making largely depends on the rules governing standing.  
Second, jurisdiction refers to those rules that are centralised in a single-
body or decentralised in multiple constitutional review powers. Centralisation 
implies the existence of a monopoly that increases the incentives for 
employing it in a dynamic way. Decentralisation diffuses this power but does 
not necessarily decrease the incentives for an active use of constitutional 
review. In fact, the factors that allow higher courts to have a certain degree of 
control over lower courts' performance are the hierarchy of courts and the 
existence of binding precedent.  
Third, the rules governing effects determine the extent to which 
judgements could be generalizable, in so doing they affect also the capacity of 
courts to check executive and legislative authorities. Under erga omnes effects 
every authority is bound to follow the dispositions rendered by the Supreme 
Court, a feature that expands the influence of courts' judgements beyond 
judicial boundaries. Conversely, inter partes effects limit the capacity of courts 
to produce far-reaching resolutions, which means a substantial reduction of 
their formal powers to make policy. Nonetheless, the possibility of making 
rules applicable only in single cases expands the scope of a discretionary use 
of constitutional review.  Erga omnes effects compel judges to be aware of all 
the potential consequences that their judgements may generate. Therefore, in 
practice having stronger effects does not necessarily stimulate a more 
dynamic use of constitutional review powers.  
Fourth, precedents, in formal and informal terms, are one of the most 
outstanding instruments that judges have to make policy and law. When 
courts are bound to follow dispositions from previous or higher courts, such 
dispositions gain an authority akin to erga omnes effects. The authority of 
precedent relies on legal provisions like those that determine which rulings 
are subject to become case law, but it is also determined by informal rules 
which in many instances make them as influential as proper binding judicial 
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precedents. Although the authority of precedent is circumscribed to the 
judicial sphere, tradition and forward thinking by government authorities 
contribute to expanding its degree of influence.  
The rules governing each of these elements greatly determine the way 
courts perform the two aforementioned policy-making functions. For example, 
a highly accessible court without inter partes rulings would probably be a less 
effective policy-maker than a tribunal inaccessible to the ordinary citizen with 
erga omnes rulings. As standing determines whether certain actors have 
greater access to courts than others, and as jurisdiction determines how 
fragmented the constitutional review powers are, both of them are more 
related to the arbitration than to the rule-making function. In contrast, 
generalizability and the role of precedent are particularly relevant to rule-
making because both define the scope of influence of resolution rendered by 
courts. To map how the merging of these elements creates different designs 
and thus different policy-making tools, the next table shows, on one side, the 
different possible combinations of standing and jurisdiction, and on the other 
those of generalizability and precedent.  
Table 2.1 Policy-making and the design of constitutional review 
Arbitration Rule-making 
  Jurisdiction   Generalizability 
  Decentralised Centralised   inter partes erga omnes 
St
an
di
ng
 Individuals 
US model 
Mexico 
(amparo) 
Mexico from 
1994 (CC & 
AU) 
Pr
ec
ed
en
t 
Not 
binding 
Mexico 
before 1882 
(Amparo) 
European 
model 
Influential 
political 
actors 
- European model Binding 
US model 
Mexico from 
1882 
(Amparo) 
Mexico from 
1994 (CC & 
AU) 
CC= constitutional controversy, AU=action of unconstitutionality 
 
Table 2.1 shows how Mexico’s constitutional review procedures compare 
to the US and European models. The European model has, in formal terms, 
tools more suitable for conducting the arbitration function because it implies a 
centralised setting with access to courts by influential political actors. The 
difference is less evident in rule-making terms, essentially because the 
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principle of stare decisis provides courts the power to issue judgements with 
an authority similar to those rendered under the European model. 
Notwithstanding such particularities, from a legal perspective it is clear that 
the combination of erga omnes effects with binding precedent sets a powerful 
framework for judicial rule-making.  
As with the United States Constitution, the first Mexican charter enacted 
in 1824 made no reference to any form of judicial review of laws. The lack of 
mechanisms for protecting individual rights and guarding constitutional 
supremacy inspired the creation of the amparo procedure in 1847 (next 
sections explain in more detail the evolution of constitutional review and the 
relevance of amparo). The original institutional design of amparo restricted 
the effects of the judgements only to the parties directly involved in a 
concrete case (this clause is known in Mexico as Formula Otero).  
Under Formula Otero, and in the absence of provisions defining the 
authority of judicial precedents, the Supreme Court lacked the tools to become 
an effective policy player. The enactment of the 1881 Amparo Law set up a set 
of rules to define under which conditions it would be able to create precedents 
with a binding force. Jurisprudencia, as this case law system is known, gave 
formal authority to judicial resolutions without abolishing Formula Otero. 
From that year, jurisprudencia has allowed the Supreme Court –and from 1967 
the Circuit Courts too- to have an increasing involvement in the creation and 
renovation of the norms of general application in Mexico.  
In 1994, as a result of a presidential initiative, a group of constitutional 
reforms granted the Supreme Court stronger constitutional review powers 
through the creation of the constitutional controversy (concrete centralised 
review) and the action of unconstitutionality (abstract centralised review), 
both procedures of its exclusive jurisdiction. The reform gave the Supreme 
Court, for the first time in Mexico’s history, the capacity to render erga omnes 
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effects rulings. Furthermore, a proper system of binding precedents2 was 
created for all constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality 
adjudicated by the Supreme Court. From the 1994 reform emerged a design 
where the Supreme Court preserved the role of last resort court, but also with 
powers similar to those that characterise European constitutional courts. 
Certainly, as it will be explained in more detail in the following sections, with 
1994 judicial reform the Supreme Court gained unprecedented tools for 
developing a more active arbitration function, as well as for becoming a more 
effective rule-maker.  
Once established, this basic framework for understanding the link 
between the design of constitutional review and the policy-making by courts, 
the following sections are devoted to clarify in more detail the evolution of the 
constitutional review in Mexico, from its birth as independent nation in the 
eighteenth century and until the enactment of the 1994 judicial reform. The 
purpose of this is to provide a thorough explanation of why this reform meant 
a revolution for Mexico’s constitutional review framework, therefore, why it 
set the basis for the development of a policy-making Supreme Court.  
2.2 The Emergence of Constitutional Review  
A hundred years passed between the outbreak of The War of Independence in 
1810 and the start of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. During this period, 
Mexico underwent different domestic and international armed conflicts that, 
among other consequences, resulted in the loss of more than half of its 
original territory to the United States3. The country had a high rotation in the 
presidency -48 different presidents took office between the enactments of the 
2 Section 2.4 provides a more detailed explanation of this system of binding precedents.  
3 The most relevant of these domestic conflicts was the Reform War that took place between 
1857 and 1861 and emerged from the opposition of conservative groups to the enactment of 
the liberal 1857 Constitution.  
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1824 and 1857 constitutions4- that prevented the construction of a stable 
government. The legacy of decades of violence and turmoil created the 
appropriate environment for the emergence of the dictatorial regime that 
ruled the country for over 35 years (Guerra 1988). In the end, political 
instability and authoritarianism prevented the emergence of a genuine 
democratic representative system.  
Mexico’s judicial system was built upon the unstable environment that 
distinguished the nineteenth century. In the years that followed the 
establishment of the first federal republic in 1824, despite lacking 
constitutional review powers, the Supreme Court was an influential actor, 
which, for instance, disputed with Congress the power to review the 
constitutionality of state constitutions (Cossio Diaz, 2008). Years later, with 
the substitution of federalism by a centralist republic, the Supreme Court 
acquired the right to initiate legislation, a faculty that it successfully employed 
to adapt the judiciary’s structure to the features of the centralist system that 
ruled the country from 1835 to 1847 (Arnold, 1996).  
In the late 1850s began a process of gradual subordination of the Supreme 
Court to the federal executive. This was most notable when a group of justices 
were dismissed after opposing the abolition of military and clerical privileges 
that a piece of legislation known as Ley Juarez had established. The 
centralisation of power Porfirio Diaz’s authoritarian regime contributed to 
subordinate the judicial power and to reinforce the Supreme Court’s restraint 
from political arenas. From that moment, instead of contributing to balance 
the distribution of power, the Supreme Court became a source of regime 
legitimacy (Guerra, 1988).  
Despite the unstable political environment, the origins of both 
constitutional review and binding precedent date back to the eighteenth 
4 This calculation is based on the information included in Fowler’s book (2008) on Mexican 
rulers.  
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century. Through a chronological analysis of the major constitutional and 
legal reforms, this section explains, first, that the emergence of both elements 
occurred due to the need to construct mechanisms to protect constitutional 
rights and, second, that they were not powerful enough to allow the Supreme 
Court to effectively check the executive and legislative branches.  
The United States Constitution inspired the drafters of the 1824 
Constitution to establish in Mexico a popular, federal, representative and 
republican system of government, with formal separation of power and a 
Supreme Court as the head of the federal judiciary (Rabasa, 2000).  The design 
of Court consisted of 11 justices5, life tenure, exclusive jurisdiction over 
conflicts involving federal authorities, and last resort court within the federal 
judiciary. As mentioned above, the 1824 Constitution made no reference to 
any formal method of constitutional review by courts. Indeed, it was vague in 
determining whether the Supreme Court or the Federal Congress would be in 
charge of settling the cases involving two or more states. As a result of this, 
the Supreme Court never adjudicated a case of this nature, being the Congress 
instead the institution that struck down state laws (Cossio Diaz, 2008)6.  
Despite the fact that a transition from federalism to centralism (1835-1846) 
meant a radical drift in the system of government, for the Supreme Court it 
only implied a narrow transformation7. The centralist constitution, known as 
Siete Leyes Constitucionales and established in December 1836, preserved both 
the composition and recruitment method, but removed lifetime tenure, gave 
the Supreme Court the right to initiate legislation and the ability to review 
any law related to the administration of justice and, it also expanded the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over military and ecclesiastic matters. In regard 
5 The Federal Prosecutor was an original part of the Supreme Court as established by the 
1824 Constitution.  
6 According to Cossio Diaz (2008) the Congress struck down at least eight state laws in the 
period comprising the enactment of 1824 Constitution and the establishment of Mexico’s 
centralist republic.  
7 Between 1935 and 1946 the Mexican federalism established in 1824 was formally abolished, 
so Mexico was governed under a central republican regime (Zamora et al, 2004).  
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to the administration of justice, the most important innovation to develop 
during the centralist period was the establishment of the Supremo Poder 
Conservador (literally Supreme Conservative Power), a judicial body with 
competences that virtually made it a fourth branch of government (Fix-
Zamudio, 1991; Pantoja, 2005). The Siete Leyes Constitucionales specifically 
granted this body with constitutional review jurisdiction over laws, decrees 
and judicial resolutions, but only in cases endorsed by the heads of the 
executive, legislative or judicial branches.  
The Supremo Poder Conservador adjudicated a small group of salient cases 
related, for example, to debt contracting or the imposition of controls on free 
press (Cossio Diaz, 2008). This quasi-constitutional review mechanism existed 
only during the centralist period. Its creation, however, revealed the need for 
establishing proper constitutional review procedures that allowed citizens to 
protect their rights and courts to guard constitutional supremacy. In this light, 
the first example of a procedure for enforcing constitutional rights was 
created under centralism with the enactment of the Political Constitution of the 
State of Yucatan in 1841. Inspired by Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America”, 
Mexican jurist Manuel Crescencio Rejon designed amparo as a procedure 
intended to provide citizens with the power to contest in Yucatan state courts 
legislation and government action (Fix-Zamudio, 1999).  
The victory of liberals over conservatives in 1847 led to the restoration of 
federalism originally established in the 1824 Constitution, and to the adoption 
of the Act of Reform of the Federal Constitution of 1824. This legislation 
restored the Supreme Court’s power to settle concrete legal conflicts between 
two or more states and granted the Senate constitutional review powers over 
state laws. Additionally, the Act established the Chief Justice as the first 
replacement in line in case of presidential absence.  
The 1847 Act did not consider any proper individual guarantee of rights 
but it did “introduce the term ‘rights of man’, and created, at the federal level, 
the amparo proceeding, as a federal judicial procedure through which an 
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individual could defend his or her constitutionally guaranteed liberties and 
protections in court” (Zamora et al., 2004: 233). As drafted by Mariano Otero, 
article 25 of the 1847 Act included a clause (known as Formula Otero) 
establishing that the effects of amparo would only be applicable to the parties 
directly involved in a legal dispute8. This law inaugurated a decentralised 
system of constitutional review with inter partes effects and no provision 
related to the authority of precedent. Ever since, amparo has been the main 
judicial remedy for the protection of constitutional rights in Mexico but under 
Formula Otero it has not been a particularly effective tool in policy-making 
terms. 
The enactment of the 1857 Constitution again changed the structure of the 
Supreme Court, specifically by setting first-degree indirect election as justices’ 
appointment method, as well as by increasing the size of the Supreme Court 
with the introduction of four supernumerary positions. Regarding 
constitutional review, the 1857 Constitution gave the Amparo procedure 
constitutional status but keeping the restrictions imposed by Formula Otero. 
The 1861 Amparo Law was the first instrument specifically created to regulate 
amparo proceedings. Under this law, district courts were in charge of 
adjudicating amparo petitions at the trial level, and the Supreme Court of 
ruling upon appeals (Magallon Ibarra, 2004).  
Given the difficult conditions that judges were facing to follow the 
provisions established by the 1861 Law, a second Amparo Law was published 
in 1869. This piece of legislation, albeit more detailed, included no disposition 
related to the effects of judgements or precedents. In 1870 a decree issued by 
President Benito Juarez –a former Chief Justice to the Supreme Court- created 
8 Article 25 of the Act of Reform stated that “The courts of the Federation shall afford 
protection to [ampararan] any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of 
the rights granted to him or her by this Constitution and constitutional laws, against any 
attack by the legislative and the executive branches, whether of the Federation or of the 
States; said courts being limited to provide protection in the specific case that is the subject of 
the process, without making any general statement regarding the law or act that gave rise to 
this protection”.  Translation borrowed from Zamora et al. (2004).  
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the Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, the official weekly bulletin publishing 
the judgements rendered by federal courts. The creation of this publication 
implied no formal change neither to the structure of the Supreme Court nor to 
the design of constitutional review design. However, by establishing an 
instrument to publicise the work of federal courts it also contributed to 
enhance the authority of judicial rulings (Gonzalez Oropeza, 2011).  .  
The 1882 Amparo Law established the first provisions to formally regulate 
the role of judicial precedents in Mexico’s legal system (Meza-Chavez 2012). 
The introduction of these rules was driven by a reaction to the application of a 
compulsory recruitment policy by the army force. The conflict between the 
judicial branch and the army arose in 1876 when army forces started to apply 
this aggressive measure to cover the vacancies left by casualties and dropouts. 
A group of people affected by this policy resorted to the federal courts 
requesting by means of amparo the invalidation of the measure. Judges from 
the states of Puebla, Tlaxcala and Veracruz granted amparo proceedings 
preventing some of the affected people to be recruited by army forces. High-
ranked officials within army forces responded by submitting a formal 
complaint to the Supreme Court, arguing that the decisions rendered by 
federal courts were virtually legalising desertion. The Supreme Court 
reviewed these allegations confirming the unconstitutionality of compulsory 
recruitment as determined by lower federal courts (Gonzalez Oropeza, 2011). 
The decision of the Supreme Court, however, underlined that federal 
courts lacked the formal powers to rule unconstitutional army’s compulsory 
recruitment policy. The Supreme Court urged to the Federal Congress to 
legislate on this matter in order to prevent a conflict between the federal 
judiciary and the army forces. As the Federal Congress failed to intervene in 
this issue, federal courts continued ruling case-by-case the unconstitutionality 
of the compulsory recruitment policy implemented by the army. The Supreme 
Court resolved to publish in the Seminario Judicial de la Federacion all the 
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judgements related to this issue in order to draw attention to the crisis that in 
fact emerged. 
Eventually, as a result of the conflict between the judiciary and the army 
forces, representatives from the executive and legislative branches agreed to 
carry out a reform to reinforce the strength of judicial rulings. Mexican jurist 
Ignacio L. Vallarta, who served as Chief Justice to the Supreme Court in the 
period 1877-1882, was entrusted with drafting the corresponding project of 
reforms to the Amparo Law (Cabrera, 1990). Vallarta, drawing on the 
innovations produced in the United States by Marbury v. Madison, drafted a 
bill that enhanced the authority of judicial rulings but preserving the inter 
partes clause established by Formula Otero.  
The articles 37, 44 and 73 of Vallarta’s Amparo Law established the 
following:  
Article 37. Decisions pronounced by judges shall always be based on the 
applicable constitutional text. For its proper interpretation, attention shall 
be paid to the meaning given in the opinions of the Supreme Court and the 
[doctrina] writings of authors. 
Article 44. Decisions of the Supreme Court ought to state the reasons the 
tribunal considers sufficient for its interpretation of the constitutional texts 
and to resolve, by the application [of these reasons], the constitutional 
questions addressed. When the votes on decisions are not unanimous, the 
minority shall also set out in writing the reasons for its dissent.  
Article 73. The granting or denial of amparo against the text of the 
Constitution or against its fixed interpretation by the Supreme Court, by at 
least five uniform opinions, shall be punished with the loss of employment 
and imprisonment from six months to three years if the judge has acted 
fraudulently [dolosamente], and if by lack of instructions or care, with 
suspension of its functions for one year 9.  
 
The main innovation of the 1882 Amparo Law was the creation of a 
method whereby the Supreme Court could set binding precedent without 
formally disregarding Formula Otero (Mirow, 2006). In particular, this law a) 
established the Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution; 
9 This translation of 1882 Amparo Law is borrowed from Mirow (2006).  
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b) requested the Supreme Court to explicitly provide in every judgement the 
reasons that support that specific resolution; c) established that five 
consecutive, uniform opinions of the Supreme Court could constitute a fixed 
interpretation (i.e. binding precedent) of the constitution; d) determined that 
state and lower federal courts must follow the constitutional interpretations 
included in Court’s judgements; e) specified that judges who do not follow 
jurisprudencia could be subject to punishment.  
Although the Federal Procedures Code of 1897 abolished all the provisions 
referent to the authority of precedent to prevent federal judiciary to encroach 
on legislative powers (Carbonell, 1995), jurisprudencia was reinstated in 1908 
through the enactment of the Civil Procedures Code, becoming therefore the 
most relevant tool that federal courts had to issue generalizable decisions.  
The basic rules that govern the creation and application of jurisprudencia 
are those established by Ignacio L. Vallarta in the eighteenth century. 
Certainly, Vallarta’s system of case law, multiple-ruling jurisprudencia 
(because of the clause requesting five consecutive, uniform opinions of the 
Supreme Court to constitute a fixed interpretation), was designed to enhance 
the authority of judicial precedents without disregarding Formula Otero. 
Vallarta did so by establishing that the ‘reasons’ supporting a judgement are 
what could be subject to become binding precedent and not the disposition 
settling a specific dispute. As the next paragraph written in 1881 makes clear, 
Vallarta was well aware of the consequences that this case law system might 
produce:  
And do not think that judgments of amparo, by being trapped in the 
narrow limit of protecting an individual only in the particular, are of little 
importance: they are, on the contrary, of the highest value, so high, that 
according to law, they ought to be published in the newspapers to 
determine the public law of the nation; they serve to nullify 
unconstitutional laws, to conserve the balance between the federal and 
local authority, avoiding their mutual collisions; they form the supreme, 
definitive and final interpretation of the Constitution, even above the 
interpretation that the legislator wanted to establish; through a peaceful 
process they resolve the most serious, the most difficult questions upon 
which the peace of the nation rests at times, the sovereignty of the states, 
the imperium of law over authority, the precepts of justice over the 
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exigencies of political passion. Judgments of this transcendence cannot be 
but of the highest importance, much greater than the importance of 
judgments in ordinary trials [Vallarta (1881) cited in Mirow (2006)].  
The purpose of this brief account of the evolution of the design of 
constitutional review was to illustrate that since the birth of Mexico as an 
independent nation, the Supreme Court faced both a chronic instability and 
the lack of tools to perform a more proactive policy-making role. Neither the 
rules of standing nor those regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts set 
incentives enough for the development of an active arbitration function. As it 
happened in the United States during the first decade of the eighteenth 
century, Mexican federal courts faced the difficulty of lacking of formal 
instruments to produced generalizable judgements. The creation of a system 
to regulate the force of precedent provided the way to solve this issue. In 
formal terms, jurisprudencia improved the capacity of the Supreme Court to 
perform its rule-making function. Nonetheless, the political environment was 
decisive in preventing the emergence of an effective judicial power.   
2.3 The Development of Constitutional Review  
The main feature of the Mexican political system during the twentieth century 
was the consolidation of an authoritarian regime based on two components: 
presidencialismo and a hegemonic party (Cosio Villegas, 1964). An informal 
rule known as dedazo gave Mexican presidents the power to virtually 
designate their successors (Langston, 2006)10, whereas the control of the party 
allowed them to control most salient issues at national and sub-national levels. 
Political competition occurred mainly within the party, but outside opposition 
forces played a marginal role in institutional politics (Magaloni, 2006). In this 
context, the Supreme Court was a passive actor, which preformed according 
to the conditions of the political regime (Zamora and Cossio Diaz, 2006). This 
10 As Langston (2006) explains, dedazo or “big finger” was an unwritten rule that allowed the 
sitting president to select his successor and force potential contenders to publicly seeking 
the nomination.  
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section argues that the reforms undertaken during the authoritarian period 
were determinant to prevent the advent of a genuine policy-making Supreme 
Court.  
The 1917 Constitution preserved the structure of the federal judiciary 
constituted of the Supreme Court and the circuit and district courts. The 
Supreme Court returned to its original size of 11 justices, all of them being 
appointed by the Federal Congress for 2-year terms subject to 4-year re-
appointment. Two constitutional procedures were included in this charter: 
amparo and constitutional controversy, the latter as the legal procedure 
permitting state and federal organs of government to challenge in the 
Supreme Court the constitutionality of acts and laws by other state of federal 
organs. Regarding precedent, the original version of the constitution made no 
reference to jurisprudencia or to any other form of judicial precedent. The 
1919 Amparo Law filled this gap, establishing the Supreme Court as the only 
tribunal entitled to issue jurisprudencia, but required the vote of at least 7 
justices. Accordingly, the legal system that emerged from the Mexican 
Revolution established a mixed constitutional review system: concrete 
decentralised and with inter partes effects in the case of amparo procedure; 
and concrete and centralised for the constitutional controversies.  
A group of constitutional amendments enacted in 192811 increased the 
number of justices from 11 to 16; gave justices lifetime tenure; established a 
nomination/designation appointment system, where the president must send a 
three-candidate nomination short-list upon which the Senate must designate 
one; created salas (chambers) as matter-oriented jurisdictional bodies within 
the Supreme Court with analogous powers to issue jurisprudencia. 
Paradoxically, the 1928 judicial reform expanded presidential powers over 
11 Regarding this reform it is important to stress that the formal rules for the initiation of 
legislation were not followed. Despite lacking formal faculties, president-elect Alvaro 
Obregon submitted to the Congress a bill to reform the judiciary and another to abolish 
municipalities from the Federal District. Disregarding constitutional precepts, the Congress 
accepted and approved them.  
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judicial appointments and at the same time reinforced judicial autonomy with 
life tenure. All these changes together constituted the first step towards the 
construction of informal mechanisms that gradually allowed incumbent 
presidents to discretionarily appoint and remove justices.  
In 1934 a new reform reinforced presidential influence over the Supreme 
Court, specifically by increasing its size from 16 to 21 justices and reducing 
tenure from lifetime to a fixed six-year period. In 1936 Congress passed a new 
Amparo Law to improve the regulating framework of precedent, 
distinguishing conventional multiple-ruling jurisprudencia (also known in 
Mexico as jurisprudencia by reiteration because of the 5 consecutive rulings 
clause) from single-ruling jurisprudencia (or jurisprudencia by contradiction); 
the latter as those precedents resulting from the Supreme Court decision over 
two contradictory rulings by different chambers. These more vigorous 
attempts to alter the structure of the Supreme Court coincided with a period 
in which the two pillars of Mexico’s authoritarian regime were consolidated: a 
hegemonic party combined with presidencialismo.  
The process of transformation of the judicial system continued in 1944 
with the re-establishment of lifetime tenure which paradoxically coincided 
with the creation of a new provision that authorised presidents to request 
justices' dismissal from the Chamber of Deputies. Another two constitutional 
reforms were enacted in 1951 and 1967, both of them focused in creating 
mechanisms to help the Supreme Court in dealing with a growing caseload. 
The 1951 reform produced four main outcomes: an increase in the size of the 
Supreme Court (from 21 to 26); the introduction of a fifth chamber; the 
incorporation of jurisprudencia to the constitutional text; and the creation of 
Courts of Appeals specialised in the adjudication of amparo procedures (Fix-
Zamudio and Cossio Diaz, 1996)12. For its part, the 1967 reform made another 
12 On this issue it is important to bear in mind that Collegiate Tribunals were authorised to 
adjudicate ‘legality’ but not ‘constitutionality’ cases; this attribution remained centralised in 
the Supreme Court.  
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step towards a more decentralised setting by granting Courts of Appeals with 
the capacity for creating multiple-ruling jurisprudencia. 
Up until 1967, both the structure of the Supreme Court and the 
institutional design of constitutional review had already been altered in such 
way that affected the prospects for the emergence of more political decision 
body. Presidents desisted from promoting further changes, so no substantial 
reform was made until 1987. Political pluralism and a growing caseload within 
the judiciary led to a re-centralisation of all amparo proceedings demanding 
the constitutionality of laws in the Supreme Court. This drift towards a more 
centralised setting announced the advent of deeper changes to the judiciary’s 
design, which were eventually adopted by the 1994 judicial reform.  
Before turning to the analysis of the 1994 judicial reform, it is convenient 
to provide evidence of how presidents took advantage of the institutional 
design to promote the subordination of the Supreme Court. Since the capacity 
to affect the composition and size of a decision-making body is a powerful 
mechanism for influencing its policy outcomes (Moraski and Shipan, 1999), 
the analysis of appointment strategies is a suitable way to clarify the degree of 
presidential control over the Supreme Court.  
Figure 2.1Appointments and size of the Supreme Court, 1917-2011 
 
Source: Mexico Supreme Court Justices Dataset 1917-2011 (see Appendix I).  
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From the moment the Supreme Court was re-established in 1917 Mexican 
presidents have had broad control over the appointments of justices as well as 
over the regulations regarding the size of the Supreme Court (Domingo, 2000; 
Fix-Fierro, 2000). In the period 1917-1994, 192 different people served as 
justices to the Supreme Court, seven of them in more than one period. In total, 
199 appointments were made, an average of 2.5 per year and which, weighing 
up changes in the Supreme Court’s size, is equivalent to a mean annual 
rotation 12.9%13.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates how presidential influence on the Supreme Court 
composition followed two different paths: court-packing14 and forced-
dismissals. Court-packing strategies are particularly visible in the years 
preceding 1951. In six years of the period 1917-1951 the number of 
appointments exceeded 50% of the court’s size (1917, 1919, 1923, 1928, 1934 
and 1941). Forced-dismissals, on the other hand, are noticeable along the 
whole period but especially evident after 1941. In only 29 years of the period 
1917-1994 no appointment to the Supreme Court was made and there were 
only two periods of two consecutive years without changes in the Supreme 
Court’s composition: 1920-1921 y 1929-1930. During most of the twentieth 
century, a major feature that distinguished the Supreme Court was its ‘stable 
instability’. This instability prevented the consolidation of genuine 
experienced careers within this judicial body, consequently affecting its 
performance as source of policy and law.  
High rotation in the bench is telling but not enough evidence on its own 
to support the subordination hypothesis. The appointments with political 
background and the number of justices who completed their fixed-terms or 
13 According “The U.S. Supreme Court of Justices Database” (Epstein et al. 2010) the average 
number of appointments in the United States was 0.5 and a mean renovation of 6.2 
14 The concept of “court-packing” originated in 1937 in the United States, when President 
Franklin Roosevelt submitted an legislative initiative known as Judicial Procedures Reforms 
Bill, in which he proposed that a president would be granted with the capacity to appoint up 
to six justices, for every sitting justice older than 70 (Leuchtenburg 1966).  
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died in office are both appropriate complementary indicators. Figure 2.2 
shows that from Lazaro Cardenas presidency (1934-1940) to the Salinas 
administration (1988-1994), justices with political background represent (i.e. 
those who had occupied positions either in the federal o state executive 
branches) at least half of the total appointments of the term. As this period 
coincides with most of the years during the PRI’s hegemony, it is possible to 
conclude that presidents employed the formal and informal rules of the 
authoritarian regime to promote or block the careers of politicians, including 
the justices of the Supreme Court.  
Figure 2.2 Types of appointees by presidential term, 1917-1994 
 
Source: Mexico Supreme Court Justices Dataset 1917-2011 (see Appendix I). 
Note: there is no complete reliable information for all cases, so calculations are for 184 out of the total 
199 appointments.  
 
Figure 2.2 also illustrates how the number of justices who died in-office or 
completed their terms in only two periods was higher than the total number 
of appointments15. The number of justices leaving the Supreme Court either 
by finishing their terms or passing away ranges from 13 to 40% between the 
1940s and late 1970s. All the justices appointed from 1982 to 1994 left the 
Supreme Court before completing their terms. As all of them had lifetime 
15 The number of justices that finished their legal terms or died in-office is employed as a 
proxy for understanding to what extent presidents were able to remove justices before the 
completion of their appointments.    
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tenure it is possible to infer that political factors had an influence on their exit 
from the bench16.   
To sum up, since the enactment of the 1917 Constitution and up until 
1994, the Supreme Court went through a period that can be defined as ‘stable 
instability’. During authoritarian rule, presidents exercised an extreme and 
discretionary power, based in informal rules, to control nominations and 
dismissals of the Supreme Court’s justices. This single body, hence, instead of 
being the ultimate step in the judicial careers, became at the same time a 
‘trampoline’ and ‘freezer’ for the careers of those who served on it (Domingo, 
2000; Magaloni, 2003)17. Nonetheless, the 1994 judicial reform radically 
transformed these features, bringing about a new set of incentives for the 
Supreme Court to turn into a more independent and proactive decision-
making body.  
2.4 The Consolidation of Constitutional Review 
Only four days after his inauguration on the 1st of December of 1994, 
President Ernesto Zedillo submitted the Bill of Reforms to Federal Courts, a 
wide-ranging package of constitutional amendments to the design of the 
judiciary and, therefore, of constitutional review. As the president himself 
declared in the statement accompanying the bill, the intention was to 
contribute to the consolidation of the rule of law in Mexico by enhancing the 
16 In the period 1982-1994, presidents de la Madrid (1982-1988) and Salinas de Gortari (1988-
1994) nominated 31 different people to the Supreme Court, nominations that were all 
confirmed by the Senate. Leaving aside the 26 justices that were removed from their posts as 
a result of the 1994 judicial reform, a group of five justices left the Supreme Court in spite of 
having life tenure. Among them, stands out Jorge Carpizo McGregor who, before his 
designation, served as rector to the National Autonomous University of Mexico, and who 
left the bench to become the first President of Mexico’s Federal Human Rights Commission. 
After holding this position for three years, he was appointed by president Salinas de Gortari 
Attorney General in 1993 and Secretary of the Interior in 1994.   
17 An example of a justice leaving the Supreme Court to run for public office is Manuel 
Bartlett Bautista. With experience as legislator in Congress of Tabasco state, Bartlett was 
appointed Justice to the Supreme Court in 1941. In 1952, he left the bench to become 
Governor of Tabasco state.  
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independence and competences of the federal judiciary. Given that a 
constitutional reform requires the approval of a two-thirds majority in both 
chambers of the federal congress as well as the ratification of at least 16 out of 
the 31 state legislatures; getting approval at state level was relatively easy for 
a President whose party was at that time in control of over 90% of the 
legislatures. Passing the bill in the Federal Congress where the PRI had a 
simple majority the approval required a coalition with the National Action 
Party. Legislative bargaining was promptly concluded, so the whole legislative 
process took only 23 days, concluding in the enactment of the reform on the 
31st of December of the same year, which came into force a day later.   
The 1994 judicial reform was focused on restructuring two elements of the 
federal judicial system: the administration of federal lower courts and the 
institutional design of the Supreme Court. Regarding the first element, the 
reform created the Federal Judicial Council as the organ responsible for the 
administration and supervision of circuit and district courts. With concern to 
that latter point, the reform specifically reduced the composition of the 
Supreme Court from 26 to 11 justices; substituted justices’ lifetime tenure with 
a 15-year fixed term; and expanded constitutional review powers by 
establishing two procedures that transformed the Supreme Court in to the 
main arbitrator in Mexico’s federal, and supreme negative legislator of the 
country: the constitutional controversy and the action of unconstitutionality.  
Under the 1824 and 1857 Constitutions, the Supreme Court had exclusive 
jurisdiction over a legal procedure similar to the constitutional controversy, 
one of the two procedures mentioned above. The 1917 Constitution preserved 
this procedure and granted the federation and the three branches of 
government at state level legal standing to submit this type of cases involving 
conflicts between federal and state authorities to the Supreme Court of Justice 
(Berruecos, 2004). Between 1917 and 1994, the Supreme Court adjudicated 
only 63 constitutional controversies, almost all of them submitted prior to 
1947 (Cossio Diaz, 2008). It is possible to infer that this limit number of cases –
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less than one per year- is linked to the features that distinguished 
authoritarian Mexico, particularly to presidential control over the ruling party 
and the existence of non-institutional means for processing conflict, 
particularly the capacity presidents had to rule political disputes and the 
sanction and reward mechanisms proper of a hegemonic party-system.  
The transition to a more democratic system started in the late 1980s 
encouraged opposition actors to find new arenas wherein political conflict 
could be institutionally processed. From the late 1980s the constitutional 
controversy became a suitable instrument for opposition parties to dispute the 
PRI-controlled federal executive branch the constitutionality of its policies. 
Moreover, as municipalities lacked of legal standing for resorting to the 
Supreme Court thorough constitutional controversies, the number of and 
complexity of the amparos endorsed by authorities of this level also increased 
(Berruecos, 2004).  
The 1994 judicial reform re-shaped the constitutional controversy 
procedure, particularly through the establishment of more precise rules 
regarding standing and the effects of judgements. As Zamora et al (2004) 
explain, constitutional controversies “[were] intended to settle any dispute 
that may arise between government authorities: conflicts between federal and 
state authorities, between authorities from different states, and between 
authorities from different branches of government” (Zamora et al., 2004: 275). 
The reshaping of this concrete constitutional review procedure meant, at least 
in institutional terms, to constitute the Supreme Court of Justice as the 
‘referee’ of federalism since all authorities from all levels of government were 
allowed to bring political conflicts into the courtroom. Certainly, as the fourth 
chapter explains in detail, became more relevant as the political system 
became more competitive.  
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The action of unconstitutionality18, the second procedure included in the 
1994 judicial reform, gave standing to the Attorney General as well as federal 
and state legislative minorities (the endorsement of at least 33% of the 
legislative body is required), political parties (from 1996 and only against 
electoral laws) and human rights commissions (from 2006), to challenge in the 
Supreme Court a law within the first 30 days of its adoption. With the 
incorporation of the action of unconstitutionality to the constitutional review 
design, the Supreme Court gained unprecedented policy-making tools, first by 
the inclusion of erga omnes judgements and second through the creation of a 
third method for setting jurisprudencia which established that considerandos 
(the reasons provided by justices supporting a ruling) automatically gained 
the status of binding precedent if approved by a qualified majority of 8 or 
more justices.  
Furthermore, the establishment of this abstract judicial review procedure 
also provided a new veto power to those actors with standing. Holding this 
power has for specific actors –minority parties, for example- such importance 
that it can in fact be their only means for opposing the validity of the laws 
approved by majority parties. Political parties have two routes for reaching 
the Supreme Court through actions of unconstitutionality: they can either use 
their standing as ‘parties’ for challenging electoral laws at federal and state 
levels, or, as legislative minorities, by building a coalition with other forces to 
meet the 33% requirement (in case no single minority party can the control 
one-third of the respective legislature alone).  
18 In Spanish this figure is called “accion de inconstitucionalidad”, a term which we literally 
translate to English seeking to use it in the more neutral way without removing the real 
sense of the concept. Due to the impossibility of a precise translation, legal specialists have 
employed the term in Spanish while explaining that it may be translated as “challenge to the 
constitutionality of laws” (Zamora, et al 2004). There are also authors that prefer the concept 
of “constitutional actions” (Magaloni and Sanchez 2006); others use “unconstitutional laws” 
(Finkel 2008), and some translate it as “unconstitutional actions” (Berruecos 2003). There are 
also scholars using the employed in dissertation such as Rios Figueroa and Taylor (2006) and 
Staton (2006).  
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In Mexico the prosecutorial organ at federal level (the Procuraduria 
General de la Republica) forms part of the executive, so the standing granted 
to the Attorney General provided this branch with a new mechanism for 
preventing the application of certain pieces of legislation. Issues like abortion 
or same-sex marriage have shown that the federal executive has resorted to 
this procedure as a way to intervene in local political processes that would 
otherwise be beyond its influence.    
The substantial transformation produced by the 1994 judicial reform is 
summarized in figure 2.3. Particularly, this figure shows how, since the 
establishment of Mexico as independent nation, have evolved the features that 
this thesis has considered decisive for judicial policy-making. In first place, the 
size of the Supreme Court increased considerably along the twentieth century 
up until reaching it historical peak in 1950s with a structure of 26 justices. The 
1994 reform transformed this design and established a more compact decision 
body composed of 11 justices. The constitutional amendment passed that year 
made, however, no change to the appointment method, so it preserved the 
presidential nomination and legislative designation model created in late 
1920s. 
Figure 2.3 The evolution of the Supreme Court’s institutional design and 
constitutional review 
 
CC= constitutional controversy. AI=action of unconstitutionality 
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Turning to the justices’ periods of appointment, as the previous figure 
shows, the 1994 judicial reform meant a substitution of life tenure with a 
fixed-period, this time of 15 years. In fourth place, the reform reinforced the 
centralisation of the most important cases in the Supreme Court, particularly 
through both the creation of actions of unconstitutionality and the 
invigoration of the constitutional controversies.  
A major innovation introduced in 1994 was the expansion of standing by 
providing political actors with special powers to recourse to the Supreme 
Court in cases originated in the aforementioned actions of unconstitutionality 
and constitutional controversies. In connection to this radical change, the 
reform gave the Supreme Court for the first time in its history the power to 
rule with general effects the unconstitutionality of legislation and government 
actions. Finally, the reform reinforced the role of judicial precedents by 
establishing a new route for creating case law though the introduction of the 
“by reasons” model of jurisprudencia.  
Now that the features of the 1994 judicial reform have been covered it is 
possible to look at the determinants behind the decision of former rulers to 
limit their own power by establishing an institutionally stronger Supreme 
Court. Three different but interrelated responses have been provided to this 
apparent paradox. The first one claims that the reform resulted from former 
rulers' need to legitimize themselves in a more competitive context (Inclan, 
2004). Second, it has also been argued that the force behind the reform was the 
necessity of creating laws in an increasingly market-oriented economy 
(Magaloni, 2003). The third response has proposed that anticipating their 
removal from power, former rulers (i.e. the PRI and President Zedillo) 
reformed the judicial system as a sort of insurance policy.  
Ginsburg (2003) and Hirschl (2004) argue that the introduction of stronger 
forms of constitutional review through judicial reforms is possible in a non-
zero sum game where both rulers and opposition forces obtain benefits; the 
former guaranteeing the creation of a ‘friendly’ court that would be strategic 
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in the case of an eventual demise; the latter securing the creation of a new 
arena for advancing their political agendas. Drawing on these ideas, Finkel 
(2004) argues that in the case of Mexico President Zedillo, foreseeing the 
potential demise of his party pushed forward the reform seeking to constitute 
a loyal and powerful judiciary that might protect PRI’s interests in an 
increasingly democratic context19.  
The interviews conducted in the context of this dissertation confirm that 
both economic and political factors fostered this reform. According to 
interviewees 24 and 30, both privileged witnesses of the process, there was 
also an interest within the Supreme Court to acquire an improved tool to deal 
with an increasing number of more complex cases. High-ranking judicial 
officials sought to increase their influence over the scope of the reform by 
approaching influential members of the PRI and proposing what they thought 
would be the less harmful changes for the Supreme Court. One of the 
interviewees even mentions that it was within the Supreme Court where the 
proposal for renovating the constitutional controversy procedures was 
drafted.  
In all, by reshaping its institutional design and competences, the 1994 
judicial reform set the basis for the Supreme Court to become a more 
proactive policy-maker in at least two ways: allocating political resources 
among political actors by deciding case-by-case which one prevails in 
constitutional cases; producing more legal dispositions through erga omnes 
judgements and case law. The following section will explain how the 
arbitration and rule-making functions implied by the new powers of the 
Supreme Court developed to make it a more active and effective policy-maker.  
 
19 Inclan (2004) contends this view, arguing that the 1994 judicial reform was a concurrent 
rather than an insurance policy. According to this scholar, instead of seeking to establish a 
friendly judiciary, the need to legitimize by rulers was the driving force behind the reform.  
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2.5 A Constitutional Court upon a Supreme Court  
The 1994 judicial reform gave the Supreme Court powers comparable to those 
of constitutional courts, but without removing its role as a last instance within 
the federal judiciary. The Supreme Court therefore gained unprecedented 
powers to intervene in conflicts of a political nature but preserved a 
considerable degree of control over lower courts. For instance, the Chief 
Justice, elected every four years from among all justices presides over the 
Supreme Court and the Federal Judicial Council (CJF, for its Spanish 
abbreviation), the administrative organ within the federal judiciary. The 
previous sections explained how constitutional review evolved to create a 
Supreme Court with constitutional court functions. The purpose of this 
section is to show how legal transformations materialize in a completely 
different institutional setting.  
Table 2.2 Career paths of Supreme Court's justices, 1995-2011 
Original 
justice Term 
Judicial 
career* 
Previous 
position 
Replacing 
justice Term 
Judicial 
career* 
Previous 
position 
Aguinaco 
Aleman 
1995-03 Appellate 
Judge 
Private solicitor Cossio 
Diaz 
2003-18 - Professor 
Castro y Castro 1995-03 - Public servant Luna R, 2004-19 Appellate 
Judge 
CJF 
Diaz Romero 1995-06 Justice Justice Franco G.S. 2006-11 - Professor 
H. Roman 
Palacios 
1995-06 Appellate 
Judge 
Appellate Judge Valls H. 2004-19 - CJF 
Azuela Güitron 1995-09 Justice Justice Aguilar M. 2009-24 Appellate 
Judge 
CJF 
Gongora 
Pimentel 
1995-09 Appellate 
Court 
Judge 
Appellate Judge Zaldivar 
L.L. 
2009-24 - Private 
solicitor 
Aguirre 
Anguiano 
1995-12 - Notary public     
Ortiz 
Mayagoitia 
1995-12 Appellate 
Judge 
Electoral Court 
Judge° 
    
J.J. Gudiño 
Pelayo  
1995-15 Appellate 
Judge 
Appellate Judge Pardo 
Rebolledo 
2011-26 Appellate 
Judge 
Appellate 
Judge 
Sanchez 
Cordero 
1995-15 - Local appellate 
judge 
    
Silva Meza 1995-15 Appellate 
Judge 
Electoral Court 
Judge° 
    
Source: Mexico Supreme Court Justices Dataset 1917-2011 (see Appendix I). 
*  Highest rank held within the federal judiciary before the appointment  
 Died in office, Roman Palacios in 2004 and Gudiño in 2010. 
° Before 1996 the Electoral Court was not part of the federal judiciary  
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The first important aspect to consider is the one related to the selection of 
the people in charge of the new Supreme Court. The decree that published the 
1994 judicial reform also established that the eleven seats of the Supreme 
Court must be filled from an 18-candidate list proposed by the President to the 
Senate. On the 26th of January 1995 the PRI held a two-thirds qualified 
majority in the legislature where they appointed eleven new justices, only 
three of which without career paths in the federal judiciary and with two of 
the new appointees having been a part of the previous integration of the 
Supreme Court. This composition remained the same for almost nine years, an 
unprecedented event in Mexico’s history, until the first two justices went into 
retirement in November 2003.  
Since 2003, seven justices have been appointed to the Supreme Court, four 
of them with no previous background in the federal judiciary. This has been 
an important change because, to a certain degree, it has made the Supreme 
Court less reluctant to make administrative and interpretative changes. In 
terms of its membership, one the most important transformation to have 
occurred since 1995 is that the Supreme Court is now one of Mexican lawyers’ 
highest professional aspirations. Being justice to the Supreme Court is not 
only the highest position that judges can occupy within the federal judiciary, 
but also interesting an attractive career path for law professors, private 
solicitors and public officers.  
Figure 2.4 illustrates how the Supreme Court has become more stable and 
experienced by analysing the years seating justices have passed in the bench 
in the period 1980-2011. Before the 1994 judicial reform both the mean and 
standard deviation followed similar patterns. However, once the Supreme 
Court was re-designed and the new 11 justices were appointed, the mean 
substantially increases while the standard deviation remains steady for 8 years 
to change and the become again stable.  
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Figure 2.4 Experience of Seating Justices (years) 
 
Source: Mexico Supreme Court Justices Dataset 1917-2011 (see Appendix I).  
 
In terms of its membership, the Supreme Court has gained the stability 
that it lacked for much of Mexico’s history. Certainly, the period 1995-2003 
has been the only one since 1917 –and probably also since the birth of Mexico 
as an independent nation- in which the composition of the Supreme Court 
suffered no change. Justices as individuals learnt, during these years, learned 
to perform their role as ultimate interpreters of the constitution and, so, they 
became more aware about the implications and possibilities of this 
responsibility. As this thesis seeks to demonstrate, stability in the bench 
permitted justices to enhance their experience and, as result, more 
experienced judges working on a more stable environment within the 
Supreme Court became more prone to engage in policy-making.  
A second relevant element to underline is related to the financial 
conditions surrounding the operation of the Supreme Court and, in general, of 
the whole federal judiciary. Both the legislative and judicial branches have 
traditionally received a marginal proportion of the federal budget, the 
difference between them being small. Since the enactment of the 1994 judicial 
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reform however, the financial resources given to the judiciary have increased 
considerably.  In 1994 its budget represented less than 0.3% of all federal 
expenses, whereas by 2012 this had risen to 1.16%, a fourfold increase. The 
most important change occurred after 2000, once the PRI had lost the 
presidency.  
Figure 2.5 Budget of federal legislative and judicial branches, 1980-2012 
 
Source: author’s calculation with data from SHCP (2000; 2012).  
 
In a more pluralistic system the allocation of financial resources became 
subject to the bargain among the political forces represented in legislative 
bodies. In this new context, the judiciary has received an unprecedented 
amount of financial resources. In 2010, for instance, the outlay by the United 
States Federal Judiciary represented 0.19% of the federal budget20, while in 
Mexico it was 1.07%. There are substantial differences in the institutional 
design of the judicial branches in the United States and Mexico. However, the 
comparison remains helpful for the purpose of illustrating to what extent the 
Mexican judiciary has increased its significance in financial terms, and how it 
has received over the last years unprecedented resources to conduct their 
20 The information for the United States is based in the data published in the Historical 
Tables of the Budget of the Federal Government for the fiscal year 2011.  
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ordinary judicial function as well as being the one of guardian of 
constitutional supremacy21.  
The judicial branch has increased its relevance in financial terms. This 
change, among other features, has led to a radical variation in judicial salaries, 
therefore, increasing the incentives to work in for the judiciary, which offers 
better conditions than other areas of the public service. The Supreme Court 
and in general the judiciary have become increasingly dependent on economic 
resources and, as a result, more eager to engage in the bargaining process to 
secure its increasing financial need. This condition has implied risks for the 
Supreme Court but, as the evidence provided shows, it has managed to 
succeed in the gathering financial resources in the last two decades.  
2.6 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was twofold: on the one hand it aimed to explain 
why, before 1994, the design of constitutional review was a determinant factor 
that prevented the development of policy-making in the Supreme Court. On 
the other, it sought to account for the changes made to this institutional 
setting by the 1994 judicial reform. To accomplish this objective the chapter 
proposed that, according to the nature of constitutional review rulings, policy-
making by courts develops around two complementary functions: arbitration 
and rule-making. The rules of standing are particularly important for the way 
courts perform their arbitration function, while those governing the 
generalizability of judgements' effects and the binding force of precedent are 
determinant for judicial rule-making.  
21 In a piece of research published in 2010, Elizondo Mayer-Serra and Magaloni (2010) 
analysed the cost of selected constitutional and supreme courts. They found that in 2009, the 
budget of the United States Supreme Court represented in real terms 37% of its Mexican 
counterpart. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht, had a budget equivalent to only the 13% 
and the Colombian and Peruvian constitutional courts of 3.3% and 2.9% respectively. 
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Based upon this framework, it was argued that during the nineteenth 
century the Supreme Court underwent a process of consolidation but the 
establishment of solid policy-making tools did not accompany it. Certainly, 
the Supreme Court acquired limited constitutional review powers by the 
establishment of amparo that later gained force as result of the creation of 
jurisprudencia. The emergence of an authoritarian regime, however, prevented 
the development of an active Court able to maximize the use of such limited 
tools.  
In the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution emerged a setting that granted 
the Supreme Court certain institutional guarantees to perform an independent 
role, but the advent of a new authoritarian regime fostered judicial 
subordination by both altering the structure and controlling the composition 
of the Supreme Court. All changes made to constitutional review between 
1917 and 1994 refined the features of an already limited design. This context 
explains why the 1994 judicial reform meant a revolution for the Supreme 
Court and, in general, for the whole judiciary. The establishment of 
centralised jurisdiction, standing to privileged actors, erga omnes effects and 
the reinforcement of case law together set a completely new institutional 
framework to be employed by the Supreme Court in an increasingly 
competitive political context.   
The Supreme Court has become more autonomous but increasingly 
dependent on financial resources. It gained more robust competences for 
displaying a policy-making function, which, as this thesis argues, has been put 
into practice in a more democratic political context. At the same time, the 
Supreme Court has managed to subordinate the Federal Judicial Council and, 
thus, to continue controlling the administration of the federal judiciary 
(Carpizo, 2009).  
The Supreme Court has increased its independence from external factors, 
but also has expanded its control on the federal judiciary as a whole, 
becoming a very powerful decision body that has a broad jurisdiction not only 
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in judicial specific terms, but also in administrative ones. Altogether, the 
Supreme Court now operates in a institutional framework that allows their 
justices to play a more decisive role as policy makers.  
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3. Democracy, Constitutional Review and 
Judicialisation 
Arbitration gives a substantial amount of power to the individual in charge of 
settling a dispute. At the same time the rules governing the access to 
arbitration determine the way the power of resort to the arbitrator is 
distributed amongst different actors and this then affects the way individuals 
and organisations use their veto to challenge certain decisions. The 
distribution of this veto power also influences the nature and scope of the 
conflicts brought into courts and consequently shapes the type of policy 
outcomes judges produce. In short, if a court becomes a more effective 
arbitrator and rule-maker it is largely due to the legal rules shaping the way 
political actors employ litigation.  
As was discussed in the first chapter, this thesis is particularly interested 
in examining the effects of the convergence of democratisation and 
judicialisation. In order to study in-depth how judicialisation has occurred in 
Mexico and why democratisation has influenced policy-making by the 
Supreme Court, this chapter analyses one particular side of the convergence of 
these two processes by empirically exploring the way the political 
fragmentation from democratisation has fostered a process of judicialisation 
of politics whereby an increasing number of more complex cases have been 
brought into the courtroom.  
In particular, this chapter provides evidence to demonstrate that since 
1995 Mexico has gone through a judicialisation process whereby the Supreme 
Court has gained unprecedented influence over policy issues. As was 
examined in the first chapter, the comparative judicial politics literature 
proposed the notions of ‘insurance policy’/’hegemonic preservation’ to 
explain the reasons behind the determination by authoritarian rulers to limit 
themselves by empowering courts with broad constitutional review powers 
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(Finkel, 2008; Ginsburg, 2003; Hirschl, 2004). In the same way, this body of 
research has also provided persuasive explanations about the effects of 
political fragmentation on the emergence of more independent courts 
(Ferejohn et al., 2004; Rios Figueroa, 2007). 
This literature, however, has not addressed in-depth the question of under 
what specific conditions political actors and public authorities more 
proactively employ courts to advance their agendas1. The relevance of this 
question not only relies on the gap that exists in the literature, but also in the 
relevance of improving the understanding of the inputs upon which it displays 
its policy-making role. The argument proposed in this chapter is as follows: a 
more democratic context has fostered political fragmentation2; this has 
increased the incentives political actors have to actively use standing to 
litigate in the Supreme Court provided by the 1994 judicial reform. The 
importance of this chapter for this thesis is, consequently, that it provides an 
explanation of why judicialisation has been fostered by a more proactive use 
of litigation by actors interacting in more competitive political environment. 
This account will be used in the next chapter to explain why judicialisation 
has triggered the emergence of a more proactively policy-making Supreme 
Court.  
The chapter is organised as follows: the first section presents an 
examination of how democracy has led to different levels of political 
fragmentation at national and subnational levels. The second analyses the way 
political actors have employed the constitutional controversy procedure. The 
1 The literature of Latin American judicial politics has certainly paid attention to litigation 
but to the one employed by social actors. A good example of this is Courtis (2006), a text in 
which the author reflects on the causes provoking courts in the regions being limited to 
social policy makers. This chapter, on the other hand, is focused on researching the way 
political parties and public authorities from different levels of government use constitutional 
litigation.  
2 Here, according to the conceptualization proposed by Ferejohn (2002) and mentioned in 
chapter one, the term political fragmentation is employed to describe the fragmentation 
produced by non-institutional means, particularly divided governments and the increase of 
political forces represented within the federal and state legislatures.  
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third one replicates this analysis but for the action of unconstitutionality, the 
abstract review procedure created by the 1994 judicial reform. This chapter 
concludes that the judicialisation of Mexican politics has in fact occurred and 
that it has been triggered by political fragmentation. Constitutional 
controversy has been the main channel whereby low-ranked authorities (i.e. 
municipalities) have turned political conflict into constitutional cases 
(‘judicialisation from below’). In contrast, actions of unconstitutionality have 
been employed by high-ranked actors to overcome the decline in their 
dominance over national and subnational politics (‘judicialisation from 
above’). Above all, this chapter shows that the effects of political 
fragmentation on judicialisation-through-litigation reverse when it reaches 
medium-to-high-levels. The implication of this conclusion is that political 
fragmentation from democratisation does foster judicialisation but, 
paradoxically, a high degree of fragmentation instead of stimulating litigation 
actually reduces its use by political actors.  
3.1 Democracy and Political Fragmentation 
Mexico’s political system has radically changed in the last thirty years. It has 
passed from an authoritarian one-party system to a competitive three-party 
system with alternation in the presidency as well as in more than half of the 
32 states3. Political fragmentation has been one of the main features of this 
process of change to more democratic political conditions. Here, this thesis 
does not refers to any form of fragmentation such a federalism of presidential 
regimes but, as explained by Ferejohn (2002), to the fragmentation implied in 
the existence of divided governments and legislatures controlled by no-single 
party majority.  
3 For instance, all the 32 Mexican states were ruled by the PRI until 1989, year when the 
candidate of the National Action Party won the governor race in the Baja California state 
(Lujambio ,2000) 
90 
                                              
In Mexico, non-institutional has led in some states to the consolidation of 
divided legislatures, but in some others it has had virtually no effect in 
attenuating the dominance of a single party. The variation in political 
fragmentation over time and across the states has therefore conditioned law 
and policy-making processes. The purpose of this section is to explain how 
Mexico has largely become a more fragmented country and why this 
transformation has caused the Supreme Court to emerge as the more plausible 
arbitrator in a system that no longer has either an overwhelmingly powerful 
president or a hegemonic political party.  
3.1.1 The national level 
In the 1960s Mexico began a process of successive electoral reforms intended 
to increase access to legislative positions for opposition political parties, 
developed mainly through the adoption of clearer proportional representation 
formulas. The diputados de partido reform passed in 1963 allowed opposition 
parties to go from having 6 seats in the Lower Chamber in 1961 to 32 in 19644. 
Later on, thanks to a new design that included 300 single-member 
constituencies plus 100 positions elected through proportional representation, 
the 1977 electoral reform gave such parties the opportunity to increase their 
representation by controlling more than a quarter of the Chamber of Deputies 
(Lujambio, 2000). In 1988 the PRI lost the two-thirds qualified majority 
required to pass constitutional amendments, this was the first time in 
contemporary history that the PRI would be required to bargain with 
opposition parties to advance its agenda. The system changed even more 
when in 1997 the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Since then 
no single-party has managed to gain the majority in Congress and, as a result, 
4 The figure diputados de partido was introduced in 1963 to the Mexican electoral system. 
The reform established a system that permitted the allocation of five seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies to the parties that had obtained 2.5% of the vote in the federal election, plus one 
more for every additional 0.5%. The introduction of this incipient mechanism of proportional 
representation allowed opposition to gradually increase their representation in the chamber 
from 1961 to 1976 (Lujambio, 2000).    
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presidents and their parties have had no other option than to negotiate 
legislation with opposition parties.  
Figure 3.1 provides an account of how this transformation of the political 
system occurred. Using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) effective number of 
parties index (ENP), it illustrates how Mexico passed from having 1.5 effective 
parties in 1965, to more than 3.5 in 2009. This figure makes clear that the 1988 
election was the turning point in the establishment of the three-party system. 
Since 1988, ENP in the presidential election has been around 3 points, 
reflecting how electoral preferences are divided among the formerly 
hegemonic PRI, the right-wing National Acton Party (PAN, for its Spanish 
abbreviation) and leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD, for its 
Spanish abbreviation). In legislative matters, however, the conditions have 
been less uniform. In 1988 legislative ENP reached more than 3 points, but 
decreased to 2.2 in 1991 and remained at a similar level in 1994.  
Figure 3.1 The evolution of the effective number of parties at federal level 
 
Source: author’s calculations with data from (CIDAC, 2011). 
 
What have these changes implied for legislative politics? From 1997 no 
single-party has had complete control of both chambers composing the 
Federal Congress. According to Nacif (2005) executive-legislative relations 
with the advent of divided government have made the Congress a more 
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effective player able to check the power of presidents. In spite of the fact that 
the Mexican Constitution does not grant the presidency with particularly 
broad formal powers (Weldon, 1997), during the authoritarian period 
presidents were dominant enough as to have become the principal source of 
legislative proposals (Casar, 2002).  
Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationship between bills submission and 
approval during the five most recent legislatures (1997-2012). The number of 
submitted bills has increased from 674 in 1997-2000 to 5,067 in 2009-2012, but 
the number of bills approved has been 371 on average. In the LVII legislature –
the first one without a single-party majority- the president remained the most 
active and effective legislative player. The federal executive submitted a 
relatively stable number of bills, being successful in an also relatively stable 
number of cases (the number of bills passed vary between 40 and 75).  
Figure 3.2 Submitted vs. passed bills in the Federal Congress, 1917-2012 
 
Source: author’s calculations with data from the Government Secretary’s Legislative Information 
System (SEGOB, 2012).  
 
Certainly, as three-major parties became more dynamic, the legislative 
success of the federal executive decreased but not their approval ratings, 
which have always been higher than those of the legislators. It is clear that 
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legislative politics has changed. Legislators from all parties have engaged in a 
more active role in terms of bill submission, provoking a considerable increase 
in the number of bills to be reviewed.  
Political fragmentation has transformed the way political parties interact 
both in and outside of legislative arenas. Executive-legislative relations have 
changed as the political system has become more plural. Even if the president 
remains a highly influential player, in democratic times the presidency no 
longer plays the role of ultimate referee of the disputes arising amongst actors 
from the different branches and levels of government. Democracy has resulted 
in more fragmentation and this in turn has led to a greater need for an 
effective arbitrator able to institutionally process and settle political disputes. 
The next sections explain how the Supreme Court has gained this arbitration 
role, inviting judges to more proactively engage in the making of policy and 
law.  
3.1.2 The subnational level 
The emergence of political pluralism at state level has been the counterpart of 
the changes occurring at the national level. Before 1989 all sub-national 
executives and their respective legislatures were under the control of the by-
then hegemonic PRI. That year The National Action Party won the Baja 
California state governorship but was unsuccessful in accompanying this 
triumph with control of the local congress. At subnational level alternation 
and divided governments concurrently emerged in Baja California. Since then, 
22 states have had alternation in the governorship and the other 26 have had 
at least one divided government experience.  
Alternation and political fragmentation have followed different patterns in 
governorship races from legislative elections. Figure 3.3 shows how the 
distribution of governorships and legislatures evolved from 1992 to 2010. In 
the first instance, it makes clear that it was during the 1990s when the PRI 
gradually lost its dominance in local politics. Between 1992 and 2001 this 
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party fell from governing 30 states to only 17, most of them being captured by 
the PAN. Secondly, it also illustrates that the PRI has remained a dominant 
party in more than a half of the states.  Up until 2010 this party never lost 
more than 11 state governorships and even then has recovered them in 7 other 
states. Third, the average effective number of parties confirms that the most 
substantial change in the fragmentation of the vote occurred before 2000.  
From that year fragmentation has been steadied at slightly above 2.5.  
Figure 3.3 Governorships and legislatures by political party, 1992-2010 
 
Source: State/year constitutional litigation dataset (see Appendix I). 
 
As in the case of national level institutions, in most of the states – DF 
being the most important exception- alternation has not meant the 
substitution of the dominance of one party over another. The number of states 
where no single party has outright control of the legislature steadily increased 
up to 2001. Since that year, about one half of the states have been ruled under 
divided government. In fact, there are only six states (Durango, Hidalgo, 
Oaxaca, Puebla, Sinaloa y Tamaulipas) that, up to 2010, have not had any 
divided government experience. Unlike in the case of governorships, the 
average number of legislative parties has steadily increased before and after 
2000, passing from 1.9 in 1992 to 2.9 in 2010.  
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What does this increase in subnational political fragmentation mean? In 
the first place it is important to point out that even though political 
fragmentation has, in general terms, increased there are important differences 
among states. In Chiapas, for example, the ENP underwent a significant 
increase from 2.2 to 5. But in other states like Tamaulipas it only grew from 
2.2 to 2.5. Second, political fragmentation has affected the complexity of 
legislative decision-making processes. In those states with higher degrees, 
political parties have needed to construct coalitions stable enough to 
guarantee internal governability. Nonetheless, in the states where 
fragmentation has been less visible, such as those that had not experienced 
divided governments, governors have been able to run the states without 
effective internal checks and, moreover, without being subject to the control 
presidents used to exert in the authoritarian period5.  
Political fragmentation is visible not only in the polarisation of 
governorship elections or in the correlation of forces within a legislative body. 
A federal system implies a design where authorities of three different levels of 
government have jurisdiction over the same territory. The number of subunits 
composing a polity is another form of fragmentation that has an effect in 
governability6. A more divided polity implies a more complex scenario for a 
decision-making process particularly where the different authorities 
governing those subunits have different political affiliations. In a context 
where the authorities from the three levels can all belong to different parties, 
5 A piece of research published by Rosas and Langston (2011) illustrates the influence of 
subnational factors on national political dynamics. They found that governors have been 
able to affect voting behaviour of federal legislators thus influencing that decision made 
within the national congress  
6 As Ferejohn (2002) points out, fragmentation is also related to the territorial configuration 
of a given state. “Federalism, for example, fragments certain kinds of political powers—
vertically, between central and local governments—and can create the space for judicial 
action. Federal systems not only provide opportunities and duties for states to make policy 
unchecked by the national government, they also generally provide the states with the 
capacity to block or slow actions by the national government. Finally, jurisdictional disputes 
in federal systems, whether between states or between a state and the national government, 
need to be resolved, and courts are typically employed for this purpose” (57-58).9696 
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having an institutional mechanism to process potential conflicts is 
fundamental to guarantee governability. It is in this context that, due to its 
constitutional review powers, the Supreme Court appears to be the most 
qualified actor to undertake the arbitration of the conflicts of federal and 
republican systems. 
Mexico has become a more plural and democratic country in electoral 
terms. Political parties contend for executive and legislative positions at 
national, sub-national and municipal levels. Pluralism has led to different 
forms and degrees of fragmentation and this has also translated into more 
complex conditions for the making of policy and law. This has been the 
context where an institutionally empowered Supreme Court has emerged as a 
feasible arbitrator of political conflict and as a potentially more effective 
policy-maker. The next two sections examine the way political actors have 
used litigation and why this has been determinant for the development of 
more proactive forms of judicial policy-making.  
3.2 Constitutional Controversies: Judicialisation from below 
Since the establishment of the new institutional design an average of 2,894.2 
cases have been filed annually in the Supreme Court to be adjudicated by the 
justices working en banc (Pleno). Constitutional controversies and actions of 
unconstitutionality represent 3.4% and 1.6% of this caseload respectively. Due 
to the infeasibility of dealing with such a large volume itself, every year the 
Pleno remits to the Chambers (Salas) a significant proportion of them (86% on 
average). Sending cases to the Salas has allowed the Pleno to settle a more 
manageable volume, which on average have been 419 per year. It is in this 
reduced caseload that the relevance of both constitutional controversies and 
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actions of unconstitutionality seems clearer as they represent 1 out of every 5 
cases justices settle working en banc7.  
The procedures established by the 1994 judicial reform have been 
determinant for the emergence of the Supreme Court as an effective policy-
maker. However, the Supreme Court is not the actor that has given these 
procedures a privileged position in its everyday activity. The political actors 
with access to the Supreme Court in these procedures have also regarded 
them as a strategic tool for advancing their agendas and protecting their 
interests. Before analysing the way the Supreme Court has dealt with these 
new types of cases, this section analyses the use these actors have made of the 
right to litigate in the Supreme Court.  
Constitutional controversy has formally existed since the enactment of the 
1917 Constitution. As mentioned in the previous chapter, according to the 
original text of the charter, this procedure was restricted to settle disputes 
between states, between authorities within the states, between a state and 
federal branches, or between federal branches. The lack of secondary 
legislation along with the authoritarian conditions that characterised Mexico 
during most of the twentieth century prevented the consolidation of 
constitutional controversies as an effective constitutional review procedure 
(Zamora et al., 2004). The constitutional controversy had limited success 
between 1917 and 1937, a period during which the Supreme Court received 50 
cases. The number of cases decreased as presidencialismo and the hegemony of 
the PRI became more prevalent. In the period 1938-1947 four controversies 
were submitted to the Supreme Court. However, as not even a single case was 
initiated between 1948 and 1988, this procedure disappeared in practice from 
Mexico’s legal system (Cossio Diaz, 2008).  
7 These calculations are based on two sources: caseload data were taken from the 
information registered by the Supreme Court’s annual reports (available at 
http://www.scjn.gob.mx/Transparencia/Paginas/trans_int_labo.aspx). The information about 
actions of unconstitutionality came from the Constitutional judgements dataset integrated ex 
professo for this thesis’ purposes.  
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Between 1989 and 1994, a period when opposition parties started to gain 
control of governorships, state congresses and municipalities, the 
constitutional controversy recovered its relevance. Six new cases were filed in 
this period, all of them by municipal authorities, which lacked standing for 
doing so. Berruecos (2004), while analysing the Supreme Court’s performance 
along those years, points out that a highly relevant outcome was the 
overriding of a judicial precedent disallowing municipalities to submit 
constitutional controversies. Certainly, the emergence of the cases before the 
1994 judicial reform made evident the need for developing stronger 
mechanisms for processing political conflict in institutional arenas.  
The 1994 judicial reform re-defined the nature and scope of the 
constitutional controversy procedure by broadening standing and authorising 
the Supreme Court to render general effects rulings. The reform intended this 
procedure to be used for disputes between: a) executive and legislative federal 
branches; b) federal and state authorities (the Federal District included); b) 
federal and municipal authorities; c) authorities from different states (the 
Federal District included); d) branches of government within a state; e) state 
authorities and municipalities of the same or a different state; and f) different 
municipalities of the same or a different state.  
The institutional design established in 1994 set the basis for the Supreme 
Court to become the ultimate arbitrator of Mexico’s federal and republican 
system. In particular, the design created two categories of conflicts susceptible 
to be reviewed by the Supreme Court: a) horizontal, or those between actors 
of the same level and jurisdiction (e.g. conflicts between two municipalities or 
two branches of government of the same state), and b) vertical, or those 
confronting authorities from different levels of government (e.g. between the 
federal congress and a municipality or between a state and the president). The 
veto power implied in having access to the highest court became distributed 
among authorities of the three levels of government.  
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The Supreme Court adjudicated 1,160 constitutional controversies in the 
period 1995-20098. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of cases according to the 
parties in conflict. In the first place, it is clear from the table that 
constitutional controversy has essentially been a procedure whereby 
authorities have contested actions or decisions by higher authorities. Indeed, 
municipalities have submitted 82.9%, subnational authorities 14.1% and 
national ones 2.9%. Conversely, national and subnational parties have been 
defendants in 28.4% and 70.2%, respectively. Accordingly, horizontal 
controversies account for only 11% of the cases, most of the conflicts being 
between sub national authorities. The remaining 89% are vertical 
controversies, the overwhelming majority (97.4%) by authorities from lower 
levels against the highly ranked ones.  
Table 3.1 Constitutional controversies: claimant party vs. defendant party, 1995-2009 
   Defending party  
   National Subnational Municipal    
 
Exec.. Legisl. Jud. Exec. Legisl. Jud. Total 
Cl
ai
m
in
g 
pa
rty
 N
at
io
na
l Executive 0 13 0 5 4 0 1 23 
 (0.0) (1.1) (0.0) (0.4) (0.3) (0.0) (0.1) (2.0) 
Legislative 8 0 0 1 2 0 0 11 
 (0.7) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.0) (1.0) 
Su
bn
at
io
na
l Executive 22 9 1 2 32 6 6 78 
 (1.9) (0.8) (0.1) (0.2) (2.8) (0.5) (0.5) (6.7) 
Legislative 6 4 0 13 0 2 4 29 
 (0.5) (0.3) (0.0) (1.1) (0.0) (0.2) (0.3) (2.5) 
Judicial 2 0 0 23 31 0 1 57 
 (0.2) (0.0) (0.0) (2.0) (2.7) (0.0) (0.1) (4.9) 
 Municipal 188 75 2 227 451 15 4 962 
  (16.2) (6.5) (0.2) (19.6) (38.9) (1.3) (0.3) (82.9) 
  Total 226 101 3 271 520 23 16 1,160 
   (19.5) (8.7) (0.3) (23.4) (44.8) (2.0) (1.4) (100.0) Percentages in parentheses  
Source: State/year constitutional litigation dataset (se Appendix I). 
 
8 The calculation is based on the data available in “@lex”, the Supreme Court’s judicial 
statistics website. @lex registers information for all “original, complete and closed files”, 
excluding those incomplete and/or unclosed ones. This study employs this website as its 
source of judicial information for being the most reliable and methodologically robust 
compendium regarding constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality. As 
updated in June 2012, @alex registers 1283 different constitutional controversy files. The 
calculations used in this dissertation excluded all the 123 cases that are registered as 
submitted by or against “non-legitimate actors” as well as those described as dismissed by the 
Supreme Court without rendering a formal judgment.  
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Constitutional controversy has certainly been effective in processing 
conflicts emerging a more fragmented political scenario. In a context 
characterised by declining presidencialismo and the debilitation of the 
formerly hegemonic party system, political actors become more prone to 
employ all the tools they have for advancing their agendas. Having access to 
the Supreme Court was one of these tools that proved to be effective in 
transforming political conflict into a legal dispute subject to the arbitration of 
a court. In order to explain in more detail how political disputes have 
translated into constitutional controversies the next sections analyse in detail 
the particularities in the use of constitutional litigation by the authorities of 
the three levels of government.  
3.2.1 National-level authorities 
On the 21st of December 2004 President Vicente Fox sued (filed as 109/2004) 
the Chamber of Deputies for having refused to consider the observations he 
submitted to the Federal Budget that that organ approved for the 2005 fiscal 
year. The Supreme Court admitted the case first, then suspended the 
application of the budget as a precautionary measure and, eventually in 2005, 
once the budget was in operation, rendered a decision against the legislative 
branch. The federal budget is one of the 34 cases federal authorities have filed 
in the Supreme Court.  
At the national level the constitutional controversy has fundamentally 
worked as a mechanism for settling disputes between the president and the 
federal congress. The federal executive has been the claimant party in 13 out 
of the 21 cases opposing federal authorities, all of them filed after alternation 
in the presidency and under divided government. Likewise, all but one of the 8 
federal congress cases against the executive appeared under similar 
conditions. Both the executive and legislative branch have particularly 
targeted fiscal dispositions such as the 2005 Federal Budget or, in the case of 
the Congress, the constitutional controversy 32/2002 whereby the Supreme 
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Court struck down a decree issued by the president exempting from paying 
the Services and Production Special Tax those industries employing non-sugar 
sweeteners in the manufacture of their products.  
Alternation has had an evident effect in the way federal authorities 
employ the Supreme Court. The first time a president submitted constitutional 
controversy was in 1996 when Ernesto Zedillo, the last president of PRI’s 
dynasty, sued the PAN-governed municipality of Guadalajara for having 
issued new regulations regarding the provision of private security services to 
banking institutions. The relevance of this demand does not only rely on the 
fact that this municipality is part of Mexico’s second largest metropolitan 
area, nor on the legal outcome of the case –new regulations were struck 
down- but in being a sign of the advantages of having established formal 
methods for processing conflicts between authorities.  
The case of Guadalajara’s municipality exemplifies how political 
affiliation has been determinant for federal authorities to engage in 
constitutional litigation. The federal executive has never employed the 
constitutional controversy to sue an authority affiliated to its own party. On 
the contrary, in 3 out of the 9 cases submitted by the federal executive the 
targets of the demand have been decisions made by Mexico City’s left wing 
authorities. These three controversies filed between 2000 and 2006 were 
circumscribed to the Fox- Lopez Obrador quarrel, a conflict that lasted for the 
entire period of the former's presidency, and the latter's Head of Mexico City’s 
Government.9 The first case regarded the local Education Law (CC-29/2000), 
the second was a decree declaring the inapplicability of the daylight saving 
time in the Federal District (CC-8/2001), and the third one was a technical 
standard regulating the re-charge by injection of groundwater reserves. 
9 About the political conflict that lead to Lopez Obrador's impeachment see for example 
Roldan Xopa (2004), Oliver (2010), Flores- Macias & Lawson (2006).  
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The Federal Congress has sued only three subnational authorities and no 
municipal ones. The first of them (CC-42/2004) contested the refusal of 
Oaxaca state government to permit the evaluation for the 2002 fiscal year by 
the Federal Audit Office (Auditoria Superior de la Federacion), which is the 
country’s highest audit public body, and an institution attached to the 
Chamber of Deputies. The second case (CC-24/2005), which was linked to the 
Fox-Lopez Obrador quarrel, challenged a legislative agreement whereby the 
Mexico City’ Legislative Assembly set out the rules to conduct the 
impeachment processes of local public officers. In the third and most recent 
one the federal legislative disputed a reform to the Chiapas state constitution 
extending the fixed and predefined terms of publicly elected officers.  
National-level authorities, both executive and legislative, have used 
litigation in a selective and strategic fashion. They have privileged fiscal-
related matters over other legal matters, and have concentrated litigation 
against authorities under the control of opposition parties. Indeed, the 
evidence shows that although strategic, litigation has not been a tool regularly 
employed by federal authorities. Being at the top of the federal system allows 
executive and legislative institutions to have a more diverse set of tools with 
which to engage in political bargaining with authorities from other levels of 
government. One of these tools is the control federal authorities have over 
fiscal policy. Every year, federal and state authorities negotiate the volume of 
financial resources to be transferred from national to subnational 
governments. As it is explained in the following pages, the control of public 
money is the main factor stimulating litigation.  
3.2.2 Subnational authorities 
In the period 1995-2009 subnational authorities submitted 14% of all 
constitutional controversies, an average of 0.34 per state per year. Not all the 
states, however, have resorted to the Supreme Court. There is no single 
constitutional controversy filed by any subnational authority from Hidalgo, 
103 
Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas or Veracruz, all of which are states where the PRI 
has not lost its historic dominance. Neither have there been any from 
Michoacan nor Queretaro, states governed during most of the period by the 
PRD and PAN, respectively. The use of constitutional controversy has been, as 
in the case of federal authorities, selective and limited, as well as being 
especially affected by political variables like affiliation and fragmentation.   
Controversies against national-level authorities represent a quarter of all 
subnational cases. State-executive branches have been the most active actors, 
initiating 1 out of every 3 cases focusing litigation against the federal 
executive. In the period 1995-2000, still under PRI’s rule, governors of six 
different states sued the president for acts related to the transfer of financial 
resources, territorial disputes and criminal proceedings against state public 
officers. Among these cases, the CC-11/1995 is especially relevant because it 
was part of the 1994-1995 Tabasco state post-electoral conflict, where 
president Zedillo, governor Roberto Madrazo and the defeated PRD candidate 
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, all played relevant roles. Madrazo won the 
1994 governor election amid allegations of fraud and campaign overspending 
(Berruecos, 2003). Lopez Obrador reacted by setting up a mobilisation strategy 
that included the closure of oil fields and a march from Tabasco to Mexico 
City. 
As the PRI administrations had done in previous post-electoral conflicts, 
Zedillo negotiated an informal agreement with the PRD that included the 
organisation of new elections. To execute his part of the agreement, Zedillo 
offered governor-elect Madrazo a cabinet position in exchange for his 
resignation. Madrazo did not accept and with the support of local legislators 
took office on the 1st of January 1995 (Eisenstadt 1999). In June of that year 
Lopez Obrador sued Madrazo claiming he had committed different electoral 
offenses during the governorship race. On August 20th the Attorney General 
issued a press release informing that Lopez Obrador’s demand had been 
admitted and, as a result, his office would start the corresponding 
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investigations. A day after, governor Madrazo submitted a constitutional 
controversy demanding the invalidation of investigations under the argument 
that the Attorney General was invading Tabasco’s exclusive jurisdiction on 
criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court dismissed the case and no formal 
charges were filed against Madrazo. The relevance of this case relies on the 
fact that it was an evident sign of presidencialismo’s decline, anticipating the 
extensive use of litigation that soon would take place.  
Unlike the experience of litigation between authorities from the same 
political affiliation, since the PAN came to power in 2000, no governor of this 
party has submitted any case against the federal executive. Actually, the 
noticeable feature during PAN’s rule is the significant increase (from 1 to 10) 
of local congresses demands against the president. A good example of this 
group of cases is the file CC 109/2009 whereby Mexico City’s Legislative 
Assembly challenged a presidential decree declaring the closing-down of the 
main public energy company in central Mexico (Compañia de Luz y Fuerza del 
Centro). Despite this case's relevance for its links to the highly controversial 
conflict between the federal government and Mexican Union of Electric 
Workers, one of the most combative labour organisations in the country, most 
of the cases by state congresses are related to financial transfers from federal 
to subnational governments.  
Overall, in the case of subnational authorities, the constitutional 
controversy has mainly been a means for settling internal conflicts - 2 of every 
3 subnational cases are internal - rather than a method for contending higher 
or lower authorities. Three features distinguish internal controversies: first, 
one half of them have state judiciaries as claimant. Second, there is an evident 
difference between the number of cases emerging under divided (69) and 
unified governments (30). Third, in addition to fiscal-related controversies, a 
considerable proportion of cases linked to the designation and dismissal of 
public officers also exists. 
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The activity by state-judiciaries has coincidentally been focused on fiscal 
and public officer matters but with no clear skew towards divided 
governments. The judiciaries of Jalisco (12), Baja California (7), Tlaxcala (7) 
and Yucatan have been remarkably proactive in using litigation, mainly as 
means for protecting their financial conditions. The Baja California state High 
Court of Justice for example demanded the local congress for the approbation 
of the 2005, 2006 and 2007 local budgets, whereas its counterpart in Jalisco did 
so in 2003 and 2006 and, in addition to this, it also sued the local congresses 
for not having ratified two of the High Court’s members.  
The controversies by local judiciaries indicate a further change in the 
political system, this one at the subnational level. As in the case of the 
president, diffusion of power has, in general terms, made governors less 
dominant, and, at the same time, it has encouraged the other branches of 
government to effectively check executives.  
The divided governments’ effect on constitutional litigation is noticeable 
in the number of cases brought by local executives. Whereas under a unified 
government there are only 3 cases of governors challenging the congress, in 
divided government this figure reaches 22. Nayarit is a state where conflict 
has been more intense. Between 2002 and 2005 the governor, who was elected 
as the candidate of PAN-PRD coalition, sued the local congress 14 times, half 
of them contesting fiscal dispositions. The case of Nayarit clearly illustrates 
how governors have resorted to the constitutional controversy as practically 
their only way to oppose unfriendly legislatures. If controversies by state-
judiciaries show the autonomy gained by courts, controversies by executives 
are evidence of the decline of governors’ dominance.  
Up to this point the main patterns followed by subnational authorities' use 
of litigation have been explained. Constitutional controversy has amounted to 
an important tool for both contesting federal authorities and processing 
internal conflicts. Nonetheless, it has been narrowly employed to deal with 
inter-state conflicts. There are only two cases confronting authorities from 
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different states, both them filed in 1996 by the governor of Jalisco against its 
counterpart in Colima, and circumscribed to the historic territorial conflict 
between these states (Barragan 2002). In a similar way, subnational authorities 
have barely employed the constitutional controversy against municipalities. 
Save for the CC-83/2008 whereby the Morelos’ High Court of Justice sued 33 
municipalities in Morelos, subnational authorities have demanded 9 out the 
2456 municipalities that exist in Mexico.  
To sum up, constitutional controversy has performed two main roles at 
the subnational level: it has been a mechanism whereby authorities from 
opposition-governed states have contested federal authorities, particularly in 
connection to fiscal issues; and also as a channel for processing states' internal 
disputes, mainly in divided government contexts. Nonetheless, the procedure 
has not been significant in settling inter-state conflicts or for contesting 
municipalities.  
3.2.3 Municipalities 
Mexico’s federal system is composed of: 32 subnational entities (31 states and 
the Federal District) and 2,456 municipal-level authorities (2,440 proper 
municipalities plus Mexico City’s 16 boroughs). Subnational entities have 76.8 
municipalities on average but with an extreme variance among them, ranging 
from 5 in Baja California and Southern Baja California, to 570 in Oaxaca, the 
state with the largest proportion of indigenous population (INEGI, 2011). 
Under the 1917 Constitution (Article 115), municipalities have exclusive 
jurisdiction over land use regulations (zoning) as well as for the provision of 
drinking water, sewerage, lighting, graveyards, markets, streets, parks gardens 
and public security. Municipalities, despite being in more regular contact with 
the population, have limited fiscal faculties, a condition that, as in the case of 
states, implies that they have the right incentives to constantly resort to the 
Supreme Court.  
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As was mentioned earlier, before 1995 municipalities' lacked the standing 
to resort to the Supreme Court through constitutional controversies. One of 
the 1994 judicial reform's main innovations was to have provided municipal 
authorities with access to the Supreme Court. In the first fifteen years of the 
new provisions, municipalities have submitted 962 cases or, in other words, 4 
out of every 5 constitutional controversies filed in Court. If the reform is 
assessed by only considering the extent to which municipal authorities have 
in fact employed their standing, the conclusion would be clear: it has been a 
success. Indeed, it has been effective in taking to the Supreme Court a 
considerable volume of a completely new type of cases that has gradually but 
radically transformed the way constitutional judges understand their role in 
the political system.  
Authorities of 632 different municipalities have filed all the 962 
controversies. Put differently, a quarter of all the 2,457 municipalities that 
exist in Mexico have sued other authorities in the Supreme Court. These 632 
municipalities are almost equally distributed between rural (55%) and urban 
(45%). However, in terms of the number of cases, the urban municipalities 
have been more active, submitting 59% compared to 41% from the rural areas. 
This distinction is relevant in understanding what was mentioned earlier 
about the considerable number of indigenous rights controversies in 2001.  
That year the Supreme Court received 315 cases by municipal authorities 
(92% of them from Oaxaca state) contesting the constitutional reform that 
incorporated into the charter a group of dispositions intended to be more 
protective of indigenous communities. At the core of these demands was the 
claim that the reform failed to comply with the organisation of a popular 
consultation of the proposed changes, an obligation the Mexican state had as a 
result of the ratification of the International Labour Organisation Convention 
169 on indigenous and tribal peoples. As these cases targeted a constitutional 
reform process rather than conflict between the charter and a low-ranked 
disposition, the Supreme Court opted to dismiss them, justifying its decision 
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on a precedent specifying the constitutional controversy as an unsuitable 
procedure to challenge constitutional amendment processes.  
Indigenous rights controversies represent 27% of all cases the Supreme 
Court received from 1995 to 2009. Leaving these cases aside, municipal 
controversies are distributed in the following way: 18% against national 
authorities, 81.4% against subnational ones and 0.6% against other 
municipalities. Contrary to the predominant use national and subnational 
authorities have made of constitutional controversy to settle horizontal 
disputes, municipalities have largely employed it to contest high-ranked 
authorities.  
Three aspects feature municipal controversies against federal authorities. 
Firstly, they have fundamentally emerged after alternation took place in 2000. 
There were only 7 cases registered before 2001, but 109 afterwards. Secondly, 
they have main been submitted to contest the Federal Congress. Thirdly, they 
have targeted two main categories of provisions: fiscal and those related to the 
appointments of public officers. Indeed, municipal authorities initiated 44 
different cases contesting the appointments of the commissioners to the 
Federal Commission of Telecommunications.  
Turning to controversies against subnational authorities, it is important to 
first bear in mind that they represent the largest proportion of all cases by 
municipalities (4 out of every 5). Second, in a similar way to the cases against 
national authorities, subnational ones are characterised by an increase 
considerably after 2001 (from 28.5 on average, to 42.9). Third, this group of 
cases is predominantly concentrated on fiscal matters, followed by 
functionaries’ appointments and then infrastructure and planning.  
Finally, all four cases between municipal authorities are linked to conflicts 
related to the services exclusively provided by municipalities. Two of them 
were originated in disputes over drinking water provision in the 
municipalities of Puebla (CC-23/1998) and Martinez de la Torre (124/2006). 
The other two, filed by the municipalities of Tultepec (CC-14/1999) and 
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Tlanepantla (CC-17/1999), both of them within the state of Mexico and within 
Mexico City’s metropolitan area, were intended to annul a single construction 
permit authorising the development of a sizable housing project which was 
issued by the municipality of Cuautitlan. The relevance of municipal 
horizontal municipalities does not rely on the conflict that they have brought 
to the Supreme Court, but on the one that they have not. The absence of 
horizontal conflicts between municipalities undoubtedly deserves further 
research to elucidate its causes. This objective, however, is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation.  
3.3 Actions of Unconstitutionality: Judicialisation from 
above 
The introduction of the action of unconstitutionality to Mexico’s legal system 
was the major innovation of the 1994 judicial reform. Before then Mexico 
lacked an abstractive review procedure whereby the Supreme Court could 
adjudicate on the constitutionality of legislation passed by the national and 
subnational legislative bodies. Inasmuch as the reform expanded the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, political actors were also granted with an 
unprecedented veto power over legislation that has influenced legislative 
behaviour and thence the way laws are made.  
As reformed in 1994, article 105 provides standing to initiate abstract 
review cases to: a) the Attorney General; and b) legislative minorities (with 
the support of least the 33% of the legislature) but only against laws approved 
by the legislative body they belong to. Later on, the 1996 electoral reform 
expanded standing to federal and state-level registered political parties (the 
latter only against local laws). In 2006 a new amendment further increased the 
scope of litigating by giving standing to the National Commission for Human 
Rights (CNDH) as well as to human rights commissions in the states.  
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The incorporation of the action of unconstitutionality to Mexico’s political 
system created a scenario more appropriate for the emergence of a 
judicialisation process of legislation. This procedure’s institutional design, 
however, included a pair of rules that, while guaranteeing a certain margin of 
deference to legislative bodies, limited the prospects of an extreme use of 
litigation. These rules introduced: 1) a 30-day span after the enactment of a 
piece of legislation as the only period in which actors with standing have to 
present a demand in the Supreme Court, 2) a supermajority of 8 out of the 11 
justices as the minimum vote the Supreme Court must reach to override any 
law under its jurisdiction.  
Unlike in other countries such as Colombia, where access to abstract 
review is open to the ordinary citizen, the institutional design selected for the 
action of unconstitutionality restricted standing only to political actors and, 
consequently, set the basis for the development of the Supreme Court as an 
eminently politicized body10. In order to analyse to what extent these political 
actors have in fact used this procedure this section categorizes them according 
to two main criteria: hierarchy and the fragmentation of veto power. 
Hierarchy refers to the jurisdiction to what different the actors with legal 
standing belong, that in Mexico’s federal system could be national or 
subnational.  
On the other hand, drawing on Tsebelis’ (2002) study of veto players, the 
analysis developed in the following pages consider that the veto power 
implied in having standing to resort to the Supreme Court could be 
fragmented when this power is given to different actors which in order to 
10 Schor (2009) provides an interesting comparison of the Mexican Supreme Court and the 
Colombian Constitutional Court. He argues that each court is playing a different role in their 
respective democratic order due to the institutional design that was established, but also as a 
result of short-term political bargains and long-term societal transformations. In his view, 
these differences explain why the Colombian Constitutional court has undertaken a more 
ambitious agenda than this Mexican counterpart.  
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employ it need to act collectively (i.e. the 33% of the members of a legislature); 
or can be unified when this power is given to individual actors.  
Individual and collective players have different incentives to litigate. 
Individual actors virtually have full autonomy to determine the use of veto 
power implied in having standing to initiate abstract review cases. 
Conversely, the behaviour of collective actors largely depends on the 
correlation of forces within a legislative body. For example, when the 
fragmentation within a legislative body is as low as to make it impossible for 
opposition parties to meet the 33% requirement, the use of litigation by 
collective actors is null. The incentives for litigating grow as fragmentation 
grows but, at the same time, the possibilities for conducting non-consensual 
decision-making decrease. Therefore, when fragmentation is so as high as to 
always require a coalition composed by more than three parties to pass a law, 
the possibility of taking this law to the Supreme Court is very low.  
Table 3.2 Actions of unconstitutionality: claimant party vs. defendant party, 
1995-2010 
   Jurisdiction of the challenged legislation  
   
National  
Subnational legislatures 
Total    Subnational Municipal 
Cl
ai
m
in
g 
pa
rty
 
N
at
io
na
l 
Attorney General 12 80 215 307 
 (1.71) (11.40) (30.63) (43.73) 
Political party 14 241 1 256 
 (1.99) (34.33) (0.14) (36.47) 
Human Rights Commission 3 8 0 11 
 (0.43) (1.14) (0) (1.57) 
Legislative minority 6 - - 6 
 (0.85) - - (0.85) 
Su
bn
at
io
na
l Political Party - 12 0 12 
 - (1.71) 0 (1.71) 
Human Rights Commission - 3 0 3 
 - (0.43) 0 (0.43) 
Legislative minority - 105 2 108 
 - (14.96) 0.28 (15.24) 
  Total 35 449 218 702 
   (4.99) (63.96) (31.05) (100) 
Percentages in parentheses 
Source: State/year constitutional litigation dataset (see Appendix I). 
 
As individual actors, the scope for employing litigation increases for 
political parties. They have two possible paths to resort to the Supreme Court: 
either as part of a legislative body or as individual actors, but only in electoral 
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matters. So when parties have marginal legislative force -which has been the 
case for several small parties- standing turns into a powerful tool to advance 
their agendas11. The incentives the Attorney General has to litigate are even 
higher because he can bring to the Supreme Court cases of any nature. 
Therefore, as the president appoints the Attorney General, and its office (the 
Procuraduria General de la Republica) is considered one of the administrative 
organs composing the federal executive, when this functionary litigates it is 
virtually acting as a delegate of the president. On the whole, having privileged 
access to the Supreme Court is strategic for being a veto power with the 
capacity to annul political decisions by other actors. In a fragmented 
environment where no actor has extreme dominance over the rest, having a 
veto power that is not accessible to all policy players becomes even more 
relevant.  
The Supreme Court adjudicated 70212 actions of unconstitutionality in the 
period 1995-201013. The largest proportion of these cases (77.6%) originated 
from petitions by national actors against subnational ones. Example of this 
type of cases are the actions of unconstitutionality submitted by the Attorney 
General challenging abortion law reforms passed by Mexico City’s local 
congress (chapter 5 analyses in depth these two cases). As in the case of 
constitutional controversies, vertical conflicts account for the larger 
proportion of cases but unlike them, the design of the action of 
unconstitutionality does not allow lower-ranked actors (i.e. subnational 
actors) to challenge decisions by those of higher levels of the federal system. 
11 By small-parties this thesis refers to the political parties that have a marginal 
representation in legislative bodies (federal and local). Among these parties are the Labour 
Party, the Green Party of Mexico, the Social-Democratic Party, Convergence Party.  
12 This figure excludes 16 cases registered in @lex, the source of judicial information, 
because they were submitted by or against actors with no standing. For further information 
of this source please refer to Appendix I.  
13 The period of analysis for the actions of unconstitutionality comprises one more year 
(2010) than the one for constitutional controversies. @lex, the main source of judicial 
information, does register information for this procedure up to that year. The aim then was 
to use the largest sample possible in order to maximize the explanatory power of this 
research.  
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On the other hand, horizontal cases mostly concentrate at the subnational 
level. What does this preliminary examination mean? In general terms, it 
makes clear that federal actors like the president during democracy have had 
to resort to the Supreme Court as a method of overcoming the decline of their 
influence over subnational politics. In the following pages it is explained in 
detail how the use of litigation by the different categories of actors was 
greatly affected by the changes in the political environment at both national 
and subnational levels.  
3.3.1 National actors 
National actors, that is those to belong to the federal jurisdiction like the 
Attorney General or the Human Rights Commission, submitted 4 out of every 
5 actions of unconstitutionality and within this group only 1% were by 
collective actors. The fragmentation of standing has made the use of litigation 
more difficult. However, individual actors have been encouraged to engage in 
a more proactive use of the Supreme Court insofar as they have not needed to 
agree the use of litigation with others. But even when the different individual 
actors have similar incentives to litigate, the factors fostering the use of it 
have been operated in different ways. For instance, it is possible that 
presidents have had to resort to litigation as they capacity to subordinate 
other actors declined. Small parties have never enjoyed real influence on 
decision-making processes, so having access to the highest court has always 
been strategic for them. For legislative minorities the decision-making 
processes have, on many occasions, been difficult enough that it has made no 
sense for them to litigate against decisions they were already involved in.  
There are three particular features featuring the cases brought by national 
actors: a) they have overwhelmingly been submitted by individual actors, b) 
they have considerably increased after alternation in the presidency, and c) 
they have particularly targeted subnational level legislation. More plural and 
competitive conditions have increased the incentives political actors have to 
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litigate. Litigation then increased the incentives to engage in policy-making in 
a more proactive way. To explain how litigation evolved, this section analyses 
separately the different uses individual and collective actors have made of it.  
3.3.1.1 The Attorney General  
The Attorney General has been the most active litigant in the Supreme Court. 
The 307 cases submitted by this actor represent 43% of all actions of 
unconstitutionality, an average of 1.6 per month in the period 1995-2010. 
However, the Attorney General only made use of standing after Vicente Fox 
came to office. Although the federal executive already had legal standing, 
under PRI’s rule this actor made no use of the capacity to bring cases into the 
Supreme Court. The relevance of this actor’s use of litigation relies on the fact 
he has been the main litigant, but also on the fact that when litigating in the 
Supreme Court the Attorney General virtually acts as agent of the president.  
Despite different efforts having been made to adopt a less centralised 
formula, Mexico’s fiscal federalism remains considerably centralised 
(Weingast, 2009). Federal government concentrates most on tax-collection 
functions, so state and municipal revenues largely depend on transfers from 
the federation (Courchene and Diaz-Cayeros, 2000; Diaz Cayeros, 2006). 
Bearing in mind this condition of Mexico’s fiscal system, it is not strange that 
the Attorney General has mostly litigated against subnational fiscal laws. 
Seven out of every 10 constitutional actions by the Attorney General 
challenged fiscal regulation approved by state congresses, but to be 
exclusively applied at municipal level.  
The Attorney General has mainly targeted laws related to the 
administration of public financial resources, however, as most of them have 
only municipal jurisdiction the salience of these cases has in general terms 
been limited. In the case of Attorney General Actions against municipal laws, 
there seems to be no effect of political affiliation in the use of litigation. The 
most challenged states by the Attorney General are Yucatan (74), Morelos (41) 
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and Coahuila (36), the first two under PAN control. This evidence shows that 
the Attorney General has litigated even against legislatures under its own 
party’s control. An example of this type of case is the AI-55/2008, whereby the 
Attorney General sued Revenues Law of the Municipality of Tixmehuac, 
passed by the Yucatan state Congress, claiming that taxing energy 
consumption violated Federal Congress' taxing jurisdiction.  
If political affiliation had no effect on litigation against municipal-level 
laws, the opposite would occur in regards to laws of state jurisdiction. The 
Attorney General has proportionately demanded more laws approved by 
divided and opposition-controlled legislatures than by those of its own party. 
Certainly, the case of the Federal District is especially interesting because 
among all subnational entities it has been the most demanded by federal 
actors. Laws as different as the Reading Promotion Law, the Law of the 
Protection of Non-smokers, or the Financial Code, just to name a few, have all 
been subject to demands by the Attorney General. However, the most salient 
ones have been related to questions about the role of the state in reproductive 
and family matters.  
The Attorney General challenged in 2000 a law decriminalising abortion 
for genetic causes (AI-10/2000), then in 2007 a new reform legalising first-
trimester abortion (AI-146/2007) –these two cases are the subject of analysis in 
chapter six- and later on the legalisation of same-sex marriage approved in 
2009 (AI-62/2009). These cases are emblematic because they opposed actors 
from different ideological orientations: the right-wing federal government and 
leftist Mexico City local legislature. Overall, the patterns followed by the 
Attorney General’s use of litigation exhibits how in a more competitive and 
ideologically diverse system, the presidency has had to resort to legal 
instruments in seeking to defend in judicial arenas what has been impossible 
to prevent in legislative ones.   
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3.3.1.2 Political parties 
Under article 105, political parties are restricted to present actions of 
unconstitutionality only against electoral laws. The 45% of national cases - 
slightly more than a third of the total - were by national political parties. The 
first and foremost relevant feature in the litigation by these actors is being 
essentially employed to contest subnational laws: 95% of the cases brought by 
national parties challenge subnational legislation. Political parties share with 
the Attorney General an inclination against laws of subnational jurisdiction.  
The second important feature is that the parties that have made more 
regular and extensive use of the action of unconstitutionality are the smaller 
ones that lacked real capacity to influence the legislative decision-making 
process. In the period 1995-2011, 13 different political parties filed a total of 
256 cases, 45% by the largest ones (i.e. PRI, PAN and PRD), and the remaining 
55% by ten smaller organisations (6 of which are already defunct14 due to poor 
electoral performance). For large parties the action of unconstitutionality has 
turned into a useful tool in those states where they have a limited electoral 
competitiveness. This explains, for example, why the PRI has submitted only 
12 cases, the PAN 38 and the PRD 65.  
Resorting to the Supreme Court is, for small parties, a strategic instrument 
they have employed in cases seeking to counterbalance the power of the three 
principal parties. Interviewee 4 confirmed this by describing this procedure as 
a powerful political ‘weapon’ they use to respond to the making of law by the 
three major parties. Small parties' marginal legislative representation makes it 
even more important for them to have access to the Supreme Court. “On some 
occasions [he concludes] what is at stake is our own subsistence, so having 
this tool is very important even to negotiate with stronger parties”.  
14 These parties are: Nationalist Society Party (PSN for its Spanish abbreviation), Party for 
Social Alliance (PAS for its Spanish abbreviation), Mexican Revolution Authentic Party 
(PARM for its Spanish abbreviation), Party of Democratic Centre (PCD for its Spanish 
abbreviation), Social-Democratic Alternative Party and Social-Democratic Party.  
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The third most relevant characteristic of political parties' actions is the 
high proportion of cases challenging laws passed by PRI-controlled 
legislatures. Political parties have challenged 14 federal laws, four of them 
before 1997 when the PRI held both chambers, and the remaining 10 
afterwards, under divided governments. Still under unified government the 
PRD (2), PAN (1) and PVEM (1) challenged the Federal Code of Electoral 
Institutions and Proceedings' (COFIPE) new provisions in electoral justice, 
public funding and proportional representation matters. This modification to 
the COFIPE was the application to this secondary law the new electoral 
principles and competences incorporated in to the constitution by the 1996 
electoral reform.   
The 1996 reform gave full autonomy to the Federal Electoral Institute, the 
body in charge of organising elections at federal level, and the Federal 
Electoral Tribunal, the group of courts responsible of the arbitration of 
electoral conflicts (Becerra, Salazar, and Woldenberg 2000). The constitutional 
component of the reform was passed with the support of all parties. However, 
the conflict emerged when the PRI approved the changes to the secondary law 
–the COFIPE- without having reached an agreement with opposition parties. 
The four actions of unconstitutionality resulted from this conflict and, 
paradoxically, opposition parties employed their standing which the 1996 
constitutional reform gave them to challenge the legal changes derived from 
that amendment.   
After the arrival of divided governments small parties submitted all but 
one of the cases involving federal parties. The relatively equal correlation of 
forces among the three main parties in the federal congress has forced the 
construction of coalitions to legislate and this has reduced the incentives they 
have to litigate. The exception to this trend is AI-25/2003 whereby in 2003 the 
PRD challenged the designation of the Federal Electoral Institute’s General 
Council new councillors. The Supreme Court soon dismissed the case under 
the argument that designations of public officers are acts not laws and 
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therefore cannot be challenged through actions of unconstitutionality. This 
case, however, is important because the performance of the IFE run by those 
councillors was the PRD’s main complaint in the 2006 post-electoral conflict 
(Eisenstadt, 2007).   
The dominance the PRI has in a fair number of states has provoked 
political parties to concentrate their demands precisely in the states where this 
party has complete control of the congress. Mexico and Veracruz, the most 
and third-most populous states in the country, have concentrated the largest 
amounts of cases. It is remarkable the fact that this type of litigation is 
focusing in states that have not experienced divided government because it 
reinforces the conclusion that it is a parties' low fragmentation degree which 
fosters litigation.  
3.3.1.3 The National Commission on Human Rights  
In September 2006 the National Commission on Human Rights (CNDH) and 
human rights commissions in the states were granted with standing to actions 
of unconstitutionality. This was the first time since the creation of the 
procedure that a constitutional amendment was passed to expand the access 
to the Supreme Court to non-partisan actors. The amendment opened the door 
for the development of wider use of litigation, made it susceptible to becoming 
more human rights centred, and less focused on fiscal and electoral matters. 
From 2006 to 2010 the CNDH has been claimant in 11 cases, 3 against federal 
laws and 8 more against subnational applications. Although the reform has 
substantially transformed the nature of cases under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction, it has certainly provided judges with cases that involve more 
relevant questions about human rights and the role the state must play in 
their protection.  
The CNDH sued the federal congress three times, all in 2009. One major 
aspect of this is that the two cases are linked to national security laws and 
were filed in the context of the ‘war on drugs’ declared by Felipe Calderon’s 
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administration in 2007. The first one (AI-22/2009) challenged a reform to the 
Federal Commerce Code claiming that the new provision restricting appeals 
only to the cases involving at least 200,000 Mexican pesos (around £10,000 
pounds sterling) establishes a discriminatory rule in contradiction to 
constitutional guarantees. In the second case (AI-48/2009) the CNDH 
challenged a new provision incorporated in to the Federal Police Law 
prohibiting non-Mexican born citizens to hold high-rank positions. The last, 
and second national security-related one, is a case whereby the CNDH 
challenged a reform to the Attorney General’s Office Organic Law granting 
this prosecutorial organ with discretionary powers to deny public information 
to the CNDH.  
The subnational actions by the CNDH challenged legislatures with no 
single-party majority and under the control of both the PRI and the PRD, but 
none against the PAN. Four out of these 8 cases sued the leftist Mexico City 
legislature, one against Public Health Law, another related to the Civil 
Proceeding Code and one more against the Disability Rights Law, but the most 
salient and coincidentally the first action of constitutionality submitted by the 
CNDH contested liberalisation of first-trimester abortion in Mexico City. This 
case was joined by a demand the Attorney General submitted against the 
same law. In these cases the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision that 
held the reform as constitutional. For the CNDH this was an important 
reversal because it prompted hard criticisms from feminist groups and 
academia not only because it was conceived as a conservative measure by the 
highest institution devoted to human rights protection, but also because it was 
regarded as a sign of subjection to presidential power (Fuentes, 2008)15.  
15 A note published by Fuentes (2008) in Mexico City’s newspaper Reforma, mentions that 
five full-time professors at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, who by the time 
were also members of the Human Rights Commission’s Council, publicly expressed their 
concern about the decision of José Luis Soberanes, Head of the Commission, to challenge the 
liberalisation reform passed in Mexico City. Pedro Morales Ache, in representation of the 
Information Group on Reproductive Choice (GIRE for its Spanish abbreviation), a non-profit, 
non-governmental organization devoted to promote women’s reproductive rights, also 
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3.3.1.4 Federal legislative minorities 
Mexico has been under divided government since 1997. The PRI lost their 
majority that year in the Chamber of Deputies and three years later in the 
Senate. A divided government gradually transformed politics in both 
chambers, forcing parliamentarian groups to become more proactive in 
legislative processes. The construction of coalitions is what has distinguished 
legislative decision-making since 1997. This is the context in which federal 
legislative minorities have employed litigation.  
In the period 1995-2010 federal legislators filed in the Supreme Court five 
cases, one of them before the advent of divided government, and the rest 
afterwards. In 1996 deputies from the PAN, PRD and Labour Party (PT, for its 
Spanish abbreviation) together sued PRI’s majority in the Federal Congress for 
passing the Law for the Coordination of the National Public Security System, 
claiming that the incorporation to the National Public Security System of the 
Defence and Navy Secretaries was in contradiction to the constitutional 
principle establishing public security as a matter of the civil police corps 
exclusive jurisdiction. In this case (AI-1/1996) -the second action of 
unconstitutionality filed in the Supreme Court ever- justices delivered a 
decision against the legislative minority which is, in fact, the only case where 
federal legislators have not been successful.  
It took seven years for the Supreme Court to receive a new case by federal 
legislative minorities. In 2003 and 2004 deputies from PAN, PRD, Green 
Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM, for its Spanish abbreviation), PT and 
Convergencia (a small left-to-centre party created in 1999) submitted three 
different actions against the Federal Revenues Laws for those fiscal years. 
Later in 2008 legislators from the Chamber of Deputies also sued the Fiscal 
Coordination Law. Legislative minorities achieved relative success in all these 
criticised the arguments provided by the Commission as they imply that abortion must be 
absolutely prohibited and criminalised.   
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cases, getting from the Supreme Court the invalidation of at least one of the 
contested norms.  
Now, in relation to litigation by members of the Senate, it is important to 
underline, first that although they have exclusive standing to contest 
international treaties ratification, no case of this type has ever been filed in 
the Supreme Court. Second, there is only one case that has prompted a group 
of senators to employ litigation against a norm approved in their own 
chamber: the reform to the Federal Law of Radio and Television passed in 
2006 known as Ley Televisa (named after the largest media company in 
Mexico and allegedly the main beneficiary of this piece of legislation).  
In March 2006, in the middle of that year’s electoral process, the Senate 
approved a reform that eased telecommunications regulations in favour of 
‘concessionaires’ (in Mexico the electromagnetic spectrum is considered a 
public property that the state allocates to a public contractor in the form of a 
‘concession’). Under the new provisions concessionaires have less restrictions 
to consolidate their dominance over the electromagnetic spectrum, essentially 
through the expansion of their control over frequencies, the tacit 
authorisation, under the same concession, for providing services additional to 
radio and television broadcasting, and the contraction of regulatory powers by 
the sector regulator (Madrazo and Zambrano, 2007).     
Immediately after the approval, the Ley Televisa provoked an intense 
debate about the new regulations themselves and, most importantly, regarding 
the subordination of state institutions to the power of private corporations 
(Esteinou and Alva de la Selva, 2009). Certainly, Santiago Creel, former 
Secretary of Government, declared in 2007 that the reform had in fact been an 
imposition by television companies which, taking advantage of the on-going 
electoral process, put enough pressure on the legislature to get the new law 
approved by 79/38 (Becerril, 2007). In reaction to Ley Televisa, 47 senators –
more than those who voted against the law- endorsed an action of 
unconstitutionality (AI-26/2006) claiming that the new provisions violated the 
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state constitutional obligation of administrating national property. The 
Supreme Court struck down 6 articles and 16 paragraphs of the Ley Televisa, 
invalidating the dispositions permitting concessions to be ratified without 
auction, setting irreversible fixed-term concessions, and authorising the 
provision of services unspecified in the concession titles.  
3.3.2 Subnational actors 
Under article 105, subnational actors have standing to litigate only against 
legislatures from their own jurisdiction. Therefore, all the 122 subnational 
actions imply internal horizontal disputes. This certainly is one of two main 
features identifying this procedure at the subnational level; the other being 
the legal mechanism whereby the highest judicial organ in the country 
arbitrates internal legislative conflicts. The second feature is that, unlike 
national cases, 9 out of every 10 subnational actions have had collective actors 
as the claiming party.  
Subnational individual actors consist of state-registered political parties 
and state commissions on human rights. These actors together have submitted 
only 15 cases to the Supreme Court, two-thirds of which are against 
legislatures where a single-party holds the majority. Two facts explain the 
limited number of cases by this group of actors: first, national-registered 
parties are the dominant electoral organisations at subnational level, curbing 
the development of local forces and therefore limiting the demand of litigation 
to just a few parties. Second, the human rights commissions gained standing 
only in 2006, so in comparison with the rest of the actors they have had a 
narrower time-span to more actively engage in litigation.  
In regards to actions of unconstitutionality by local parties it is important 
to underline, first, that they have been submitted by a reduced group of ten 
parties from in an equal number of states. These parties together filed 12 cases 
in the Supreme Court, nine of them contesting single-party controlled 
legislatures and the rest from divided congresses. In a similar way to national 
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small parties, local organisations have targeted laws modifying the allocation 
of public funding and imposing stricter rules for electoral coalition formation. 
The AI-11/1999 constitutes a good example of the cases of this type. In this 
action, the People’s Conscience Party from San Luis Potosi state sued the 
congress claiming that the then recently approved public funding regime 
created an unequal resources-distribution system. This example makes clear 
incentives for national small parties and state-registered parties alike: lack of 
legislative presence to effectively take part in rule-making processes compels 
them to use litigation. The difference and reason why just a few small parties' 
cases exist is due to the limited number of small parties.  
State human rights commissions have made use of standing in just three 
cases. In the first one (AI-37/2006) the San Luis Potosi state commission 
contested the state’s Minor Offenders Law, in the second the Zacatecas state 
commission sued the Law of the Institute for Women in Zacatecas, in the most 
recent one Mexico City’s commission challenged the local Patrimonial 
Liability Law. Only in this last case did the claimant prevail largely because 
the submitted demand was more precise and comprehensive in invoking 
international instruments and precedents by supranational courts. Still, what 
is most outstanding in the case of the human rights commission is the deficit 
in their use of litigation16.  
Legislative minorities have filed a total of 107 actions of 
unconstitutionality. The peculiarity of these cases is that most of them 
emerged from single-party majority legislatures, rather than from the divided 
ones. Three-quarters of these demands targeted single-party majority 
legislatures, two-thirds of them controlled by the PRI. The states of Veracruz, 
Sinaloa or Durango are examples of how litigation has been triggered by less 
fragmentation. In all, the local congresses have been under PRI`s control 
16 In this respect, it is convenient to underline that the lack of cases from human rights 
commissions encouraged Justice Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz to dedicate one his newspaper 
collaborations to invite these types of institutions to make more active use of the action of 
unconstitutionality (Cossio Diaz, 2012).   
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throughout the period of this study. Opposition parties have therefore lacked 
the capacity for vetoing majority decisions in the legislative arenas. It is this 
context in which standing has become a strategic mechanism for contesting 
the majorities’ dominance. Something similar has occurred in the Federal 
District and Nuevo Leon, the states with more cases by legislative minorities, 
but where the dominant parties have been the PRD and PAN, respectively.  
3.4 The Determinants of Constitutional Litigation 
This section presents the results of a more comprehensive statistical analysis 
about the specific political factors determining judicialisation. The literature 
on Mexican judicial politics has addressed the question of whether political 
factors influence the Supreme Court’s decision-making (Magaloni and 
Sanchez, 2008; Magaloni and Sanchez, 2006; Rios Figueroa, 2007) –the next 
chapter pays particularly attention to this question- but has not responded in 
depth to extent to what political factors have been the determinants of 
judicialisation. Having preceding sections provide an account of the evolution 
of political fragmentation and the use of litigation at national and subnational 
levels, the current one aims to find out the specific causes in Mexican states 
fostering political actors to resort to the Supreme Court.  
The specific study conducted for this section consisted of a panel data 
negative-binominal regression analysis using a generalized estimating 
equations model (GEE). The selection of this method was based on three 
considerations: first, since the purpose of this analysis was to examine the 
effects of political variables through time but also across the different states, 
the appropriate method to conduct is longitudinal or panel data analysis 
because it permits to account for these changes by using state-year as the unit 
of analysis (Agresti, 2007; Wooldridge, 2001). Second, as the response variable 
is a count (i.e. the number of cases filed in the Supreme Court by state per 
year) and therefore the data are zero-inflated and not following neither a 
normal nor a Poisson distribution, a negative-binominal methods was selected 
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because it is specifically intended to account for date distributed in this 
particularly way (Greene 1994; Hilbe 2011; King 1988)17. Third, as the data 
included in the model present a certain degree of correlation, the analysis 
opted to employ GEE because it permits to address such difficulties at the 
same time as using an event count response variable (Ballinger, 2004; Zorn, 
2001).  
The dataset employed in the analysis was constructed from the sources 
cited in the Appendix. The following table reports descriptive statistics for all 
data.  
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics. Time span 1995-2010 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Actions of unconstitutionality  
Number of cases 
512 1.31 4.19 0 62 
Constitutional controversies  
Number of cases 
512 1.88 3.61 0 42 
PRI  
Governor 
512 0.63 0.48 0 1 
PAN  
Governor 
512 0.22 0.42 0 1 
PRD  
Governor 
512 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Divided government 
Local congress 
512 0.37 0.48 0 1 
FENP 
Effect. no. of parties in fed. congress 
512 3.02 0.40 2.29 3.56 
LENP  
Effect. no. of parties in local congress 
512 2.59 0.57 1.40 5 
LENP2  
LENP squared 
512 7.02 3.48 1.95 25 
Population (logged) 
State population 
512 14.66 0.78 12.83 16.53 
Participaciones (logged)18 
Financial resources from fed. govt. 
512 22.42 0.75 20.59 24.36 
Municipalities (logged) 
State’s no. of municipalities 
512 3.74 1.12 1.61 6.35 
Following the theoretical arguments outlined in the first chapter, the 
analysis expects that the use of litigation will vary positively with political 
17 An example of the use of this model in political science might be found in Cox (2008).  
18 Aportaciones are the targeted financial resources that federal government transfers to the 
states to be applied in specific programs. Aportaciones distinguish from participaciones in the 
fact that the latter are those non-targeted resources (Courchene and A. Diaz-Cayeros 2000). 
The model employs participaciones at constant values of 2003.  
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affiliation, as well as with higher degrees of national and subnational political 
fragmentation.  In the first place, the expectation of litigation to be positively 
associated with PRI affiliated governorships relies on the premise that there 
are more incentives to judicialise political conflict in states governed by the 
former hegemonic party. Second, litigation is expected to vary positively with 
national political fragmentation because the latter constitutes a sign of 
presidencialismo’s decline and therefore of the increasing need for a new, 
ultimate political arbitrator. Third, litigation is expected to vary positively 
with fragmentation because of the difficulties that it engenders in the 
decision-making process.  
Accordingly, the analysis aims to test the following hypotheses: 
H1a: Litigation will vary positively in PRI-governed states 
H1b: Litigation will vary positively with FENP  
H1c: Litigation will vary positively with LENP.  
 
Table 3.4 GEE analysis of effects of political variables on constitutional litigation 
 Constitutional controversies Actions of unconstitutionality 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 PRI -0.603 -0.613 -0.577 -0.597 0.226 -0.279 0.22 -0.415 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.41) (0.39) (0.42) (0.40) 
PAN -0.235 -0.295 -0.259 -0.31 0.609 0.079 0.578 0.018 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.43) (0.41) (0.43) (0.41) 
PRD -0.097 -0.206 -0.237 -0.284 0.918* 0.12 0.874 0.226 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.45) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) 
FENP 
 
0.535** 
 
0.508** 
 
1.904**
  
2.022*** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) 
LENP 
  
2.212** 2.256** 
  
2.688** 2.311* 
 (0.84) (0.84) (0.91) (0.94) 
LENP2 
  
-0.331* -0.351* 
  
-0.435** -0.433** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
Population -0.643** -0.501* -0.585** -0.449* -
 
-0.361 -
 
-0.329 
(logged) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Particip. 0.968*** 0.816*** 0.918*** 0.766*** 0.870*** 0.341* 0.801*** 0.27 
(logged) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Municip. 0.482*** 0.464*** 0.477*** 0.462*** 0.274** 0.121 
 
0.290*** 0.158 
(logged) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Constant -
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
-7.43*** -8.48*** -
 
-
  (2.28) (2.24) (2.50) (2.48) (2.22) (2.35) (2.53) (2.61) 
Observation
 
512 512 512 512 512 512 512 512 
Wald test 85.801 102.12 96.187 110.002 46.505 121.524 53.679 131.509 
P value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 3.3 presents the results of the population-averaged generalized 
estimating equation model (GEE)19. This table divides the analysis of 
constitutional controversies from the one for actions of unconstitutionality, in 
order to assess the variation in the use of these two different procedures. 
Moreover, for each of them four different models were conducted with the 
purpose of examining separately the effects of affiliation and fragmentation 
variables. Models 1 and 5 consider only political affiliation variables; models 2 
and 6 incorporate national fragmentation to the analysis; model 3 and 7 
exclude national fragmentation but include the subnational; finally in models 
4 and 8 all variables under analysis are included.20 
The results of this analysis stand out, first, for disconfirming the 
hypothesis of the association between political affiliation and litigation. In 
none of the models is the statistical effect of political affiliation to any of the 
parties significant. This result means that the governorship of a state by any 
particular party makes no substantial difference in the use of litigation. In 
other words, the fact that a state is governed by the PRI –or any other party- 
does not increase the probability of the Supreme Court receiving a 
constitutional claim. This finding therefore shows that factors other than the 
political affiliation of governors have been determinant for activating the use 
of litigation. This finding does not necessarily mean that political affiliation of 
the parties involved has no impact at all, but that a state being governed by a 
certain party does not significantly impact the use of litigation.  
Second, political fragmentation at federal level is statistically significant 
for both types of procedures. FENP variable performs as expected producing a 
positive effect on litigation showing that as the political system becomes less 
19 The GEE model was selected because it allows for the accounting of the average effect of 
the explanatory variables across all the state-year observations. This is a relevant aspect 
because the purpose of this analysis is, instead of finding out specific state level effects, to 
identify effects in the sample as a whole. Ingram  (2009) is an example of another study 
employing a GEE model (it does not use a negative-binomial distribution though).  
20 All the eight models were estimated with Stata v. 12.0 using the command xtgee. The data 
and the corresponding do-file are available from the author upon request. 
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presidentially-centred, the incentives for resorting to the Supreme Court 
increase. This is also an interesting result that supports the diffusion of power 
argument: the absence of a dominant actor increases the prospects of more 
equal political actors requiring the intervention of a third-party for solving the 
disputes emerging among them. This third-party is no longer the president, as 
it used to be under authoritarian rule, but the Supreme Court of Justice.  
The third relevant finding is that subnational political fragmentation 
(LENP) is also linked to the use of litigation. Models 3 and 7, as well as 4 and 8, 
test all for a quadratic effect of the effective number of legislative parties on 
litigation. In all cases the effect is statistically significant which means that the 
relationship between state-level fragmentation and judicialisation takes an 
inverse “U shaped” form. This finding may constitute a contribution to the 
judicial politics literature because it provides evidence to show that the effects 
of fragmentation on judicialisation are limited by the dynamics of democracy. 
In other words, democracy produces fragmentation, fragmentation produces 
judicialisation but more higher levels of fragmentation produce less 
judicialisation. The results indicate that political actors have more incentives 
to litigate when they are excluded from decision-making processes. When 
political fragmentation is high enough that a wide coalition is required to pass 
any piece of legislation political actors found fewer incentives to judicialise a 
decision in which they were probably involved. This finding, however, 
deserves further attention in order to explore in more detail and with more 
precision the quadratic association between state-level fragmentation and the 
use of litigation.  
Fourth, the effects of control variables on litigation are also a major 
finding of this analysis. In the case of constitutional controversies population, 
participaciones and municipalities are statistically significant in all models, the 
former producing a negative effective, while the latter two a positive one. For 
actions of unconstitutionality all variables are significant and produce similar 
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effects but not in all models. Population is significant in model 3 only, while 
participaciones and municipalities in models 1, 2 and 3.  
The findings related to control variables are interesting because of three 
main aspects. In the case of constitutional controversies, the four models 
confirm that more population is negatively associated to litigation. In other 
words, the models provide evidence that shows that the prospects of using 
litigation are higher in less populated states. The implications of this 
particular finding, however, need further research in order to be properly 
interpreted.  
The second relevant aspect related to control variables is that they show, 
also in the case of constitutional controversies, that that political 
fragmentation in terms of the territorial structure also affects litigation. In all 
the four models for constitutional controversies, municipalities are positively 
associated to more litigation. This finding indicates that the odds of using 
litigation increase in states composed by a larger number of subunits. More 
municipalities therefore expand the possibilities of conflict arising between 
authorities from different levels and, thus, of requiring the involvement of an 
arbitrator (i.e. the Supreme Court of Justice).  
The third aspect that should be noted in relation to control variables is 
that the financial resources transferred from the federal government to the 
states and the territorial fragmentation of the state are both linked to the more 
active use of litigation. In short, the arbitration role the Supreme Court 
performs while adjudicating constitutional controversies becomes more 
relevant for wealthier and more fragmented states.  
The relationship between federal transfers (participaciones) and litigation 
is particularly relevant because it indicates there exists an association between 
litigation and Mexico’s centralised fiscal policy. 90% of states' total revenues 
come from federal transfers, and for municipalities this figure is 65% 
(Courchene and Diaz-Cayeros, 2000). This condition creates an excessive 
dependence of states on the federal government, and therefore incentives for 
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the federal executive to employ fiscal policy to control local governments, and 
for local governments to overcome federal dominance by resorting to 
constitutional controversies.  
This structural feature of the Mexican federal system explains why the 
constitutional controversy, as the procedure intended to process conflicts of 
federalism, has been particularly employed to challenge fiscal-related 
government acts and legislation. The emergence of the Supreme Court as an 
arbitrator of the federal system has modified the dynamics of Mexico’s 
federalism but not the structural conditions unbalancing the correlation of 
forces among the authorities of the three levels of government.  
To sum up, judicialisation is linked to the changes the political system has 
lived through in the last fifteen years. Actions of constitutionality are more 
related to the dynamics of political fragmentation within legislative bodies, 
while constitutional controversies are particularly linked to fragmentation in 
territorial terms. More municipalities and financial resources are more 
problematic and produce a positive effect on litigation. More fragmentation 
engenders more judicialisation but only up to a certain limit. In democracy, 
and more specifically in the different degrees of fragmentation, lies the origin 
and limits of judicialisation.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Mexico’s political system has become more competitive, plural and democratic 
in the last two decades. In 2000 Mexico faced alternation in the presidency for 
the first time after more than seventy years of PRI’s administrations. 
Democratisation has allowed the opposition to gain the control of an 
increasing number of legislative and executive positions. As the political 
system has become more fragmented decision-making processes at national 
and subnational levels have also become more complex. The result of this 
increasing complexity in a less presidentially centralised political system has 
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been the need for a new and more effective institutional means for processing 
political conflict.  
The 1994 judicial reform set the institutional foundations for the process 
of judicialisation to occur. Although a necessary condition, institutional 
change itself does not provide a sufficient explanation of the process that 
emerged in the country with the inauguration of the Supreme Court’s new 
institutional design. In the case of constitutional controversies, judicialisation 
has essentially come from ‘below’, that is, from low-level authorities resorting 
to the Supreme Court as a means for effectively opposing those with more 
influence. Actions of unconstitutionality on the other hand have 
fundamentally been employed by national level actors to challenge laws 
passed at state level.  Both processes show a substantial transformation in the 
political system since both are connected to the consequences of the diffusion 
of power on the behaviour of political actors. In short, while some actors are 
no longer reluctant to legally challenge others with a more privileged position 
in the system, the most influential ones are no longer so dominant as to be 
able to constantly constrain the less privileged.  
The increasing degree of political fragmentation has been the decisive 
factor behind the judicialisation of Mexican politics. Judicialisation has forced 
the Supreme Court to deal in a more complex way with an increasing amount 
of more difficult cases. The next chapter explains how this process has 
gradually encouraged the Supreme Court’s Justices to employ in a more 
proactive and strategic way the tools they have to shape the making of law 
and policy. 
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4. Constitutional Review and Policy-making  
The Supreme Court acquired the right to overrule legislation and government 
action with the enactment of the 1994 judicial reform on the 31st of December 
of 1994. The Supreme Court did not employ this power until June 1997 when 
it struck down the dispositions that the Municipality of Guadalajara had 
established for the provision of private security services to banking 
institutions -a case previously mentioned in chapter three. Interestingly, it 
was the first case filed by Ernesto Zedillo, the president who promoted the 
reform that established this new constitutional review power. Before deciding 
this case, the Supreme Court had received 77 other constitutional 
controversies and adjudicated nine of them, so justices only rendered a strike 
down judgement until the one responsible for their nominations submitted his 
first case.  
The two previous chapters were devoted to analysing the factors related 
to the development of a more proactive policy-making by courts, paying 
particular attention to the way such elements have been displayed along 
Mexico’s history. In particular, the previous one demonstrated that political 
factors such as the increase in fragmentation have had a major role in the 
development of the judicialisation process. Now, this chapter is intended to 
explain how the institutional change from the reform, political factors from 
democratisation, and the unprecedented stability gained by the Supreme 
Court from 1995, all fostered the development and consolidation of this body 
as a national policy-maker in Mexico, an actor with the capacity of 
performing as Mexico’s political system’s ultimate arbitrator, as well as an 
effective source of generally applicable norms.  
The literature on Mexican judicial politics has explored the effects of 
political pluralism in the development of a more active court. Rios Figueroa 
(2007) found out that the probability for the Supreme Court to rule against the 
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PRI has increased as political fragmentation at the federal level has also 
increased. Magaloni and Sanchez (2008; 2006), on the other hand, asserted, 
that before but also after alternation in the presidency the Supreme Court has 
been inclined to rule in favour of the PRI, particularly in highly salient cases, 
and, meanwhile it has been inclined to strike down laws by opposition-
controlled institutions. 
Certainly, there seems to be a tacit agreement about the effects of political 
fragmentation in the Supreme Court’s performance, but not regarding 
partisan bias and autonomy. Furthermore, the analysis of the effects of the 
Supreme Court’s own transformation on its decision-making processes still is 
gap in Mexican judicial politics scholarship. The purpose of this chapter is, 
considering judicial rulings as non-zero game that produce different 
outcomes, to explore how the convergence of fragmentation with a more 
stable and experienced Supreme Court might have shaped its performance as 
policy-maker.  
The chapter is structured as follows: the first section provides a schematic 
account of the Supreme Court’s decision-making process to explain that there 
are different phases along which the Supreme Court displays its arbitration 
function. Having set this framework, the second and third sections 
respectively examine the different patterns this role followed on constitutional 
controversies and actions of unconstitutionality matters. Finally, the third one 
presents a statistical explanation of what have been the determinants of the 
Supreme Court’s decision-making, testing to what extent fragmentation and 
stability indeed altered its performance.  
4.1 Policy-making in the Structure of Decision-making 
The design of legal proceedings shapes decision-making processes by courts 
and, hence, their capacity to make policy and law. The objective of this section 
is to explain how the structure of the decision-making greatly affects the way 
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the Supreme Court arbitrates the conflict and employs case law to introduce 
laws that in practice can become rules of general application. But before 
presenting a detailed explanation of the structure of the decision-making 
process in actions of unconstitutionality and constitutional controversies, this 
section briefly revises the broad general features that distinguish the judicial 
operation of the Supreme Court. This first part of the section compares the 
Mexican case with the United States to better illustrate how policy-making by 
courts is shaped by certain rules regarding case selection and assignment, and 
the publicity of debates.  
First, unlike its counterpart in the United States, the Mexican Supreme 
Court has a limited control over its docket that limits its agenda-setting 
capacity (Magar et al., 2010). Albeit the Supreme Court has the facultad de 
atraccion, a proceeding whereby cases from lower courts can be brought to 
Supreme Court jurisdiction -either by petitions originated in lower courts’ 
judges or in the own Supreme Court’s justices-  in general terms the Supreme 
Court lacks of tools for implementing a regular and permanent case selection 
policy. In the United States, most of the caseload originates by certiorari 
petitions, a procedure whereby the parties of a trial request the Supreme 
Court to ‘attract’ the case from lower courts. Each year the United States 
Supreme Court receives numerous petitions from which justices select those 
more interesting for them and that could be adjudicated along a single-term 
(which usually goes from October to June). In the 2005-06 term, for example, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 78 out of the 8,517 petitions received 
(Thompson and Wachtell, 2009).  
To select what cases will be ruled on the merits1, the Supreme Court 
employs the cert pool, a method whereby petitions are randomly allocated to 
justices’ law clerks for them to prepare and circulate a summary of each of 
1 The concept ‘on the merits’ refers to a judgement where the judge or court bases the 
decision on fundamental issues rather than on technical or procedural aspects.  
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them (Owens, 2010)2. Justices then proceed to hold ‘conferences’, the meetings 
where they collegially decide what cases they will adjudicate. In order for a 
certiorari to be granted the vote of only four out of the nine justices in the 
bench is required. The ‘rule of four’ therefore prevents a majority of justices 
to gain the complete control over the docket (Epstein and Knight, 1998).   
The second feature that greatly differentiates the courts of Mexico and the 
United States is related to the assignment of cases. Unlike in Mexico, where 
the Supreme Court appoints a reporting justice even before admitting a case, 
the United States Supreme Court first holds hearings and only after they have 
finished proceeds to assign cases. Justices then hold the so-called conferences 
to discuss cases and take a preliminary vote. According to this vote, the most 
senior member in the majority (the president if he is in the majority) has the 
right to freely assign the case to the justice that will be responsible of drafting 
the opinion of the Supreme Court (Segal et al., 2005).  
Once the draft opinion is complete it is circulated among the rest of the 
justices who can either ratify or change their votes. If the opinion is approved, 
the Supreme Court proceeds to its announcement, which regularly occurs 
during the lasts months of the term. In the United States justices reach a 
preliminary agreement before assigning a case, a policy that allows them to, in 
most of the occasions, construct a judgement upon a decision already made. In 
the Mexican system, case assignment precedes hearings, hearings precede 
opinion drafting, and opinion drafting precedes the discussion and vote, so 
this method leaves the core of the decision-making process until the final 
stage.  
Third, there are certain rules regarding the publicity of the decision-
making process that give the United States Supreme Court greater discretion 
than its Mexican counterpart. In that country, most parts of the process are 
2 Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger created the cert pool in 1973. During his tenure 
Justice John Paul Stevens did not take part in the cert pool . Justice Samuel Alito Jr. decided 
in 2008 to no longer participate in the pool (Liptak 2008).   
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not open to the public. The hearings for the presentation of oral arguments 
are public, but justices discuss and make decisions in private. In Mexico, 
although private sessions are not an uncommon practice, the Supreme Court 
does hold public hearings, but also deliberates and votes on the cases in 
public. Interviewees 18, 19 and 32, all of whom were clerks to different 
Supreme Court justices, report that public sessions deeply affects justices’ 
behaviour, in some cases preventing them from engaging in more open and 
sincere debates but in others encouraging them to more constantly disagree. 
These three interviewees agree in that the effects of the public transmission of 
become noticeable from the moment they began to be televised on 2005.  
To summarise: the way Mexican process is structured makes it, first, more 
focused in the conduct of the proceedings than in reaching an effective 
decision; second, it opens a space for the development of a less consistent 
jurisprudencia; third, it creates conditions for evading a public confrontation of 
arguments and; finally, grants the reporting justice with considerable 
discretion for making relevant policy decisions such as case admissibility.  
As mentioned in the second chapter, constitutional review allows courts 
to play a double policy-making function: arbitrating political conflict and 
making law. Arbitration is essentially displayed through the dispositions 
whereby courts settle disputes, between two opposing parties; rule-making 
through the reasons founding such resolutions. This chapter is devoted to the 
analysis of the patterns followed by the Supreme Court decisions since the 
renovation of its institutional design in 1994. This section examines the 
decision-making process the Supreme Court conducts to adjudicate 
constitutional cases in order to explain the way arbitration and law making 
are displayed in the different decisions that are made along the process 
different stages.  
Turning to actions of unconstitutionality and constitutional controversies, 
it is convenient to recall that the fundamental task of last resort courts is to 
review judgements previously rendered by lower level courts. Last resort 
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judges analyse whether first and second level courts properly conducted legal 
proceedings, made a right interpretation of law and properly rendered 
judgements. They essentially work with the files of the cases at hand, and 
under some circumstances they also gather the arguments of the parties either 
orally or written. For last resort judges therefore it is not usual to be in charge 
of integrating judicial files for themselves, developing a first and completely 
new judgment. The incorporation of the action of unconstitutionality along 
with invigoration of the constitutional as procedures of the exclusive 
competence of the Supreme Court provoked a significant change to its 
proceedings and decision-making process. From 1995 the Supreme Court had 
not been only focused on deciding appeals but also in constructing 
judgements ‘from scratch’ in the constitutional cases under its exclusive 
jurisdiction.  
This innovation to the proceedings is not the only noticeable feature. The 
proceedings of the Supreme Court for constitutional cases on their own have 
also considerable influence on decision-making and, hence, on the way 
political conflict is arbitrated. The Supreme Court conducts its proceedings 
along three different stages: 1) case assignment and admission, 2) presentation 
and analysis of arguments and proposed judgement drafting, and 3) discussion 
and final judgement integration. All the cases presented before the Supreme 
Court pass the first stage but not necessarily through the rest of them. Indeed, 
a constitutional case may conclude either in the first or in the third stage, but 
not in the second one. The following paragraphs describe each phase in detail 
and explain why the different decision the Supreme Court is confronted with 
allows it to strategically decide when to define the party prevailing in the 
dispute.  
The main purpose of the first stage is to decide whether a demand is 
admissible or not. For doing so, the Supreme Court assigns the cases to 
justices through a turn-by-turn method following a sequential order not 
publicly available. Once the case is assigned to the reporting justice (ministro 
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instructor), he or she must decide its admission or rejection and issue the 
respective order (acuerdo inicial). In case the justice determines the rejection 
the process ends, unless the actor presents an appeal, which is also 
adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Although proceedings are alike for both 
constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality, for being a 
concrete rather than abstract review procedure, in the controversies 
challenging acts the reporting justice could - either ex officio or by petition- as 
a precautionary measure suspend their application  
The second phase is the longest part of the process. Once admitted the 
case, the reporting justice proceeds to request the parties to present either oral 
or written arguments, and does the same with the Attorney General who 
formally represents the interests of the nation. However, it is also possible 
that even after having admitted the case the reporting justice rules an order to 
reject the case without being required to gather the endorsement of the rest of 
the justices or taking the decision to the organ ‘en banc’. When it does not 
occur in such a way, the reporting justice in collaboration with the law clerks 
(Secretarios de Estudio y Cuenta) drafts a complete judgement proposal 
(Proyecto de Sentencia) that should be integrated by three parts: a description 
of the different parts of the process and summary of the arguments of the 
parties involved (vistos y resultando), an exposition of the reasoning and 
interpretation of the law conducted by the Supreme Court (considerandos), and 
finally a proper resolution of the element or group of elements included in the 
demand.  
The third phase begins when the judgement proposal is submitted for the 
discussion of the decision on the merits by the designated organ. In most cases 
this organ is the whole court working ‘en banc’3; under certain circumstance 
the chambers –or panels- could also conduct the final adjudication though. 
The Supreme Court discusses the cases in public sessions, which are streamed 
3 The concept ‘en banc’ refers to a session where a case is heard before all the judges of a 
court and not by a panel of judges.  
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on its website as well as broadcasted by the Canal Judicial, a channel run by 
the Supreme Court available on the internet as well as in paid television 
systems. There is no limited time for the Supreme Court to discuss a case, so 
justices freely discuss all the aspects they consider needed to settle the 
dispute. The regular practice is to take a vote to determine if the majority 
considers that, in general terms, the proposal should be the basis for the final 
judgment. In case the judgement proposal receives the endorsement of the 
majority, justices then proceed to vote on each of the decisive points 
(resolutivos) considered on it. When the project is dismissed, the Supreme 
Court can either vote on the decisive points proposed along the discussion and 
designate a different justice for drafting the definitive judgement (engrose), or 
defer the resolution and appoint a new reporting justice.  
Since the Supreme Court makes a decision for every decision point of the 
proposed judgment, the definitive one may include one or more final 
dispositions. For example, in a single case the Supreme Court can strike down 
an article of the challenged legislation, but confirm the constitutionality of 
another one. This means that the different types of decision are mutually 
exclusive but only for a single decisive point; a ruling may include several 
decisions of different types. There are four different possible decisions the 
Supreme Court can make: strike down, validate (or not to strike down), 
dismiss, or desestimar, which occurs in those cases when the majority vote to 
strike down but the supermajority clause of eight justices is not met4.  
After the Supreme Court reaches a final decision, the reporting justice (or 
the one appointed as replacement) prepares the definitive judgement (engrose) 
that has to incorporate the observations raised during the deliberation session. 
Once the final proposal is ready it is circulated again to gather the approval of 
4 The secondary legislation establishing the regulations on actions of unconstitutionality and 
constitutional controversies is called Statutory Law on the Fractions I and II of the 105 
Constitutional Article. This law establishes that for striking down general norms, either 
through constitutional controversies or actions of unconstitutionality, a supermajority of 8 
votes is required.  
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every justice. When the plenary requests so, the reporting justice is also 
responsible of preparing the corresponding jurisprudencias (case law, see 
explanation in chapter two). Nonetheless, the justice in charge of the final 
draft also has certain discretion in promoting certain criteria to be raised as 
binding precedent: who controls the drafting of the definitive judgement 
controls law making. Along the whole process the Supreme Court faces 
arbitration-related decisions, in the final stage is when it confronts the 
opportunity of making law by setting rules of general application.  
Figure 4.1 Decision-making process in the Supreme Court to constitutional 
controversies and actions of unconstitutionality 
 
 
Figure 4.1 depicts how, along the three different stages composing its 
decision-making process, the Supreme Court arbitrates conflict by deciding 
which party prevails in the dispute, and may create a norm of general 
application through the reasoning founding such decisions. Accordingly, the 
decisions to strike down and to create case law are the two most relevant ones 
in policy-making terms because both imply that the case has undergone the 
whole decision-making process. However, another two decisions play a 
crucial role in the arbitration of political conflict: dismissals and suspension 
grants (which exist only for constitutional controversies). Dismissals allow the 
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Supreme Court to conclude a case before reaching a final decision. 
Suspensions grants on the other hand, permit justices to concede the claimant 
the suspension of the act that originated the demand also before a final 
judgement is made.  
The first relevant policy-making decision the Supreme Court makes is 
defining whether to rule a case on the merits or not. Through the different 
stages the Supreme Court has different opportunities to dismiss a case, in the 
admissibility of the first stage, but also during the second phase exists the 
possibility for the reporting justice to reject a case or propose that the rest of 
the justices do so5. In some cases the grounds for rejection are blatant, for 
example when an actor without proper standing presents a case, but in many 
others the reporting justice has a certain degree of discretion in ruling the 
admission. A case whereby a political party challenges an amendment to a 
local constitution illustrates this discretionary capacity, because the reporting 
justice is able to decide if such an amendment satisfies the clause that limits 
parties to demand only electoral laws. As Magaloni and Sanchez (2008) point 
out, admissibility has in fact been helped to define the party that prevails in a 
case avoiding the risks implied in rendering a decision on the merits.    
The second relevant policy decision is also made in the first stage when 
the Supreme Court defines whether granting a decree of suspension to the 
claimant party or not. In the next section is explained in detail why the 
suspension has been a determinant policy-making tool. For now, it is enough 
to underline that by granting the suspension the Supreme Court is in some 
way conceding a preliminary ‘victory’ to the claimant party. In cases where 
the challenged disposition has fixed duration such as budgets or other fiscal 
norms, suspensions might become even more important than decisions on the 
merits. Figure 4.1 shows in dashed-lines this ‘accessory’ decision is linked to 
5 The Supreme Court has not followed a consistent strategy on this matter. There are cases 
in the second stage where the rejections have been ruled by the reporting justice, while in 
others they have been the product of a decision made by justices working en banc.  
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the rest of the process, accessory because it has not been made compulsory 
and is only applicable for the constitutional controversy cases challenging 
official acts rather than norms of general application.   
The third meaningful policy decision is in the judgement the Supreme 
Court renders on the merits (de fondo). Here is where resides most of its 
arbitrating capacity since the necessary outcome it involves is to define if a 
decision by a political actor - that can either be government action or general 
applicable norms - can be struck down. While not all validation decisions can 
be conceived of as necessarily political -for example because they are subject 
to rules of procedure- insofar as an overriding judgement implies a decision to 
change the status quo it also reveals the explicit intention to revert a 
previously political decision. In the case of the Mexican Supreme Court this is 
even more evident as a result of the aforementioned rule of 8 that requires the 
vote of an equal number of justices to strike down a general norm –for 
government actions only a simple majority of 6 justices is needed.  
Finally, setting binding precedent is the fourth relevant policy-making 
decision the Supreme Court makes. In Mexico not all judicial rulings 
constitute binding precedent. For doing so, as chapter two explains, the 
Supreme Court has three different routes: multiple-ruling jurisprudencia (five 
consecutive cases decided in the same way), single-ruling jurisprudencia (when 
the Supreme Court decides upon two contradictory precedents set by different 
appellate courts), and considerandos (the proper system of precedents 
established by the 1994 judicial reform, determining that the reasons founding 
the judgements to those constitutional controversies and actions of 
unconstitutionality decided by the vote of at least eight of the 11 justices 
automatically gain the authority of case law).  
In constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality the 
Supreme Court has followed a considerandos system, but also it has remained 
creating tesis de jurisprudencias to explicitly establish which specific 
interpretations emerging from cases of both types should become case law. It 
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has happened this way as a result of path dependence, but also because, 
several interviewees note, legal operators including judges, lawyers and 
university professors are habituated to the use jurisprudencias and not 
considerandos. Jurisprudencias, hence, are for the Supreme Court the most 
appropriate method to communicate their legal and constitutional 
interpretations. In short, as tesis de jurisprudencia are more familiar to legal 
operators, they also are more effective than considerandos for spreading the 
rules established by the Supreme Court through the creation of binding 
precedent.  
Before turning to the empirical analysis, one more element needs to be 
addressed in this revision of the structure of the Supreme Court’s decision-
making process. After being restructured and its composition completely 
renewed, the Supreme Court struggled with constructing an internal 
mechanism for solving constitutional cases. The first response to the problem 
was the creation of an organ within the Supreme Court (the Unit for Actions 
of Unconstitutionality and Constitutional Controversies) especially devoted to 
conduct the process of all constitutional controversies and actions of 
unconstitutionality submitted before the Supreme Court. The first two 
directors of this ‘Unit’ in charge of drafting the judgements to constitutional 
cases were interviewed on the context of this research (interviewees 10 and 
25). They both comment that for almost ten years there were the clerks 
working for the ‘unit’ rather than the justices’ clerks who were in charge of 
preparing all the decisions justices had to make along the different stages, 
from the declaration of admissibility to the judgement proposals. 
Until 2004 most of the justices had scarce contact with the process 
through which the Supreme Court was ruling constitutional controversies and 
actions of unconstitutionality. Interviewee 29 asserts that during these years 
the unit was in charge of dealing with the most important parts of the process 
there existed within the Supreme Court a sort of micro constitutional court. In 
other words, during the years following the reform that gave the Supreme 
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Court unprecedented constitutional review powers, justices had little contact 
with the decision-making process for the adjudication of the cases emerging 
from procedures created by the reform. Nonetheless, the delegation of these 
tasks to an area composed of just a few lawyers rapidly changed with rotation 
in the bench began in 2003.  
To sum up, the 1994 judicial reform produced a substantial change in the 
decision-making process of the Supreme Court, from management of cases 
resolution to a transformation of its capacity to make policy in terms of 
arbitration and law making. The process the Supreme Court conducts to rule a 
case is composed by three stages that allow justices to make four different 
decisions whereby they arbitrate conflict and set rules of general application. 
Dismissals and suspensions allow the Supreme Court to arbitrate conflict 
before reaching a decision on the merits, while through strike down decisions 
and validation the Supreme Court can either change or confirm the status quo 
previously set by a different or a group of different political actors. Rule-
making on the other hand has essentially been displayed through the rules 
jurisprudencia establishes. The next sections provide an account of how 
political change and the own evolution of the Supreme Court influenced the 
way it employed its policy-making tools to become a more prominent political 
player.  
4.2 Decision-making in Practice  
The procedures established by the 1994 judicial reform have been determinant 
to the emergence of the Supreme Court as an effective policy-maker. In 1995 
the Supreme Court received 19 constitutional controversies and only one 
action of unconstitutionality. It only adjudicated three out of those cases, two 
of them on the merits but without making any declaration of 
unconstitutionality. Fifteen years later in 2009, the Supreme Court received 
more than 200 cases, settled 140 of them on the merits and declared the 
unconstitutionality in one quarter of this 140. The Supreme Court has 
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undergone an important process, justices and their staff went from learning 
how to deal with these more complex and politically salient cases, to 
becoming more aware of their capacity to make policy and law and therefore 
be strategic in the use of the different tools they have for doing so.  
Albeit the evolution of decision-making proceedings has been similar for 
both actions of unconstitutionality and constitutional controversies, the way 
the Supreme Court has in practice decided over these two types of cases has 
been different. A longitudinal revision of the actions of unconstitutionality 
makes it clear that the decision-making on this type of case has gone through 
three different periods: one before 2000, when the Supreme Court faced a 
small amount of cases, particularly submitted by the political parties; another 
between 2000 and 2005, distinguished by a subtle increase in the number of 
decisions rendered every year; and a third one from 2006 to 2010 characterised 
by an even more significant increase in the workload provoked by the 
outstanding use by the Attorney General of this legal figure focused on 
challenging subnational level laws.  
Figure 4.2 Constitutional cases: files, decisions and case law, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Constitutional review judgements dataset (see Appendix I). 
 
As figure 4.2 shows, the relationship between the volume of cases filed in 
and the number of cases decided every year by the Supreme Court is similar. 
The Supreme Court has on average employed 178 days for deciding actions of 
unconstitutionality, the cases filed in 2004 have on average taken more time 
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(509 days) and the ones submitted in 2010 less (73 days). Overall, the fact that 
the number of cases filed and decided is greatly proportional shows that the 
Supreme Court has sought to avoid backlog by giving priority to the 
resolution of actions of unconstitutionality  
In the case of constitutional controversies the Supreme Court has not only 
taken more time; the resolution of these cases has also been less proportional 
to the amount annually filed. As in the case of actions of unconstitutionality, 
2001 was the turning point for constitutional controversies: in that single year 
the Supreme Court received 326 controversies requesting the invalidation of 
indigenous rights constitutional reform6. The Supreme Court dismissed almost 
all of them in 2002, and, even when the number of cases never again reached 
such a large number, the volume of cases filed in later years has abruptly 
increased. For instance, in five different years -2003, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 
2009- the volume of cases has been above a hundred.  
The Supreme Court has gradually taken less time to settle constitutional 
controversies. Before 2002 the average time for a constitutional controversy to 
be decided was over a year (decision-making process for cases filed in 1997 
lasted in average 761 days), afterwards it gradually decreased until reaching 
an average of 118 days in 2009. However, it has occurred this way largely 
because of the reduction of the amount of cases annually decided. According 
to the law clerks interviewed for this thesis–particularly interviewees 29, 32 
and 34- constitutional controversies stand out because their resolution process 
requires hearings and other types of proceedings that delay the making of a 
final judgment. Nonetheless, they also mention that the Supreme Court has 
employed the discretion it has to delay the resolutions of some cases, and to 
speed up some others.  
6 In most of these cases, the Supreme Court held that the constitutionality of constitutional 
amendment could not be challenged through the use of the constitutional controversy.  
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The previous section explained how the structure of decision-making 
processes allows the Supreme Court to arbitrate political conflict in different 
stages. The Supreme Court can opt to reject to review a case, giving no chance 
to claimants to advance their interests in the judicial arena. In the case of 
constitutional controversies the Supreme Court can also grant the suspension, 
thus preventing the application of the act or disposition the claimant party 
alleges unconstitutional before reaching a decision on the merits; and finally it 
can strike down or validate what the claimant demanded. The Supreme Court 
has employed these different types of decisions to strategically arbitrate the 
conflict being brought before its jurisdiction, as well as to advance rules of 
general application through the creation of case law.  
The discretion the Supreme Court has in the case of actions of 
unconstitutionality is more limited than for constitutional controversies. 
Justices may use timing and dismissals to arbitrate conflict without rendering 
a final judgment. Despite this discretion, the fact that 94% of the actions of 
unconstitutionality have been decided on the merits show these types of 
decisions have been particularly relevant for the Supreme Court to display its 
arbitration role. Although the Supreme Court made no overriding of any law 
in the first two years of its new integration, since 1997 strike down decisions 
increased constantly until 2007, when they become 4 of every 5 cases. On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court passed from creating case law in at least a 
quarter of the cases, to making a much more limited use of this power since 
2007.  
If, in the case of actions of unconstitutionality, the court has essentially 
performed its arbitration functions by deciding on the merits in almost all 
cases, the story has been different for constitutional controversies. The 
Supreme Court has dismissed 40% of all cases and has struck down only 22% 
of those decided on the merits. In figure 4.3 it is evident that the Supreme 
Court has employed frequently but irregularly all types of decisions through 
which it can display its arbitration function. In other words, the Supreme 
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Court has not had a preferred method to arbitrate conflict; it has in the case of 
constitutional controversies resorted to all the instruments available for 
defining which party prevails in a constitutional dispute. Jurisprudencia has 
followed a similarly irregular pattern, a preliminary evidence of the strategic 
use that the Supreme Court may have made of this rule-making tool.  
Figure 4.3 Policy-making decisions to constitutional cases, 1995-2010 
 
Source: Constitutional review judgements dataset (see Appendix I). 
 
The case of the federal budget mentioned in the previous chapter is a good 
illustration of how the Supreme Court makes strategic decisions. In December 
2004 when President Fox sued the Chamber of Deputies for the approval of 
the 2005 budget, justices Aguirre Anguiano y Gudiño Pelayo granted the 
suspension, thereby preventing the application of the budget as passed by the 
Federal Congress. When the Supreme Court issued a final judgement on May 
17th of 2005, the executive branch had already achieved what it originally 
sought: applying its own version of the budget.  
This case became even more controversial because of the consequence it 
produced in the Supreme Court’s administrative organisation. Interviewee 29 
explains that the by-then head of the Unit for Actions of Unconstitutionality 
and Constitutional Controversies premeditatedly altered the pre-established 
order for case assignment to avoid appointing reporting justice any of the 
justices he thought would be more reluctant to grant the suspension requested 
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by President Fox. According to interviewees 25 and 29, in 2004 the influence 
of the head of the unit was such that governors used to visit him directly to 
discuss the cases their states were involved in. The federal budget case along 
with the arrival of new justices provoked in 2005 the removal of the head of 
the Unit for Actions of Unconstitutionality and Constitutional Controversies, 
and the elimination of most of the functions of this administrative organ.  
This transformation led to a drastic change in the way the Supreme Court 
managed its decision-making process, visible in an increase in the proportion 
of cases in which the Supreme Court granted the suspension, as well as in the 
decrease in the percentage of cases that produced one jurisprudencia at least. 
Interviewees from inside the Supreme Court commented that the number of 
jurisprudencias increased  as a result of the economic incentive law clerks 
received according to the number of precedents established as jurisprudencia 
they were involved in. This observation, however, is not completely right as 
the previous figures show. The ‘economic incentive hypothesis’ proves to be 
mistaken by the fact that the average number of jurisprudencias by judgement 
went from 5 in 1995 to 0.43 in 2010 –being below two since 2005. 
The structure of the Supreme Court’s decision-making process has 
affected its performance as policy-maker. Albeit they represent a minor 
contribution to the caseload, actions of unconstitutionality and constitutional 
controversies have undoubtedly been part of the most salient cases the 
Supreme Court has adjudicated: 1 of every 5 cases decided by justices working 
‘en banc’ has been either a constitutional controversy or an action of 
unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court has actively employed the policy-
making tools it has available. In the first years following the reform it made 
timid use of its capacity to strike down legislation but recourse to create 
setting case law, in part for filling procedural provisions that had been omitted 
in the law regulating constitutional cases, in part for making policy without 
requiring to use invalidations. Nonetheless, as the country turned into a more 
plural polity and the Supreme Court became a more stable and experienced 
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decision-making body, justices began to be less reluctant to render strike 
down decisions.  
4.3 The Supreme Court as Policy-Maker 
Once provided, a general, longitudinal explanation of the way the Supreme 
Court has transformed the use of its policy-making tools related to 
constitutional review, this section explains how such instruments have 
allowed it to arbitrate conflict and create norms of general application in 
practice. In particular, this section explores whether the Supreme Court’s 
decisions are related to the hierarchy and political affiliation of the actors 
involved in constitutional cases. The argument advanced along the section is 
that the hierarchy -conceived as the level to what different actors belong 
within Mexico’s federal system (national, subnational and municipal)- has 
been a factor particularly affecting decisions in constitutional controversies. 
Political affiliation –which refers to the political party to what different actors 
are affiliated - has also had an impact in procedures of this nature, but it has 
been even more visible in actions of unconstitutionality. The section is divided 
into two parts, one for each of the criteria proposed. 
4.3.1 Hierarchy  
The previous chapter explains why in the case of actions of 
unconstitutionality judicialisation has been produced from ‘above’, while for 
constitutional controversies it has mainly come from ‘below’. ‘Judicialisation 
from above’ has been linked to conflicts between more equal forces; 
‘judicialisation from below’ has essentially consisted of the opposite. The 
influence of hierarchy has been more visible in the case of constitutional 
controversies, a procedure in which the Supreme Court has tended to be less 
‘aggressive’ with national and subnational actors. Albeit less intense, 
hierarchy’s impact on actions of unconstitutionality has been particularly 
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clear in cases challenging municipal-level laws, as well as in creation of 
precedents.  
Figure 4.4 Policy-making decisions to constitutional cases: hierarchy 
 
 
Source: Constitutional review judgements dataset  (see Appendix I). 
Note: for constitutional controversies the calculations exclude all cases linked to the 2001 Indigenous 
Rights Constitutional Reform.  
Figure 4.4 depicts the way the four relevant policy-making decisions are 
distributed according to the type of procedure and the hierarchy of the case. 
Regarding actions of unconstitutionality –a procedure for which granting 
suspensions is not possible- it is noticeable, first, that the use of dismissals has 
been marginal -only 5% of the cases were dismissed- so arbitration has 
particularly been displayed through decisions on the merits. The Supreme 
Court has struck down at least one legal disposition in 56.8% of the 662 cases 
decided on the merits. In the case of the 34 actions challenging national-level 
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laws, invalidations were equivalent to 55.8%, 52.6% for the 415 subnational, 
and 74.6 for the 213 municipal ones.  
The Supreme Court has certainly been more prone to strike down the 
laws with the narrowest jurisdiction. The Attorney General was claimant in 
210 out of 213 actions of unconstitutionality challenging municipal-level laws, 
resulting in successful petitions in 3 of every five cases. This evidence may 
indicate that the Supreme Court has been biased in favour of the 
presidentially appointed Attorney General. Nonetheless, when analysing the 
success of this actor in national and subnational cases this hypothesis seemed 
less clear. In national cases its rate is above that of the mean of the rest of 
federal claimants (55.8%), but equal to the one of federal legislative minorities 
(66.7%); in subnational ones the Attorney General has been less successful 
(37.5%) than the average claimant (47.7%).  
As was explained in the previous chapter, the design of the action of 
unconstitutionality impedes subnational actors challenging a federal law, so 
all cases from different jurisdictions emerge from ‘above’. Looking at the 
subnational level it is noticeable that there seems to be a bias in favour of 
national level actors. A revision of how cases distribute to the level of the 
claimant reveals that this tendency does not in fact exist. Additionally, actions 
of unconstitutionality also stand out for the proportion of cases that had 
established case law through jurisprudencia: 22% of cases have originated at 
least one jurisprudencia. This proportion has been considerably higher in the 
cases challenging laws of national of jurisdiction (56%) and so much more 
marginal in those demanding municipal ones (4%).  
The salience of the cases related to national level laws is, for the broad 
jurisdiction of them, regularly higher than for the rest. Besides, all actions 
demanding national statutes necessarily mean a clash between national level 
actors, which makes them even more relevant. Yet, as the section explains in 
more detail, the creation of jurisprudencia is more linked to strike down 
decisions than to the hierarchy of the parties involved. In any case, what is 
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relevant for the purpose of this analysis of policy-making by the Supreme 
Court is the plausible relationship between strike down decisions and the 
formation of case law.  
The impact of hierarchy is even more evident in the decisions the 
Supreme Court renders to constitutional controversies. First, as figure 4.4 
shows, the proportion of cases where a suspension was granted is similar for 
decisions by national and municipal actors, and higher for subnational ones. 
However, looking at how cases distribute according to the level of the 
claimant rather than to the defendant offers a different perspective: when the 
claimant is national the Supreme Court grants the suspension in 23.5% of the 
cases, in 20.6% if it is subnational and 16% if municipal.  
The link between dismissals -the other arbitration-related decision that is 
not a product of on the merits judgements- and hierarchy is also clear. Leaving 
the 326 indigenous-rights controversies aside7, the Supreme Court has 
proportionally dismissed more cases challenging municipal authorities than 
national or subnational ones. As Magaloni and Sanchez (2008), observe the 
Supreme Court does not only dismiss cases for procedural reasons but also as 
a strategy to filter risky cases. In figure 4.4 it is visible that in the case of 
national and subnational defendants there have been dismissals for both 
vertical and horizontal conflicts (claimants from the same jurisdiction), but 
there has been no dismissal for cases confronting national level authorities. 
This means that even though the Supreme Court has aimed to elude what it 
may be perceived as ‘risky’ cases, it has employed this strategy for disputes 
between the executive and legislative federal branches.  
7 Indigenous rights controversies were excluded from this large-n analysis presented in this 
chapter for considering them atypical cases. All of them were presented in a single year and 
against the same combination of norms and acts; and virtually all of them were decided in 
the same way. The purpose of this chapter is to find out if certain patterns have 
distinguished the decision whereby the Supreme Court makes policy and law, so including 
atypical cases may lead to mistaken conclusions regarding the Supreme Court’s 
performance. In their study of the Supreme Court’s decision-making, Magaloni and Sanchez 
(2008) also exclude these cases for the same reasons.  
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The main and far-reaching policy outcomes rely on cases decided on the 
merits. The Supreme Court has issued strike down decisions in 22% of 
constitutional controversies decided on the merits. This proportion varies 
significantly according to the hierarchy of the defendant party though. The 
Supreme Court struck down 50% of the 10 controversies against municipal 
authorities, 24.6% of the 541 against subnational and 14% of the 149 against 
national ones. In the case of the latter, more than a half of the invalidations 
came from demands by national authorities, while for the subnational ones 
the horizontal conflicts led to just a quarter of all strike down decisions. These 
numbers support the contention that there is a negative relationship between 
invalidations and the hierarchy of conflicts.  
With jurisprudencias something very similar than with strike down 
decisions happens: the proportion is greater for defendant municipal 
authorities but in a scarce number of cases, but this proportion decreases in 
the by far larger volume of cases that have subnational and national 
authorities as defendants. This is an interesting fact because it is exactly the 
opposite of what characterises actions of unconstitutionality. The explanation 
for this relies precisely in the volume of cases targeting municipal level 
decisions: 213 actions of this type have been ruled on the merits and just 16 
controversies. Since municipal level cases are regularly less salient cases, the 
Supreme Court has opted to set a marginal number of jurisprudencias because 
of the limited effect they may produce.  
4.3.2 Political affiliation 
The impact of political affiliation in Court’s policy-making has been different 
for actions of unconstitutionality than for constitutional controversies. In the 
case of the former, it has been more noticeable in the decisions rendered on 
the merits than in dismissals. As was mentioned above, decisions where the 
Supreme Court has struck down at least one of the challenged norms 
represents 55.6% of all actions ruled on the merits. A revision of how this 
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invalidation distributes among the different legislatures, shows that the two 
parties (PRI and PAN) that have held the presidency in the period of analysis 
(1995-2010) have been particularly affected by strike down decisions. The 
Supreme Court struck down the 59.6% of all actions of unconstitutionality 
passed by PRI-controlled legislatures, this figure being even higher for the 
PAN (76.1%).  
Figure 4.5 Policy-making decisions to constitutional cases: political affiliation 
 
 
Source: Constitutional review judgements dataset (see Appendix I). 
Note: the calculations for constitutional controversies exclude all cases linked to the 2001 
Indigenous Rights Constitutional Reform.  
 
At first glance, these figures seem to make it clear that the Supreme Court 
has been biased against these two political parties. Nonetheless, as figure 4.5 
clarifies, in the case of the PAN strike down decisions have predominantly 
resulted from demands submitted by actors also affiliated to this party (75%). 
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An example of the cases of this kind are the 61 demands whereby the 
Attorney General demanded the PAN-controlled Yucatan state Congress for 
the approval of an equal number of Municipal Revenues Laws for the 2007 
fiscal year. On that occasion, the Supreme Court struck down all of the 61 
municipal provisions, and did the same with a group of 10 similar cases 
originated in the state of Aguascalientes.  
Two factors contribute to explain why the Supreme Court has been more 
prone to strike down in disputes between actors of the same affiliation: first, 
the vast majority of same party disputes occurred between PAN affiliated 
actors. This group of cases has had the Attorney General as the claimant 
party, in other words, the federal executive has been the actor behind the case, 
and so the Supreme Court has predominantly sided with this, the highest 
ranked actor. Second, most of these cases have targeted laws of municipal 
jurisdiction that, as it was already mentioned, would be less harmful because 
of their slight salience.  
Excluding the analysis of same-party cases but considering only laws of 
state jurisdiction confirms that proportionally the Supreme Court has been 
more prone to strike down laws passed in legislatures controlled by the 
parties that have held the presidency during the period of this study (1995-
2010). The Supreme Court invalidated at least one legal norm in 55% of state-
level laws passed in PAN-controlled legislatures; 48% of those under the 
control of the PRI, 48% in divided legislatures and only the 31% approved by 
PRD legislative majorities. It is appropriate to bear in mind that these figures 
are based on added information that does not account for the impact of factors 
varying across the time such as political fragmentation and the experience 
gained by justices working in a more stable Supreme Court. In the next 
section is provided a more detailed analysis that incorporates these as well as 
other variables. 
Actions of unconstitutionality against federal laws offered preliminary 
evidence about the impact that political fragmentation and alternation in the 
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presidency have had in the Supreme Court’s performance. Five out of 34 cases 
of this kind were submitted before September 1997, that is, when the PRI still 
held the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. While the Supreme Court did 
not strike down any of these five cases it did so in 19 out of the remaining 29 
filed under divided government. The Supreme Court therefore avoided openly 
confronting the PRI, by then the dominant party. As the next section explains 
in more detail, the Supreme Court became less reluctant to openly oppose the 
PRI and, in general, more influential actors as it became a more stable decision 
making body, justices gained experience and the political fragmentation 
increased.  
Political affiliation has also been related to the creation of case law, but in 
an opposite way from that of strike down decisions. The PRD is the party that 
presents the largest proportion of cases originating jurisprudencias with 45%, 
followed by divided legislatures with 26%, the PRI with 21% and PAN with 
14%. All but one of the 19 actions of unconstitutionality challenging PRD 
legislatures particularly targeted laws approved by Mexico City’s Legislative 
Assembly, the local congress that has passed some of the most controversial 
pieces of legislation the Supreme Court has adjudicated. Illustrations of them 
are the files 10/2000 and 02/2010, the former related to decriminalisation of 
genetic abortions and which led to the establishment of nine jurisprudencias, 
the latter linked to the legalisation of same-sex marriage, from which emerged 
another 14. The next chapter examines in detail the involvement of the 
Supreme Court in abortion regulations including an analysis of the precedents 
created under that case. It is important to stress in this section though, that 
jurisprudencias have helped the Supreme Court to, in certain cases, establish 
general norms without invalidating the laws under its review.   
In the case of constitutional controversies, political affiliation has played a 
more discreet role. All policy-making decisions have affected the PRD the 
most, it is the party that concentrates the greatest proportion of suspensions, 
but also the party with the largest proportion of dismissals; it has also been 
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the party with the highest percentage of strike down decisions as well as the 
one whose cases have led to a wider proportion of jurisprudencias. 
Nonetheless, all these characteristics have been linked to the small amount of 
cases among the three largest parties, a volume that represents a third of the 
controversies challenging PAN-affiliated authorities and a fifth of those 
having the PRI as defendant.  
The PRI affiliated authorities, on the other hand, have been the authorities 
for which the impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions has been slighter. 
Indeed, in all suspensions, dismissals, strike downs and jurisprudencias the PRI 
is the party with the lowest percentage. The fact that of every 10 cases against 
authorities affiliated to this party nine were submitted by municipal 
authorities helps to explain why policy-making by the Supreme Court has 
affected this party the least. In other words, what this evidence shows is that 
in the case of constitutional controversies hierarchy has been a more decisive 
factor than political affiliation.  
Political fragmentation fostered the development of a more proactive 
Court. But in addition to political fragmentation, the transformation of the 
Supreme Court, including its composition, were decisive for the 
transformation of the Supreme Court. Certainly, justices become more prone 
to exercise their power to strike down legislation and government acts. 
Stability and experience and allowed the Supreme Court to become a more 
effective political arbitrator; more effective because its performance began to 
show more autonomy from the formerly hegemonic party system, which had 
been the one in charge of promoting the reform that gave it broader powers 
and nominated and appointed a new generation of justices.  
4.4 The Determinants of Arbitration and Rule-Making 
With the main patterns that the Supreme Court’s policy-making has followed 
outlined, this section presents the results of the statistical analysis conducted 
to assess in more detail the hypotheses founding this research. Instead of 
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examining all policy-making decisions, this analysis only includes the 
decisions the Supreme Court has rendered on the merits because they contain 
the two most relevant policy outcomes: the disposition of the case which 
establishes which party prevails in legal disputes and the reasoning 
supporting such disposition that materializes in a jurisprudencia.  
The account presented in this section is based on the application of two 
different models: cross-sectional logistic regression combined with cross-
sectional negative-binomial regression. Since the first objective is to find out 
determinants of strike down decisions logistic regression is employed because 
it is the appropriate model for a dichotomous categorical response variable 
(Agresti and Finlay, 2009). The second objective of this analysis to discern the 
extent to which the number of jurisprudencias established in a case is 
explained by political and other variables related to the Supreme Court’s 
performance. Accordingly, negative-binomial regression was selected because 
it is specifically intended to account for count response variables that present 
a zero-inflated distribution (Hilbe, 2011; King, 1988), which is precisely the 
case of jurisprudencias.  
The response variables employed in the analysis are the following:  
Strike down:  
 
1 if the struck down at least of the dispositions challenged in the 
case, 0 otherwise. 
Jurisprudencias:  count of jurisprudencias originated from the case. 
ENP deputies:  
 
effective number of legislative parties in the Chamber of Deputies at 
the moment the case was decided (this variable is employed as an 
indicator of the country’s general degree of political fragmentation). 
SCJN stability:  
 
mean average days (logged) seating justices have passed in the 
Supreme Court at the moment the case was decided (this variable is 
particularly intended as a measure of justices’ average experience as 
an indicator of its stability).    
PRI defendant:  1 if the defendant is PRI-affiliated actor, 0 otherwise. 
PAN defendant:  1 if the defendant is PAN-affiliated actor, 0 otherwise. 
PRD defendant:  1 if the defendant is PRD-affiliated actor, 0 otherwise. 
National claimant:  1 if the claimant belongs to the national jurisdiction, 0 otherwise.  
Subnational claimant:  1 if the claimant belongs to the subnational jurisdiction, 0 otherwise.  
Same party:  1 if the claimant and the defendant are both affiliated to the same 
party, 0 otherwise. 
No fiscal or electoral:  1 if the subject of the case is not fiscal or electoral, 0 if it does.  
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The dataset employed in the analysis was constructed from the sources 
cited in the Appendix. The following table reports descriptive statistics for all 
data.  
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of variables explaining policy-making 
 Actions of unconstitutionality Constitutional controversies 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Strike down 662 0.57 0.50 0 1 700 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Jurisprudencias 662 0.97 3.03 0 39 700 0.82 2.13 0 22 
ENP deputies 662 3.33 0.31 2.29 3.56 700 3.18 0.32 2.29 3.56 
SCJN stability 662 8.00 0.30 5.72 8.32 700 7.87 0.42 5.83 8.32 
PRI defendant 662 0.44 0.50 0 1 700 0.23 0.42 0 1 
PAN defendant 662 0.20 0.40 0 1 700 0.12 0.32 0 1 
PRD defendant 662 0.06 0.24 0 1 700 0.04 0.19 0 1 
National claimant 662 0.84 0.36 0 1 700 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Subnational claimant - - - - - 700 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Same party 662 0.13 0.34 0 1 700 0.07 0.26 0 1 
No fiscal or electoral 662 0.25 0.43 0 1 700 0.64 0.48 0 1 
 
Based on the theoretical arguments proposed in the first chapter as well as 
at the beginning of this chapter, this analysis aims to test -for both actions of 
constitutionality and constitutional controversies- to what extent the policy-
making by the Supreme Court displayed through strike down decisions 
(arbitration) and the creation of jurisprudencias (rule-making) is determined by 
different degrees of political fragmentation as well as by changes in the 
Supreme Court. The analysis employs the following as explanatory 
(independent) variables: ENP deputies, SCJN stability, defendant’s political 
affiliation (i.e. PRI, PAN, PRD), claimant’s hierarchy (i.e. national, subnational, 
municipal). In particular, ENP deputies is used an indicator of the country’s 
general degree of political fragmentation, while SCJN stability is intended to 
be a measure of justices’ average experience, but it also is captures changes in 
the Supreme Court’s composition. On the other hand, same party and no fiscal 
or electoral are employed as control variables. Accordingly, the analysis aims 
to test the following hypotheses:  
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H1a. Strike down odds will vary positively with ENP deputies.  
H1b. Strike down odds will vary positively with SCJN stability.  
H1c. Strike down odds will vary positively with defendant’s affiliation to the PRI.  
H1c. Strike down odds will vary positively with national claimants.  
 
H2a. Jurisprudencias (count) will vary positively with strike down decisions.  
H2b. Jurisprudencias (count) will vary negatively with ENP deputies. 
H2c. Jurisprudencias (count) will vary negatively with SCJN stability. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Determinants of Supreme Court's policy-making decisions 
Response variable: Strike down  
(logistic) 
Response variable: Count of jurisprudencia  
(negative binomial) 
 AU CC  AU CC 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
PRI defendant 0.819*** -0.433 PRI defendant -0.543* -0.949*** 
 (-0.21) (-0.28)  (-0.26) (-0.27) 
PAN defendant 0.874* -0.065 PAN defendant -0.199 -0.179 
 (-0.36) (-0.31)  (-0.44) (-0.3) 
PRD defendant -0.084 0.319 PRD defendant 0.511 -0.248 
 (-0.41) (-0.45)  (-0.45) (-0.45) 
ENP deputies 1.434*** -1.120** ENP deputies -1.705** -0.133 
 (-0.42) (-0.41)  (-0.57) (-0.40) 
SCJN stability 0.946* 0.950* SCJN stability 0.41 -0.55 
 (-0.45) (-0.40)  (-0.46) (-0.31) 
Federal level claimant -0.409 1.808*** Federal level claimant -0.214 1.595*** 
 (-0.26) (-0.38)  (-0.3) (-0.39) 
State level claimant - 0.584* State level claimant - 0.796*** 
 - (-0.23)  - (-0.22) 
Same party 1.066* 0.816* Same party -3.214*** 0.886* 
 (-0.49) (-0.38)  (-0.77) (-0.36) 
No fiscal or electoral -1.459*** -0.128 No fiscal or electoral 1.110*** 0.335 
 (-0.23) (-0.20)  (-0.28) (-0.19) 
   
Strike down 1.151*** 1.384*** 
 -0.24 -0.2 
Constant -11.949*** -5.307* Constant 1.674 3.519 
 -2.93 -2.53  -2.69 -1.81 
   
ln alpha 1.738 1.151 
 (-0.12) (-0.13) 
Observations 662 700 Observations 662 700 
Chi2 154.267 46.656 Chi2 82.657 113.839 
P value 0 0 P value 0 0 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.062 Pseudo R2 0.059 0.075 
Area u/ROC curve (%) 76.6 66.37 Log-likelihood -661.04656 -699.71012 
Sensitivity (%) 76.6 10.69 
   Specificity (%) 61.54 98.15 
   Pos. Pred. Value (%) 72.36 62.96 
   Neg, Pred. Value (%) 66.67 78.9 
   Correctly classified (%) 70.09 78.29 
   Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Actions of unconstitutionality (AU), Constitutional Controversies (CC) 
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Table 4.3 summarises the results of the two types of analysis conducted 
divided for the two classes of procedures included in this study. Models 1 and 
2 present the estimates of the cross-sectional logistic regression model and 
models 3 and 4 those of the cross-sectional negative binominal regression. 
Using strike down decisions as response variable the first two models aim to 
find out whether the aforementioned explanatory have determined or not 
invalidations declared by the Supreme Court. The last two models on the 
other hand seek to elucidate whether the Supreme Court strategically creates 
jurisprudencia as means for establishing norms of general application.  
4.4.1 Strike down decisions  
Four aspects distinguish the results for strike down decisions. First, they 
confirm that that there is an association between political fragmentation and 
arbitration decisions by the Supreme Court. Second, they also confirm that 
changes in the Supreme Court’s stability have a positive impact on the 
probability of the Supreme Court rendering a strike down decision. Third, 
they reveal that political affiliation produced an impact in the Supreme 
Court’s performance. Fourth, they show that hierarchy is a relevant and 
statistically significant variable. However, variables perform differently for 
actions of unconstitutionality than for constitutional controversies. The next 
paragraphs present a separate analysis for each of these two types of legal 
procedures. 
In the case of actions of unconstitutionality, save claimant’s level, all 
variables perform as expected. The estimates for ENP deputies are positive and 
statistically significant, the same occurs with SCJN stability as well as with 
both control variables, Same party increasing the odds of a case to be struck 
down by the Supreme Court, while No fiscal or electoral the opposite. 
Moreover, an outstanding finding is that not only PRI defendant is positive and 
statistically significant, this also happens with PAN defendant. The best way to 
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illustrate these results is by plotting the predicted effects of the statistically 
significant response variables.  
Figure 4.6 makes clear that both political fragmentation and the 
experience gained by justices under a more stable composition have had a 
positive effect on the Supreme Court’s arbitration performance but also that 
this effect has varied according to the affiliation of the defendant’s party. 
Certainly the odds have increased but have always been higher for the PRI 
and PAN, the parties that have held the presidency during the period of study. 
The results of SCJN stability effects on the Supreme Court’s performance 
constitute a contribution to literature of Mexican judicial politics, showing 
that internal factors have also played an essential role in the development of 
more effective and proactive courts. Figure 4.6 illustrates that in the case of 
SCJN stability effects have also varied according to political affiliation, being 
higher for the PRI and the PAN. More experienced justices working in a stable 
composition gradually become in charge of performing a function similar to 
the one played by Mexican presidents during the authoritarian period: the role 
of ultimate political arbitrator. 
Figure 4.6 Actions of unconstitutionality: effects on arbitration 
  
 
Above was underlined that in the case of constitutional controversies, 
instead of political affiliation, hierarchy is the variable associated to the 
performance of the Supreme Court. Figure 4.7 shows that strike down 
decisions have largely depended on the hierarchy of the actor bringing a case 
into the Supreme Court. But unlike actions of unconstitutionality, the effects 
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of political fragmentation and experience from stability move in opposite 
directions. ENP deputies variable decreases the probabilities of invalidation by 
the Supreme Court which seems a reasonable effect, particularly by 
connecting it with hierarchy, because it makes clear that as fragmentation 
grows the Supreme Court becomes less biased in favour of the national, and 
more influential actors. On the other hand, the results for SCJN stability 
confirm that for arbitration this was a decisive factor.  
Figure 4.7 Constitutional controversies: effects on arbitration 
  
 
The findings presented for strike down decisions, particularly those 
related to actions of unconstitutionality, are in tune with the results of Rios 
Figueroa (2007) about the positive impact of fragmentation in the probability 
of a decision against the former hegemonic party. Additionally, they provide 
evidence that questions the conclusion by Magaloni and Sanchez (2006) that 
claim that after alternation the Supreme Court has remained biased in favour 
of the PRI.  
The main conclusion of this analysis is that factors varying across the 
time have indeed provoked the emergence of a more effective arbitration 
body. Under more plural conditions, the role of Supreme Court as arbitrator 
has gradually turned more frequent and decisive, whereas the opposite has 
occurred with the presidency. Political fragmentation has created new 
incentives for political actors resorting to the Supreme Court. Litigation, 
political fragmentation and stability have fostered the development of an 
autonomous Supreme Court. Since strike down decisions have an impact on 
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the parties but not necessarily on the normative structure, the Supreme Court 
has employed case law as the preferred means for creating rules of general 
application.  
4.4.2 Case law 
The results for case law confirm the strategic use the Supreme Court gives to 
precedent. Five aspects stand out from the analysis of the determinants for the 
creation of jurisprudencias. In the first place, the strike down variable does 
produce a positive effect in the expected number of jurisprudencias and it is 
statistically significant. This result confirms the hypothesis above mentioned, 
and reveals that the Supreme Court took advantage of striking down decisions 
to introduce new rules for both, delineate its own jurisdiction and, second, to 
give legal substance when it rendered its most far-reaching decisions.  
Figure 4.8 Actions of unconstitutionality: effects on rule-making 
 
 
Second, the results show that political fragmentation is linked to the 
response variable (only for actions of unconstitutionality), but in the opposite 
direction than for strike down decisions. This result therefore disconfirms the 
second hypothesis regarding the creation of case law. Figure 4.8 presents the 
estimates of political fragmentation and strike down variables for actions of 
unconstitutionality, the only procedure for which the latter is statistically 
significant. The figure illustrates how, as fragmentation has increased, the use 
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of case law by the Supreme Court has decreased; this makes it clear that 
effects have been different for actors of different affiliation; and shows that 
strike down has been associated with a larger number of expected 
jurisprudencias. In short: the use of case law played a major role when political 
power was more centralised.  
The third relevant result from the analysis is that SCJN stability on 
jurisprudencia is not statistically significant, neither for actions of 
unconstitutionality nor for constitutional controversies. This result 
disconfirms the third hypothesis enunciated at the beginning of the section. 
Albeit further research is required, a preliminary interpretation of this 
evidence is that case law more clearly reflects judges’ policy preferences while 
striking down resolutions more clearly shows strategic decision-making. Case 
law does not necessarily affect parties involved but it does influence further 
cases because of its binding precedent nature. In the end, this evidence shows 
that, unlike what occurred in strike down decisions, justices were not required 
to undergo a learning process to be inclined to use case law in an active way.  
Figure 4.9 Constitutional controversies: effects on rule-making 
 
 
Fourth, political affiliation is significant for both legal procedures 
examined but only for the PRI and in the opposite direction than for the strike 
down variable (see figure 4.8). Hierarchy is also positive and statistically 
significant at 1% but only for constitutional controversies. Figure 4.9 plots 
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estimates of jurisprudencias according to hierarchy, political affiliation and 
strike down variables. It illustrates how the number emerging from a 
constitutional controversy has been linked to invalidations and has greatly 
varied for the different jurisdiction to which claimants belong. Additionally, it 
illustrates that affiliation has had an effect. In this point it is right to recall that 
only the PRI is statistically significant. The results regarding hierarchy 
support the findings presented for strike down decisions, which make it clear 
that in the case of this type of procedure the Supreme Court has been biased 
in favour of high-ranked claimants.  
The evidence presented in this section supports the contention that 
political fragmentation and the experience gained by justices stimulated the 
development of more a politically-oriented Supreme Court in terms of its 
capacity to effectively arbitrate conflict as well as for creating legal norms. 
The analysis of on the merits rulings also proved that the political affiliation of 
defendant parties has had an effect on the probabilities for the Supreme Court 
to render a decision to strike down but only in the case of actions of 
unconstitutionality. Instead of political affiliation, what affects constitutional 
controversies is the jurisdiction to which the claimant party belongs 
(hierarchy): the more influential the claimant, the higher the odds of getting a 
positive outcome in the Supreme Court.  
On the other hand, the number of jurisprudencias emerging from a case is 
linked with more fragmented conditions, but only for actions of 
unconstitutionality. Again, hierarchy is positively related and statistically 
significant in the case of constitutional controversies. But the common, most 
relevant variable is strike down: when the Supreme Court invalidates a norm 
or official act it takes advantage of the decision to create binding precedent. 
This section provided an assessment of the factors that determined the 
Supreme Court’s decision-making and, therefore, shaped its performance as 
national policy-maker. It is now time to offer a general balance of the findings 
presented along the whole chapter.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has positively answered the question of why the Supreme Court 
became a more active policy-maker in Mexico. The first relevant factor was 
institutional change from judicial reform: the Supreme Court gained broader 
constitutional review powers; political actors the right to bring political 
conflict into the Supreme Court. Political fragmentation fostered the active 
use of constitutional litigation by political actors and, at the same time, 
influenced Court’s performance by creating incentives for justices to be less 
reluctant to put into practice their right to strike down laws and official acts, 
as well as to establish precedents subject to become norms of general 
application. In addition to political fragmentation, the Supreme Court went 
through a learning process to adapt its organisation and decision-making 
processes to its new constitutional review powers. This chapter proved that 
experience gained by justices was the third determinant of the emerging 
policy-making roles of the Supreme Court.  
The structure of decision-making gives the Supreme Court the capacity to 
arbitrate conflict without being forced to render a decision on the merits. Cases 
such as the 2004 Budget reveal that the Supreme Court has avoided the direct 
confrontation implied for instance in decisions to strike down by resorting to 
dismissals and suspensions grants. The most relevant outcomes of the 
Supreme Court’s policy-making, however, have relied on decisions on the 
merits, because they have permitted the Supreme Court to continue arbitrating 
political conflict, but also shaping administrative decisions and the contents of 
laws passed in legislative bodies.  
This chapter shows that the Supreme Court has been strategic when 
deciding constitutional cases. The statistical analysis provided makes it clear 
that political variables have played a major role. The rulings of the Supreme 
Court seem to have been linked to a strategic assessment of the capacity of 
reaction of the different parties in conflict. This capacity has been reflected in 
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role of hierarchy and political affiliation in the Supreme Court’s decision-
making.  
This chapter presented a systematic, exhaustive large-n analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s resolutions to constitutional cases. This account allows us to 
find out the most important patterns followed by its performance in policy-
making terms. Once these main, macro trends have been demonstrated, it is 
time to explain how the Supreme Court has displayed its arbitration and rule-
making functions in the micro level.  
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5. The Supreme Court and the Legal Status of 
Abortion  
Since the 1950s countries from different regions of the world have adopted 
less restrictive regulations for performing legal terminations of pregnancies. 
According to recent estimates 4.2 million induced abortions are performed 
annually in Latin America (Kulczycki, 2011), one of the regions of the world 
with the toughest laws on the matter. Criminalisation has not prevented Latin 
American women from resorting to abortion services, but has triggered 
clandestine and unsafe conditions that particularly affect the poorest patients. 
In Mexico, for example, abortion is the fifth leading cause of maternal 
mortality (CONAPO, 2004) and hence, a serious public health issue that has 
demanded special attention from public authorities.  
The advent of more democratic conditions that the world has witnessed 
during recent decades (Diamond, 1994) has gradually transformed the 
environment for abortion to be publicly debated. Political actors have become 
less reluctant to include abortion in their agendas. For instance, both El 
Salvador and Guatemala, once among the few Latin American countries with 
liberal abortion regulations, recently passed new laws that have virtually 
prohibited all legal terminations of pregnancy. In Uruguay a president 
nominated by a left wing coalition vetoed the legalisation of first-trimester 
abortion, while in Colombia the Constitutional Court eased the general ban to 
authorise abortions in cases of rape, incest or when the life of the mother or 
the child are at risk.  
Mexico is no exception to this trend. In 2000, the same year the PRI lost 
the presidency to the PAN, Mexico City’s congress passed reforms on the local 
criminal dispositions to legalise abortion for genetic causes in order to widen 
the scope for women to access safe services. As a reaction, legislators that 
opposed the reform submitted to the Supreme Court, a demand that gave 
171 
justices the opportunity to validate or strike down with general effects a piece 
of legislation related to abortion matters. In the resolution rendered to this 
case the Supreme Court held the incorporation of exceptions for the 
prosecution of abortion as constitutional, so it ruled the 2000 reform as valid. 
The Supreme Court, however, set a precedent whereby it established that a 
Mexican constitution does protect the right to life from conception. The 
Supreme Court, therefore, opted not to invalidate a decision by a left-wing 
legislature but at the same time created a conservative and authoritative rule 
that sought to deter the development of further liberalising reforms.  
Induced abortion reached the Supreme Court again in 2007. Mexico City’s 
left-wing local congress passed an even more liberal reform that legalised 
abortion on request during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. This time the 
reaction came from both the Attorney General and the President to the 
National Commission for Human Rights, who challenged the constitutionality 
of the reform. The Supreme Court endorsed the reform, but this time through 
an interpretation of the Constitution holding that, as abortion falls within 
state jurisdiction on criminal matters, local legislatures have the right to 
establish their own regulations on the subject. The Supreme Court again ruled 
in favour of Mexico City’s left wing legislature, but established a new rule that 
by deciding in terms of competences rather than rights opened the door for 
each state to set a different legal configuration according to the ideology of 
the party or parties controlling the local legislative assembly. Between 2008 
and 2011, 18 out of the 32 Mexican states have included in their constitutions 
a clause establishing that the right to life is protected from conception.  
What has happened in Mexico that policy issues as controversial as 
abortion are now falling under the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction? How has the 
Supreme Court’s ‘voice’ become so loud as to encourage local congresses to 
pass laws reacting to its decisions? Throughout this thesis it has been argued 
that the convergence of institutional change, political environment and 
stability, has permitted the Supreme Court to become a more effective source 
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of law and policy. Institutional change took place in 1994 when stronger 
constitutional review powers were granted to the Supreme Court. Since the 
1990s, Mexico has become more pluralistic and politically fragmented, not 
only at the national level but at the sub national too. The Supreme Court has, 
since 2003, undergone a gradual renovation of its membership through the 
appointment of new seven justices.  
The previous two chapters presented a large-n analysis of the Supreme 
Court's performance to support the thesis that the Supreme Court has become 
a more effective policy-maker as democracy has developed in Mexico. The 
objective of this one is to provide further evidence to support such a claim 
through the examination of the Supreme Court’s impact in one of the most 
controversial policy issues contemporary societies face. Using abortion as a 
case study, this chapter presents an evaluation of the Supreme Court’s policy-
making role at the micro level based on a research strategy that combines the 
following elements: a review of abortion law transformation over the last 
forty years; interviews to key actors -including law clerks and civil society 
organisations leaders; and an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
decision to landmark abortion cases and their effects on state level 
regulations.  
The chapter is structured as follows: the first section analyses abortion 
reform trends at international level to set a theoretical framework for later 
assessing the Mexican experience. The second explains how domestic abortion 
politics transformed as a result of the democratisation process started in the 
late 1980s. The third section presents an in-depth study of the decision-
making processes related to the two landmark cases on abortion matters: one 
ruled in 2002 and the other in 2008. Finally, the chapter concludes that, despite 
the prominence the Supreme Court has gained in recent years, there still 
exists in Mexico a significant gap between law and social practices which 
prevents the consolidation of the rule of law.  
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5.1 Abortion, Politics and Courts 
Abortion is a controversial issue connected to the most entrenched cultural 
values of a society; it entails fundamental questions about life and the role the 
institutions of the state have to play in its protection. Different cultures have 
different orientations regarding how it should be regulated. Despite such 
differences abortion is regularly and extensively practiced at the global level: 
recent estimates show that 43.8 million abortions were performed in 2008 
worldwide (Sedgh et al., 2012). The rates per 1,000 women aged 15-44 across 
the different regions of the world fluctuate from 17 in Oceania to 32 in Latin 
America. Similar rates in different regions–29 in Africa, 28 in Asia and 27 in 
Europe- confirm that even though cultural values are important they do not 
significantly affect the incidence of abortion; however, they do influence the 
way the state regulates its practice.  
The legal status of abortion greatly varies across different regions. Save 
Poland and Ireland –both predominantly Catholic countries- in Europe 
abortion is broadly legal and safe: only 9% of the procedures in those countries 
are carried out under unsafe conditions. In contrast, Latin America and Africa 
have some of the world’s more restrictive regulations as well as the highest 
levels of unsafe abortions –95% and 97% respectively (Cohen, 2009). Stricter 
rules do not inhibit women from terminating their pregnancies, but they do 
foster the development of unsafe conditions affecting the poorest social 
sectors the most.  
The struggle to control the legal status is at the core of the politics of 
abortion. The social implications that the legal status produces focuses the 
debate on how executive, legislative and judicial institutions must intervene to 
either impose tougher rules or adopt more permissive ones. In a democracy, 
executive authorities are regularly considered as the most plausible 
institutions to implement policies that might mitigate the negative effects of 
abortion on public health. They can propose and promote reforms in any 
direction, but the capacity to change the legal status is beyond its 
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competences. The activity of legislative and judicial institutions is necessarily 
linked to the normative structure of a society. They can either modify the 
legal system or preserve the status quo. This possibility makes the debate 
surrounding abortion become focused on the intervention of legislators and 
judges.  
This section presents a revision of the recent trends in abortion 
regulation. It proposes a typology of abortion’s legal reforms based on the 
different nature they may have (criminalisation-decriminalisation-
liberalisation), as well as the sources from which they come (legislative or 
judicial decisions). The next sections employ this analysis as a framework to 
understand the nature and scope of the recent transformation of abortion's 
legal status in Mexican states.  
During the second half of the twentieth century the world witnessed a 
global trend towards more liberal abortion laws. In 1967 the United Kingdom1 
approved the Abortion Act to authorise procedures on demand during the first 
28 weeks of pregnancy. This reform was followed by similar changes in other 
European nations (David, 1992)2. In the Americas, Canada approved abortions 
for therapeutic cases in 1969 and, through the decision rendered by the 
Supreme Court in the landmark case Roe v. Wade, the United States legalised 
first-trimester abortion (Driscoll, 2005). Developing countries as different as 
China, Cuba, India, South Korea, Tunisia and Zambia, also adopted more 
liberal abortion regulations (Crane, 1994).  
1 In England, as it is pointed out by Moher (1978), abortion was allowed by common law 
during the first 16-18 weeks of pregnancy (quickening), but this legal provision changed in 
1803 considering all abortions carried out after quickening felonies. Since 1861 and until 
1967 al surgical abortions at any stage of gestation were prohibited, thus establishing 
criminal sanctions for those committing the offence.  
2 From 1970 to 1990 abortion regulations were liberalised in: the German Democratic 
Republic (1972), Denmark (1973), France (1975), Federal Republic of Germany (1976), 
Netherlands (1980), Turkey (1983), Portugal (1984), Spain (1985), Greece (1986) and Belgium 
and Bulgaria (both in 1990) 
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By the mid-1980s this liberalising trend became less apparent. While some 
countries like Mexico enacted laws to permit certain types of abortions -rape 
and genetic mainly- some others promoted changes in the opposite direction 
(Kulczycki, 1999). In the United States, the Supreme Court upheld the adoption 
of stricter regulations for the provision of abortion services, while 
constitutional courts in Colombia (1994) and Poland (1997) blocked the 
adoption of exceptions for the prosecution of abortions (Rahman et al., 1998). 
In this century abortion reforms have not followed a clear path; some 
countries have imposed stricter rules –El Salvador and Nicaragua, for 
example- and some others have created less restrictive norms (Singh et al., 
2009). 
This brief review of the global trends shows that abortion law reform has 
occurred in three different directions: there have been reforms authorising 
abortion on demand during a specific period of the pregnancy (liberalisation), 
there have been changes oriented to decriminalise abortion under certain 
circumstances, and there have modifications to de-authorise all procedures 
(criminalisation). This review shows too that legal change has come from two 
different sources: legislatures and constitutional and last resort courts3. 
Legislative reforms imply the regular legislative process determined by 
political parties' correlation of forces and ideological orientations.  
On the other hand, abortion reforms resulting from the intervention of 
courts involves a more complex process that requires a controversial law, the 
use of litigation, and the resolution of the Supreme Court to set rules affecting 
the status quo (see figure 5.1). To change the normative structure courts 
require institutional instruments allowing them to render authoritative and 
generalizable judgements (i.e. erga omnes effects and binding precedent). 
Furthermore, in order to bring courts opportunities to rule on controversial 
3 I consider as criminalisation those cases in which the higher tribunal (Supreme Court or 
Constitutional Tribunal) struck-down a law that liberalised or decriminalised abortion. The 
reason for doing this is because when a tribunal decides in this way it is also preserving the 
criminal character of abortion, thus establishing precedent that prevents further reforms.  
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matters like abortion, the rules of standing need to be open enough to allow 
political and social actors to strategically employ litigation. Legislative bodies 
are mostly constrained by political factors; institutional tools are more 
relevant for courts.   
Figure 5.1 Judicial abortion law-reform 
 
 
The case of the United States provides a good illustration of how judicial 
abortion reforms operate. In Roe v. Wade (1973) the Supreme Court held that 
under the right to privacy granted by the due process clause included in the 
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution women have the 
right to decide over their own health. The main outcome of the reform was 
disallowing all the provisions restricting the exercise of this right during the 
first-trimester of pregnancy (Epstein and Kobylka, 1992). In Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, however, the Supreme Court upheld some of the more 
restrictive provisions established by Pennsylvania, including the parental 
consent in the case of minors, and the 24-hour waiting period for having 
access to abortion services. Later in 2007, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme 
Court again contributed to re-criminalise abortion by upholding the 
restrictions prohibiting late-term abortions specified in the 2003 Partial-Birth 
Abortion Ban Act4.  
The case of Colombia is representative of how abortion law reforms work 
under an institutional design that centralises constitutional review in a single 
court. In 1994, the Constitutional Court upheld a law criminalising all abortion 
4 The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act does not specify a period for determining what exactly 
a partial-birth abortion is. However, it has been commonly understood that partial-birth 
abortion implies performing an abortion when the product of the conception is a viable 
human being.  
177 
                                              
types, rape and genetic included (Uprimny and Garcia Villegas, 2004). Later in 
2006, the Supreme Court ruled that absence of exceptions constituted a 
violation of women's fundamental rights to liberty, health, life and dignity, all 
of which are recognised in the 1991 Colombian Constitution as well as in the 
international instruments ratified by Columbia (Undurraga and Cook, 2010).  
Table 5.1  Types of abortion law reforms in selected countries 
 Liberalisation Decriminalisation Criminalisation 
Legislative UK and other European countries 
Mexico and other Latin 
American countries 
Chile, Indonesia, El 
Salvador 
Judicial USA (1973) Colombia (2006) Poland, Colombia (1994), USA (1992) 
 
The doctrine of stare decisis has been a decisive factor for the United States 
Supreme Court in becoming an important source of law. Under stare decisis 
the Supreme Court has been able to set authoritative rules that have shaped 
abortion regulation. In Colombia, the erga omnes effects of the Constitutional 
Court’s judgements were the main institutional factor behind legal change. As 
the second chapter emphasized, the institutional design of constitutional 
review is decisive for courts to make policy and law. The tools they have 
available make some Courts more prone to change the status quo than others. 
A lack of instruments to produce generalizable judgements deters judges from 
engaging in more proactive forms of policy-making. The previous chapters 
explained how the Supreme Court has employed its policy-making 
instruments for arbitrating conflict and making law. The next sections show 
how the Supreme Court has enough discretion to strategically employ such 
instruments in different directions, first for solving a specific dispute; second, 
to set a rule beyond the boundaries established by that concrete case.  
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5.2 The Legal Status of Abortion in Mexico 
Mexico City legalised first-trimester abortion in 2007, becoming the first place 
in Latin America authorising women to end their pregnancies with no other 
restriction than their own decision5. Since then, abortion has been accessible 
and freely provided in public clinics. In the rest of Mexico, however, it 
remains criminalised and authorised only under specific circumstances such 
as rape or foetal malformations. The absence of a substantial, national-scale 
transformation of abortion's legal status has been accompanied by a limited 
change of its incidence. According to the available estimates the number of 
procedures performed annually during the 1980s ranged from 230,000 
according to official data (CONAPO, 2004) to 850,000 from non-official sources 
(Kulczycki, 2007). The most recent calculations report 875,000 abortions in 
2006, a rate of 33 per 1,000 women aged 15-44 (Juarez et al., 2008).  
Abortion still is mostly criminalised and at the same time recognised by 
public authorities as the fifth leading cause of maternal mortality in the 
country (Haussman, 2005). It constitutes a tragic but very illustrative example 
of the significant distance that exists in Mexico between legal dispositions and 
social practices. This section provides an analysis of the main transformations 
to abortion's legal status since the 1970s in order to contextualize the 
5 To illustrate the relevance of this reform, it is convenient to recall what the The Economist 
published on the 26th of April 2007:  “The idea of legalising abortion has long been a taboo in 
Latin America, thanks largely to the influence of the Catholic church. Most countries in the 
region allow abortion only in exceptional cases, such as foetal malformation, rape or danger 
to the mother's life. Chile, El Salvador and, since last year, Nicaragua prohibit termination in 
all circumstances. Only communist Cuba (and Puerto Rico, part of the United States) allows 
abortion on demand. This makes the decision on April 24th by Mexico City's legislative 
assembly all the more noteworthy. More than two-thirds of the assembly members voted to 
approve a law that will allow abortion on demand during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. It 
requires the Federal District's hospitals to perform abortions and potentially opens the way 
for specialised private clinics. There is nothing in the law to stop unhappily pregnant 
women elsewhere in Mexico, or in other Latin American countries, from travelling to 
Mexico City to obtain the safe and legal abortion they cannot get at home (…) Perhaps the 
biggest change has been a new willingness among politicians to debate social and moral 
issues since Mexico became a full democracy with the defeat of the PRI in 2000. Only a few 
years ago feminists would say that legalising abortion was impossible. Equally, 
conservatives were shy about calling for a crackdown on illegal abortion. There was an 
unstated pact of avoidance”. 
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significance of the Supreme Court’s intervention in the regulation of this 
highly controversial public issue. This section shows that the emergence of 
abortion in the public agenda preceded democratisation. In fact, the main 
steps towards the adoption of less restrictive regulations were made during 
the authoritarian period. Even under presidencialismo, presidential 
determination in favour of more open abortion rules was not enough to 
successfully establish a complete legalisation. Instead of encouraging legal 
changes, the advent of democracy led to an impasse that only concluded when 
the Supreme Court became involved in the debate.  
The peculiar mixture of Catholicism and laicism that characterises the 
Mexican political culture has framed the public debate surrounding abortion. 
90% of the population is Catholic, however, religiosity is not the decisive 
factor defining social and political orientation towards public issues (Basañez, 
2006)6. Catholicism converges with a deep-rooted laicism inherited from 
nineteenth century struggles to separate state from church; the opinions of 
Mexicans “reflect an intriguing blend of nineteenth-century liberalism and 
Christian moral education” (Camp, 1994). In the absence of a dominant, long-
lasting position the politics of abortion has been episodic and polarized.  
Abortion became formally prohibited in Mexico with the enactment of the 
1871 Federal Criminal Code. Since then and until Mexico City’s legalisation 
the main feature of the evolution of abortion regulations was 
decriminalisation or the gradual incorporation of exceptions –or extenuating 
circumstances- for its prosecution (Barron and Najera, n.d.) 7. The first 
antecedent of decriminalisation occurred in 1931 when Mexico City’s Criminal 
Code authorised abortion in cases of rape.  Having Mexico City establish a 
new standard in the 1940s three states approved similar reforms, all of them 
6 Accordingly to Basañez (2006) the other two pillars are nationalism originated by the 
proximity to the United States; and revolution, produced by the 1910 revolution.  
7 However, this legislation is introduced as an extenuating circumstance for the application 
of the punishment in cases related to “honour”, thus opening a frame for legally practicing 
abortion. 
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also decriminalising therapeutic –those practiced to save a pregnant woman’s 
life- and miscarriages.  
No other state passed any abortion law reform until the emergence of a 
decriminalising wave that took place between the 1970s and the early 1990s. 
For this wave to occur the incorporation to the agenda of both public 
institutions and social organisations was essential. The convergence of three 
factors gave abortion unprecedented public attention in the 1970s: 
demographic pressure, political liberalisation and the international debate. 
Mexico’s population exploded from 25.7 million in 1950 to 97.4 million in 2000 
and the 1970s saw Mexico became a predominantly urban country (Garza, 
2003). In the late 1970s the country reformed its electoral system to permit 
opposition parties access to legislative and executive positions. Finally, Mexico 
organised in 1975 the first World Conference on Women, an event that 
prompted the creation of a domestic feminist movement8 advocating the 
establishment of liberal abortion laws (Crane, 1994; Lamas, 2001a) 9. 
8 The First International Women’s Conference, organized in Mexico City in 1975, 
distinguished itself on abortion matters by being a forum in which this topic was evaded by 
government delegations. This fact contrasts with what occurred in simultaneous meetings 
organized by nongovernmental organizations, where abortion legalisation appeared as a 
central demand (Crane 1994; Lamas 2001b). Again in Mexico City, in 1985 the United 
Nations organized the International Conference on Population attended by 147 government 
delegations. The conditions in this conference were different from previous experiences. 
Whereas in the conference held in Bucharest developing countries considered developed 
countries’ assistance as an imperialistic and even racist policy, in Mexico City’s meeting the 
intervention of developed countries was accepted in population policies (Finkel 1985). 
Furthermore, the change of United States policy resulted in one of the most relevant 
conference’s outcomes. The United States’ delegation, after considering population growth 
as a “neutral phenomenon”, stated that its government did not accepted abortion as an 
adequate method for family planning matters (Kulczycki 1999). This change in the United 
States’ policy affected international debate because by that time the United States was the 
principal donor for research on population control, including the diffusion of methods for 
family planning in which abortion was included. Moreover, the papacy of John Paul II 
reinforced the Vatican’s antiabortion policies with the pope himself becoming an actor 
opposed to abortion and throughout his travels he actively spoke against any potential 
change to national policies. 
9 The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo marked a 
turnaround in the international perspective of abortion, producing a more liberalised 
understanding. The Cairo Conference was characterised, firstly, by an increasing 
participation of women’s organizations demanding a more active role of women in 
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Figure 5.2 Reforms to state of abortion laws by type 
Mexico institutionalized population policy control in 1974 with the 
National Council for Population (CONAPO). One of the Council’s first actions 
was the creation of the Group for the Study of Abortion in Mexico (GIA) as 
the entity in charge of the design of empirically based policies to monitor 
abortion prevalence in the country. GIA conducted different studies to 
determine the extent to which abortion was a national scale public health 
problem. Based on this body of research GIA concluded that abortion was in 
fact a serious problem that required not only sanitary actions by executive 
authorities but drastic legal changes. GIA particularly proposed the derogation 
of all regulations prohibiting abortions and the establishment of appropriate 
population policies at global level. In particular, women’s organizations demanded the 
implementation of more secure policies on abortion matters due to the negative effects 
produced by illegal abortions in developing countries (Cohen and Richards 1994). Secondly, 
the United States’ modified conception of population growth as a “neutral phenomenon”, as 
well as its previous position against abortion. Finally, the Vatican’s anti-abortion strategy 
sought to create an alliance with other religious leaders to prevent a declaration supporting 
abortion as a birth-control method. The Cairo conference signified a symbolic change in the 
international perspective regarding abortion, since the conference’s recommendations 
explicitly declared: “In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning. 
All Governments and relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations are 
urged to strengthen their commitment to women’s health, to deal with the health impact of 
unsafe abortions” United Nations, 1994.  
 
Source: author’s elaboration with data from Barron & Najera  (n.d. chart 1) and Aguinaco et al (2002). 
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sanitary norms to provide the safe termination of pregnancies in public health 
institutions (Lamas, 2001a).  
GIA’s recommendations were made public in a context where the lame-
duck president Luis Echeverria no longer had the power required to 
successfully promote such far-reaching proposals. Nonetheless, the report 
published by this group indicated a turning point in the way public 
institutions were dealing with abortion; it constituted the recognition by 
government authorities of the perverse consequences produced by norms 
incompatible with social practices (Kulczycki, 2007). The political context 
along with the opposition by conservative actors –the Catholic hierarchy and 
the National Action Party, mainly- prevented the adoption of national scale 
reform10. However, the emergence of abortion in the public agenda instigated 
the start of a legal renovation trend at state level, which mainly consisted of 
the establishment in local laws of further exceptions to avoid abortions being 
prosecuted.  
The abortion reform trend began when the states of Hidalgo and Tabasco 
changed their criminal status to adopt less restrictive regulations, but was 
consolidated only after Mexico held the Conference and GIA published its 
report. Between 1976 and 1982 ten more states joined this trend, thereby 
creating a new environment favourable for the promotion of a new national 
reform. In 1983, one year after taking office, president Miguel de la Madrid 
submitted to the Federal Congress a bill of reforms intended to liberalise 
abortion in the whole country (Kulczycki, 2007). Again, the reaction of anti-
abortion advocates was immediate and effective enough to force the president 
10 According to Kulczycki (2007: 55), the announcement in 1990 of the intention to legalise 
first trimester abortion in Chiapas state “re-galvanised feminist voices in support of abortion 
rights, but the Catholic Church and Church-linked organisations reacted sharply and the 
central government did not want to risk putting new obstacles in the way of mending 
church-state relations. Within two weeks, the Chiapas state legislature had suspended the 
process. The extensive media comment included television discussion involving prominent 
figures holding diverse views about abortion, a subject still taboo until then. The federal 
government defused the issue by shifting it to the National Human Rights Commission 
which avoided ruling on whether the revision violated human rights”. 
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to withdraw his proposal (Lamas, 2001a). Evidently not even presidencialismo 
and the hegemony of his party allowed the president to successfully promote 
a national reform.  
The response to this second defeat followed the same path as the previous 
one. In the period 1983-1989 fourteen states reformed their criminal codes to 
authorise abortion in cases of rape; eight of them also approved therapeutic 
procedures, six for genetic causes and two more in cases in which the 
conception resulted from non-consensual artificial insemination. The state of 
Yucatan also legalised abortion for economic reasons, available only for those 
women who were already mothers of three or more children. The 
decriminalising wave reached its peak with this reform. In the 1990s abortion 
regulations entered a process of gridlock that lasted until the Mexico City’s 
left-wing legislature was established in 2000 with a wider scope for legally 
conducted abortion procedures.  
The new turning point occurred when in 1990 the Chiapas state Congress 
unsuccessfully attempted to establish abortion as a proper-birth control 
method in the state. That year the administration of President Salinas was 
negotiating the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican, so 
Salinas managed to block the reform’s enactment notwithstanding that it had 
already been approved by the local Congress (Lamas, 2001b). The 1990s was 
the decade when opposition parties substantially increased their legislative 
and executive positions, as well as the number of municipal governments 
under their control. Political pluralism expanded, in theory, the possibilities 
for abortion to be introduced to the legislative agenda. However, the 
damaging consequences emerging political actors perceived that openly 
endorsing abortion would be for their careers prevented the development of 
further reforms on the subject.  
The arrival of the conservative PAN to the presidency transformed the 
correlation of forces and once again fostered the public debate. The first event 
to occur was the infamous case of Paulina, a 13-year old victim of rape who, 
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despite getting an order by the approved authority, was denied access to 
abortion services in the PAN-governed state of Baja California (Taracena, 
2002). Public attention gained by this case influenced Guanajuato state 
authorities to informally promote a reform to de-authorise abortion in cases of 
rape. Once again, mobilisation successfully prevented the revision of abortion 
regulations, this time however, the opposition came from pro-choice groups.  
The last, and for the purpose of this study, most decisive event of 2000 
was the approval in Mexico City of a reform legalising therapeutic abortions. 
Its relevance, as the next section explains in-depth, relies on three factors: 
firstly, it was the first change after a ten year stalemate; second, it was 
promoted by Mexico City’s first elected government; third, it culminated in 
the first case that confronted the Supreme Court with the obligation of 
analysing abortion on constitutional grounds. The involvement of the 
Supreme Court reflected the on-going transformation of Mexico’s political 
system, where new institutional means for processing political conflict were 
on the way to become consolidated.   
Despite the efforts made along the last forty years, abortion is still 
predominantly criminalised across Mexico. The process of transformation 
towards more liberal regulations mainly consisted of successive reforms to 
introduce exceptions for its prosecutions, rather than to establish a general 
liberalisation. The main features of this decriminalisation have been: a) taking 
place at state level instead of at the national level -even under authoritarian 
rule federal authorities were unable to create a national reform; b) occurring 
mostly during authoritarian times rather than in democratic times. Political 
pluralism has made the decision-making process more complex provoking, 
amongst other consequences, the Supreme Court to become a decisive 
national policy-maker. At the same time, it has increased the costs for political 
actors to abandon the comfortable centre. Controversial policies are only 
lucrative when the risks of affecting electoral outcomes are minimal. The next 
section addresses this question when explaining how abortion reforms ended 
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in the Supreme Court and why the Supreme Court ruled on them the way it 
did. 
5.3 Induced Abortion and the Right to Life 
In 2000 the Supreme Court admitted a petition demanding reform to Mexico 
City’s criminal statutes authorising therapeutic abortions. This was the first 
abortion case to be brought into the Supreme Court through the use of one of 
the constitutional review procedures emerging from the 1994 judicial reform. 
The admission itself revealed the new role the Supreme Court had begun to 
play in a new democratic contest where the president was not the ultimate 
political arbitrator. The objective of this section is to provide evidence to 
illustrate by analysing abortion law, how the Supreme Court has strategically 
employed different tools for different purposes; it has rendered decisions to 
avoid short-term conflicts with political actors but at the same time it has 
resorted to judicial precedents in order to issue long-term norms. Precedent 
therefore has been the instrument that has reflected with more clarity the 
policy preferences of the Supreme Court’s majority.  
5.3.1 The decriminalisation reform of 2000 
In 1928 a constitutional amendment proposed by president-elect Alvaro 
Obregon abolished municipalities in Mexico City, and established the practice 
that all local authorities would be appointed directly by the president (Marvan 
Laborde, 2009). In 1997 the citizens regained the right to directly elect local 
authorities, and elected Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, an experienced politician -son 
of the president who nationalised the oil-industry in 1938, former member of 
the PRI, runner-up in the 1988 presidential race, and founder of the left-wing 
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)- as the city’s first elected Head of 
Government since 1928 (Lawson, 1997). 
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His victory in the 1997 election made Cardenas one of the favourite 
contenders for the 2000 presidential race. During the campaign he offered to 
promote more liberal abortion policies in the case of being elected. However, 
in order to avoid political costs, he made no public endorsement to the 
legalisation of abortion during his two years in office (Lamas, 2001b). 
Cardenas resigned from his post in September 1999 to being for third 
consecutive time PRD’s presidential candidate. To replace him, the local 
congress appointed Rosario Robles, the Secretary of Government during 
Cardenas' administration.  
The 2000 electoral process in Mexico City was not particularly successful 
for the PRD. By a very small margin, the party preserved the control of the 
local executive but lost its majority in the local Congress. Noticing that the 
PRD’s legislative dominance was coming to an end, lame-duck Rosario Robles 
submitted a bill proposing the legalisation of genetic abortion (Billings et al., 
2002). On August 18, twelve days before the new legislature’s inauguration, 
the lame-duck PRD majority approved a reform that, a) amended the 334 of 
the Federal District Criminal Code (Codigo Penal del Distrito Federal) to 
establish that abortion shall not be prosecuted in those cases when two 
specialized physicians had diagnosed genetic or congenital alterations in the 
‘product of the conception; and b) established in article 131 of the Federal 
District Criminal Proceedings Code (Codigo de Procedimientos Penales del 
Distrito Federal) that local public prosecutors (Agentes del Ministerio Publico) 
would be in charge of authorising the corresponding procedures.  
This reform –which has been known as Ley Robles because of the surname 
of the persona who sponsored it- meant a limited expansion for legally 
performing abortions in Mexico City and, in fact, it established provisions that 
were already in force in other states. Nonetheless, unlike what occurred in 
other jurisdictions, the Ley Robles attracted public attention because it was 
conducted in Mexico’s capital as well as for being the first legal change made 
to the legal status of abortion after the PRI’s defeat in the presidential race.  
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The reform immediately generated opposition from conservative groups, 
including the Catholic clergy, the PAN and civil society organisations. As part 
of this reaction, the incoming –but not yet sworn- deputies submitted an 
action of unconstitutionality (AI 10/2000) requesting the Supreme Court to 
invalidate the reform. On their demand, the incoming deputies argued the 
following:  
a) From the very moment of conception exists a human being protected by 
the constitutional right to life establishing that no one shall be deprived 
from his or her own life but by judicial judgment. Accordingly, the reform 
to the Federal District Criminal Code constituted a violation to the 
constitution because it authorised depriving a human being of his life 
without a trial as required by the Constitution.   
b) As no one shall be deprived of their life but by the judgement rendered by 
a legally constitutional judicial authority, the reform to the Federal District 
Criminal Proceedings Code authorising public prosecutors to order 
abortion for genetic causes also constituted a violation of the right to life 
established by the 1917 Constitution.  
The first legal dilemma the Supreme Court faced was to rule over the 
admissibility of the case. On the one hand, it had to define whether a demand 
presented in the 31st day following the enactment of law is admissible or has 
to be dismissed for not complying with the 30-day window required by the 
Constitution. On the other, it had to determine if deputies-elect have the 
proper standing to endorse actions of unconstitutionality before being sworn 
in.  
The case was assigned to Olga Sanchez Cordero, then the only women in 
the Supreme Court. Justice Sanchez Cordero admitted the case and determined 
that: when the 30-day period finishes on a non-working day the window to 
submit actions of unconstitutionality extends to the next working day. Her 
admissibility decision also established that deputies-elect do have legal 
standing because actions of unconstitutionality are not intended to control 
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laws approved by specific legislatures, but by legislative bodies as institutions 
(Aguinaco Aleman et al., 2002).  
Having admitted the case, Justice Sanchez Cordero proceeded to require 
the parties to present their arguments. On one hand, both the Legislative 
Assembly and the Head of Government of the Federal District argued that the 
reform did not constitute a threat to human life because no living being exists 
until several weeks after conception. On their submissions, these authorities 
claimed that instead of threating life, the reform protected the life of those 
women that only had access to unsafe and clandestine services.  On the other 
hand, the Attorney General endorsed a concept of life beginning at the 
moment of conception, and disputed the reform with his understanding being 
based on suppositions rather than on scientific evidence (Aguinaco Aleman et 
al., 2002).  
As it mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, unlike its counterpart in the United 
States, the Mexican Supreme Court has limited tools for selecting the cases to 
resolve, but it does have control over the timing to discuss and vote on a case 
(Magar et al., 2010). Justice Sanchez Cordero circulated her judgement 
projected on the 25 of October of 2001, thirteen months after the case was 
brought into the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court working ‘en banc’ 
dedicated 12 private sessions to the analysis of the case (Aguinaco Aleman et 
al., 2002). This unusual and remarkably long process was followed by two 
public sessions where justices made public some of their arguments for either 
supporting or opposing the reform. 
The Supreme Court divided the analysis in two parts, one concerning the 
Penal Code, the other related to Criminal Proceedings Code. Regarding the 
former, seven justices voted to uphold and the other four voted to override the 
reform.11. The majority concluded that “[the reform] does not authorise the 
11 The justices that voted for not invalidating the reform were: Azuela Güitron, Castro and 
Castro, Gudiño Pelayo, Roman Palacios, Sanchez Cordero and Chief Justice Gongora 
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deprivation of life of the product of conception, but it does establish a 
possibility for not applying the sanction” (Accion de Inconstitucionalidad 
10/2000, 2002: 112).  
The Supreme Court drew this conclusion from the interpretation of 
articles 14 and 123. On one hand the Supreme Court argued that the right to 
motherhood implicit in Article 123 that regulates labour relations, protects 
women from the moment of conception and in so doing it protects the product 
of conception. The judgement is explicit in this regard: “the Federal 
constitution protects the human life and equally protects the product of the 
conception as a manifestation of human life regardless of its biological 
stage”12. On the other hand the product of conception, once defined as a legal 
human being, the Supreme Court determined that the right to life established 
in the Article 14 protects individuals from not being deprived from their own 
life without a recognised court is also applicable to the product of conception.  
Figure 5.3 The Supreme Court judgement to Ley Robles 
 
 
In relation to the Code of Criminal Proceedings, a majority of six justices 
is needed to vote to override the reform, but as the Statutory Law of the 105 
Constitutional Article (Ley Reglamentaria de las Fracciones I y II del Articulo 
105 de la Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos) requires a 
qualified-majority of eight judges to invalidate laws, no declaration of 
unconstitutionality resulted from the case. The Supreme Court again resorted 
Pimentel; while against it were: Aguirre Anguiano, Diaz Romero, Aguinaco Aleman and 
Ortiz Mayagoitia.  
12 Translation from the judgement rendered by the Supreme Court in the Action of 
Unconstitutionality 10/2000.  
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to Article 14 to conclude that public prosecutors are not constitutionally 
permitted to authorise genetic abortion procedures.  
This judgement produced two policy outcomes. In terms of arbitration, the 
ruling of the Supreme Court endorsed –or at least did not strike down- a 
decision previously made by the PRD majority in Mexico City’s local congress. 
However, in terms of rule-making, the Supreme Court set a precedent similar 
to the arguments provided by the plaintiffs in the original demand. This 
precedent, as it is explained below, had an impact on the development of 
further reforms.  
None of the people interviewed in relation to this case explicitly admitted 
that the Supreme Court’s resolution sought to discourage legislators in the 
states from carrying out further liberal reforms. However, most of them 
responded positively when they were asked if, in general, the Supreme Court 
employs precedent when seeking to intervene in certain legal areas. In 
particular, interviewee 34, a law clerk working in one the Supreme Court’s 
chambers, explained that justices have enough discretion to require clerks to 
prepare jurisprudencias (see chapter 2 for a definition of this concept) two or 
more years after a decision was formally rendered. A former Chief Justice 
interviewed for this thesis recognised that the relevance of precedent was 
such that when he presided the Supreme Court (1991-1995), the institution 
implemented a policy to systematize the jurisprudencias.  
Overall, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court was strategic in at 
least three ways: a) none of the parties involved became the absolute ‘winner’ 
of the dispute; b) an authoritative enough precedent was established to inhibit 
political actors to undertake further reforms; c) the reasoning rather than the 
resolution was the element of the judgement reflecting the justices’ policy 
preferences.  
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5.3.2 The Liberalisation Reform of 2007 
In 2003 the Federal District Legislative Assembly approved a new reform to 
the local Criminal Code and Health Law, particularly focused on four aspects: 
a) the reinforcement of punishment for people or doctors performing 
abortions without consent, b) the authorisation to local public-health 
institutions to provide free and safe legal termination of pregnancy services to 
women complying with the pre-established requirements, c) the creation of 
the necessary conscientious objection regulations to guarantee the availability 
of non-objecting providers, d) the elimination of abortion's criminal status by 
removing the clause restricting legal abortions only to those cases established 
in law as exceptions. The reform went out in 2003, albeit almost unnoticed by 
the general public, and meant a substantial change in the legal status of 
abortion in Mexico City, setting a good framework for the eventual 
achievement of a genuine liberalisation (GIRE, 2008).  
After the 2006 electoral process, the PRI parliamentary group submitted a 
bill to the Federal District Legislative Assembly proposing the 
decriminalisation of abortion authorising abortions on request during the first 
12 weeks of gestation. A left-wing coalition formed by deputies of Alternativa 
(a social-democratic party founded shortly before the previous general 
election), Labour Party and Convergencia –another centre-to-left party- 
presented a second bill also proposing first-trimester liberalisation, but 
including more detailed provisions decreasing the risk of an eventual 
challenge in the Supreme Court (Lamas, 2009). 
 After a six-month process, that included a legislative bargaining process 
to gather the support of the PRD, on April 24, 2009 the Legislative Assembly 
approved the legalisation of legal termination of pregnancy during the first 12 
weeks of gestation. The core of the reform was the establishment of new legal 
definitions of abortion and pregnancy and the creation of norms to regulate 
the public provision of safe services. The Federal District Penal Code adopted 
a definition of abortion as “the termination of pregnancy after 12 weeks of 
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gestation”, and pregnancy as “the part of the human reproductive process that 
begins at the implantation of the embryo in the endometrium”. Moreover, the 
Federal District Health Law established that local health institutions should 
provide legal terminations of pregnancy regardless of the access that women 
may have to other public or private health services.  
On May 24 the Attorney General and the President to the National 
Commission for Human Rights (CNDH) each filed actions of 
unconstitutionality in the Supreme Court. Both demands coincided in 
claiming that new legal definitions of abortion and pregnancy constituted a 
violation to the right to life of the product of conception; but while the 
Attorney General emphasized the contradiction between the reform and the 
precedent established by the Supreme Court in the judgement rendered to Ley 
Robles, the CNDH underlined the apparent overlap of federal and local 
competences on health matters.  
Justice Aguirre Anguiano, a member of the minority that opposed Ley 
Robles, was designated as responsible for drafting the opinion of the Supreme 
Court. Due to the relevance and the public attention gained by the case, the 
Supreme Court Organised a series of public hearings where 186 people 
including legislators, social organisations, political parties, members of 
academic institutions, amongst other actors, manifested their positions in 
support or opposition to the reform. A special micro-site was also 
implemented to provide the public with information about the different parts 
comprising the whole jurisdictional process. The Supreme Court employed an 
unprecedented strategy to conduct its decision-making process in a more 
transparent and open way. This occurred greatly due to the visibility that for 
those times the Supreme Court had already acquired. Moreover, this strategy 
was also linked to the own salience of abortion as well as to the relevance of 
some of the actors linked to the case (i.e. the presidency and Mexico City’s 
government).  
193 
On August 26th of 2008, Justice Aguirre Anguiano presented a judgement 
project proposing to strike down the new criminal definitions of abortion and 
pregnancy. Using porciones normativas (literally ‘normative portions’), an 
interpretation of the constitution the Supreme Court employs to virtually edit 
the pieces of legislation under review by removing and eliminating words or 
sentences but not the complete challenged articles, Aguirre’s project aimed to 
eliminate any reference to 12 weeks as the limit delineating the possibility of 
performing a legal termination of pregnancy (Interviewee 22).  
The Supreme Court took six public sessions to reach a final decision. The 
resolution included six votes to the different aspects composing the process, 
including the admissibility of the case and the dismissal of certain flagrantly 
inapplicable considerations posed by the plaintiffs. Regarding validity of the 
reform, the core of the demand, in an 8-3 decision the Supreme Court held as 
constitutional the new legal definitions and the obligation of the public 
authorities to provide safe abortion services in public clinics. The rejections of 
most parts of Aguirre’s project required a different justice to draft the final 
judgement. The majority gave this responsibility to Justice Jose Ramon Cossio 
who wrote a project merging aspects from the original one with the 
dispositions ruled. This official judgement was accompanied by concurring 
opinions by all justices composing the majority as well as of the dissenting 
opinion written by the three justices forming the minority.  
The final ruling asserted that the constitution does not provide an 
unlimited protection to the right to life, concluding that state legislative bodies 
have complete autonomy to legislate on criminal matters, abortion and 
pregnancy legal definitions included. As the Supreme Court established in its 
ruling:  
“This Court considers that the measure employed by the legislator is 
suitable to safeguard the rights of women, since the no-criminalisation 
of pregnancy termination is pregnancy has as women’s freedom to 
decide on their body, their physical and mental health, and even their 
life” (Accion de Inconstitucionalidad 146/2007 y su acumulada 147/2007  
2008, 183).  
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In 2008 the Supreme Court reached a more liberal but equally strategic 
decision. A new composition integrated by four new justices was decisive for 
breaking the division prevailing in the resolution rendered in Ley Robles. As 
Table 5.3 shows, two of the justices that in 2002 expressed more restrictive 
views (Aguinaco Aleman and Diaz Romero) were replaced with two lawyers 
who were more open to legally permit the terminations of pregnancies 
(Cossio Diaz y Franco Gonzalez Salas). The other two justices who came to the 
bench after the first case was ruled (Luna Ramos and Valls Hernandez) also 
endorsed the less restrictive regulations adopted by Mexico City’s legislative 
branch.   
Table 5.2 The Supreme Court vote on the legal status of abortion in Mexico City 
Ley Robles 
(2002) 
Liberalisation of first-trimester 
abortion 
(2008) 
Justice Genetic abortions 
Authorisation of 
genetic abortion 
by Public 
Prosecutors 
Justice 
Re-definition 
of abortion & 
pregnancy 
Aguinaco A. (1995-2003) DO MO Cossio D. (2003-2018) MU 
Aguirre A. (1995-2012) DO MO 
 
DO 
Azuela Güitron(1995-2009)  MU MO 
 
DO 
Castro y Castro (1995-2003) MU DU Luna Ramos (2004-2019) MU 
Diaz Romero (1995-2006) DO MO Franco G.S. (2006-2011) MU 
Gongora P. (1995-2009) MU DU 
 
MU 
Gudiño Pelayo (1995-2015) MU DU 
 
MU 
Ortiz Mayagoitia (1995-2012) DO MO 
 
DO 
Roman P. (1995-2004) MU DU Valls H. (2004-2019) MU 
Sanchez C. (1995-2015) MU MO 
 
MU 
Silva Meza (1995-2015) MU DU 
 
MU 
Decision 
 7/4 to uphold 
6/5  
to override 
 
8/3  
to uphold 
Note: MU= majority to uphold; DO=dissent to override; MO=majority to override; DU=dissent to 
uphold 
 
Under this new composition, the Supreme Court rendered a decision 
upholding Mexico City’s abortion liberalisation. This decision, instead of 
seeking to constitutionalise the right to abort, was supported in a legislative 
deference argument (interviewee 22). In this case, Mexico City’s authorities 
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again prevailed in the dispute. Nonetheless, as opposed to what occurred in 
Ley Robles, where the Supreme Court established a strict rule in terms of 
rights as a form to prevent the development of further reforms, in 2008 the 
Supreme Court created a precedent based in an interpretation of the 
jurisdiction of local authorities to regulation abortion rather that in an 
consideration in terms of human rights.  
The strategy employed by pro-choice groups was decisive for the Supreme 
Court making a liberal ruling. Interviewee 17, a historical leader of the 
feminist movement in Mexico, explains that since the Supreme Court 
reviewed Ley Robles, pro-choice groups paid special attention to judicial 
issues. When the case was brought to the Supreme Court they employed the 
amicus curiae figure to explain to justices the position regarding the 
constitutionality of abortion legalisation. One of the clerks involved in the 
final draft of the judgement (interviewee 22) confirms the proactive position 
of the pro-choice sector –he explicitly said ”feminists had come to the 
Supreme Court requesting their right to abort to be constitutionalised”.  
Figure 5.4 The Supreme Court decision to the legalisation of first-trimester 
abortion 
 
 
The Supreme Court’s 2008 resolution was highly covered by the media as 
well as celebrated by pro-choice groups around the country (GIRE, 2008). 
Mexico City became the first place in the whole of Latin American where 
abortion had been legalised and regulated to be freely and safely provided in 
public institutions (Kulczycki, 2011). The Supreme Court emerged more visible 
196 
for the public and more relevant for political actors, which became more 
interested in following –and even reacting- to its resolutions.  
In 1994 the state of Chihuahua approved a reform to its local Constitution 
to protect the right to life from the moment of conception. The Chihuahua 
state reform was not followed by any other state but constituted a model for 
conservative legislatures to prevent the development of further reforms. The 
Supreme Court ruled the case related to Mexico City’s legalisation of first-
trimester abortion on the 28th of August 2008. After less than three months, 
the local congress in the states of Morelos and Baja California, both with no-
single party majority, reformed their local constitutions to introduce the right 
to life from conception clause. Fourteen more states adopted similar changes 
in 2009 and 2010, and another eight bills were submitted to the local congress 
but not approved. In other words, a half of the states reacted to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling by imposing regulations intended to block more liberal 
changes.   
Figure 5.5 Mexican states protecting the right to life from conception 
 
Source: author’s elaboration with data from GIRE (2012) 
 
The backlash engendered by the validation of first-trimester abortion has 
been possible because the Supreme Court based this resolution on a 
competences argument. The legislative deference premise supporting the 
judgement was employed by conservative actors to successfully promote 
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reforms to state constitutions as a sort of insurance policy to prevent further 
liberalisation. This reaction, instead of being a sign of weakness, constitutes 
strong evidence of the relevance gained by the Supreme Court as effective 
arbitrator and rule-maker within the political system. The ‘dialogue’ that has 
emerged between the Supreme Court and legislative bodies makes it clear that 
Mexico is in the process to consolidate a conception of the Supreme Court as 
an influential policy-player that always has to be considered when promoting 
substantial legal transformations.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The norms on abortion matters constitute one of the most important pieces of 
evidence of how the state regulates life and humanity. The legal status of 
abortion is a good indicator of how public institutions process highly 
controversial issues. As in many other countries, criminalisation does not 
inhibit women from resorting to abortion as a birth-control method, but it 
does contribute to the development of unsafe services affecting the poorest of 
women most. In the end, abortion sheds light on an even clearer gap between 
law and practice and the distance that remains for Mexico to consolidate the 
rule of law.  
International factors, demographic pressure and political liberalisation 
contributed to make abortion a relevant policy issue and part of political 
parties' agendas. From the 1970s pro-choice and pro-life movements have 
contended in the public sphere to promote further reforms. Anti-abortion 
advocates have, since the 1980s, been successful in preventing a national, 
general liberalisation reform, but at state level decriminalisation has gradually 
been established. Under democratic conditions and following this trend to ease 
abortion regulations, Mexico City has promoted unprecedented reforms to 
expand the scope for legally terminating pregnancies. In the absence the great 
arbitrator represented in authoritarian times by the president, political forces 
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have resorted to the Supreme Court in looking for an ultimate decision on the 
matter.  
The introduction of abortion on constitutional grounds itself is evidence 
of the relevance gained by the Supreme Court. Whereas a centralised 
jurisdiction and standing have both been determinant for abortion via 
judicialisation to happen, erga omnes effects together with the force of 
precedent have allowed the Supreme Court to issue more effective, far-
reaching resolutions. The judicialisation of abortion politics has not led to a 
‘constitutionalisation’ of the right to terminate a pregnancy, but neither to a 
general criminalisation. The legal status of abortion is still at stake in Mexico 
and, in this regard, the Supreme Court has been particularly relevant. 
Although the resolutions rendered on abortion have been problematic and to 
some extent contradictory, they have also encouraged political actors to 
resume the debate and promote further changes. Some reforms have been 
passed to adopt less restrictive regulations, while others have been carried out 
to prevent further liberal amendments. In any case, all of these reforms have 
been reactions to what the Supreme Court has said in previous cases, evidence 
that supports the hypothesis that democracy, stronger institutions and new 
judges have all transformed the Supreme Court into a more effective policy-
maker.  
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6. The Supreme Court and Expropriation Law  
In 1938 President Lazaro Cardenas nationalised the Oil Industry through a 
decree that expropriated the concessions, facilities and assets mostly owned 
by foreign companies. One year later the Supreme Court of Justice determined 
that the right to prior hearing was inapplicable to expropriations in the 
decision rendered to the amparo lawsuit whereby the affected owner had 
challenged the constitutionality of the decree. Since then, this has been the 
dominant interpretation employed by federal courts when facing 
expropriation cases. In 1997, under a new institutional design and 
composition, the Supreme Court ratified the validity of this precedent 
inherited from authoritarian times. After nine years, however, the Supreme 
Court overrode this legacy and established that the 1917 Constitution does 
grant owners the right to prior hearing in expropriations.  
Having analysed in the previous chapters the determinants of 
judicialisation, as well as the main patterns followed by the Supreme Court’s 
performance as a policy-maker, the purpose of this chapter is to address the 
question of to what extent the Supreme Court has transformed the precedents 
established before its reconfiguration in 1994. In particular, this chapter 
examines the determinants of the overriding of precedent in the Supreme 
Court, as well as the effects that legal changes like this have produced in the 
legal system. The objective, hence, is to provide an understanding of how the 
Supreme Court has explicitly sought to make policy by modifying specific 
rules established in precedents.  
In order to accomplish this objective, expropriation was selected to 
undertake this subject-centred case study because of the following reasons: 
first, it is a subject where the overriding has not been implicit but formally 
established through the corresponding formal proceedings. Second, as in the 
case of abortion, a subject analysed in the previous chapter, the Supreme 
200 
Court has ruled on more than one landmark case, a condition that permits us 
to carry out a comparison of the Supreme Court’s performance in a relatively 
short period of time. Third, the capacity of the state to expropriate has been a 
highly salient issue in Mexico’s history; it is highly symbolic for having been 
linked to landmark events such as the nationalisation of the Oil Industry, but 
which was also employed as a tool in the construction of the clientelistic 
networks that characterised the authoritarian period.  
The chapter is structured as follows: the first section analyses the activity 
of the Supreme Court in the creation of case law, paying particular attention 
to files where a formal request of jurisprudencia-modification exists. The 
second consists of a revision of the main features of expropriation law and 
practice to establish a framework for understanding what the involvement of 
the Supreme Court has implied. The third section presents a detailed 
examination of two judgements, one in which the Supreme Court ratified the 
inapplicability of the right to prior hearing in expropriations, and another 
related to the overriding of such jurisprudencia. The fourth section explains 
the effects of this change in the legal system through the analysis of the 
evolution of both subnational regulations and the Supreme Court’s case law 
related to right to prior hearing in expropriations. Finally, this chapter 
concludes that although the Supreme Court has timidly assumed the challenge 
of analysing the legacy from authoritarian times, its resolutions have become 
a more important source of legal change.  
6.1 Overriding Jurisprudencia 
The first chapters of this thesis explained the process of transformation of the 
Supreme Court since 1994. In particular, it has been argued that the judicial 
reform along with democratisation and stability within its composition make 
the Supreme Court to gradually gain an unprecedented policy-making role in 
terms of arbitration and law making, but in addition to this function, the 
Supreme Court has also been confronted with the challenge of using legal 
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concepts and interpretations inherited from authoritarian times. The purpose 
of this section is to provide an account of the extent to which the Supreme 
Court has, since its transformation in 1994, overridden the precedents 
inherited from the authoritarian period. For doing so, it first provides a 
general account of the jurisprudential activity by the Supreme Court, and, 
second, it presents the results of a revision of the cases originated from formal 
requests of case law overriding (solicitudes de modificacion de jurisprudencia).  
The rules for the creation and application of jurisprudencia have 
undergone a process of transformation since the enactment of the 1917 
Constitution. As it was explained in the second chapter, up until 1967 the 
Supreme Court centralised the power to create “multiple-ruling” 
jurisprudencia. A disproportionate increase in the Supreme Court’s caseload 
occurred in 1960s, led in 1967 to the authorisation for circuit courts to also 
create jurisprudencia. The precedents established by these appellate courts, 
however, become applicable and thus binding only for courts within their own 
circuits (Zamora et al, 2004). This change also led to the incorporation of a 
new form of case law: single-ruling jurisprudencia. With circuit courts having 
the capacity to produce multiple-ruling jurisprudencia, the Supreme Court 
received the responsibility of ruling between opposing criteria established by 
different circuit courts.  
In order to override its own jurisprudencia -or the precedents by lower 
courts- the Supreme Court employs the formal proceeding of ‘modification of 
jurisprudencia’. This procedure operates through petitions requesting a 
specific jurisprudencia to be replaced by a new precedent, which can be 
brought into the Supreme Court by either one of its justices or a judge from 
circuit courts.  
The Supreme Court has modified or interrupted the application of specific 
precedents without following such formal procedure. Nonetheless, the 
relevance of formal requests relies in the fact that that they do reveal that the 
Supreme Court explicitly sought to make openly public that a change in case 
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law is taking place.  Hence, to provide a clearer idea of the extent to which the 
Supreme Court has been able to transform the legacy from previous, 
undemocratic times, this chapter analyses in first place the override of 
precedent in comparison to the volume of jurisprudencias established per year.  
Figure 6.1 Case law by the Supreme Court, 1917-2010 
 
Source: Expropriation law and precedents dataset 1917-2011 (see Appendix I). 
Note: calculations only include formal binding precedents known as jurisprudencia, “persuasive” 
precedents known as tesis aisladas are excluded from the analysis.  
 
Figure 6.1 shows how both the number of jurisprudencias and 
jurisprudencia-modification petitions have evolved. It reveals that the volume 
of binding precedents (jurisprudencias) established by the Supreme Court 
substantially increased with the renovation of its institutional design in 
December 1994 and also with alternation in the presidency. Before 1994, the 
average number of jurisprudencia created by the Supreme Court working en 
banc, was 36, while for four chambers together it was 129. Once the Supreme 
Court decreased its size from 26 to 11 justices, en banc jurisprudencias 
increased to 93.8 per year and those created by the chamber of the Supreme 
Court reached 139.2. These numbers increased even further after alternation 
in the presidency up to an average of 131 and 297, respectively for “en banc” 
and “chambers”.  
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The creation of precedent by the Supreme Court has constantly increased 
but also that this change has not been accompanied by a process of proper 
elimination of the case law inherited from authoritarian times. Certainly, not 
even a single jurisprudencia-modification petition was filed before 2002. From 
that year and until 2010, 101 cases of this nature were presented before the 
Supreme Court. The activity of this subject has rapidly gained more relevance: 
it went passed from 5 and 4 cases in 2002 and 2003, respectively, to 33 in 2010.  
The increasing volume of this sort of cases has come from petitions by 
circuit judges rather than from requests by their own justices. Circuit judges 
submitted seven out of every ten petitions, while justices have endorsed only 
11 cases. Indeed, only five out of the 18 justices that composed the Supreme 
Court in the period 1995-2010 employed its right to request the overriding of 
precedent. This fact provides evidence that shows certain reluctance by the 
Court’s members to formally replace precedents.  
The mixed system the Supreme Court employs for creating jurisprudencia 
permits overrides without making explicit reference to specific precedents. For 
instance, the Supreme Court has discretion enough to establish a 
jurisprudencia in direct contradiction with a previous one, which effectively 
gives us two valid but contradictory jurisprudencia. However, as interviewee 
34 explains, the supervision mechanisms that exist in the federal judiciary 
promote a constant monitoring of compliance with the more recent criteria 
the Supreme Court establishes.  
Although some signs of change have emerged in recent years, the 
Supreme Court has barely addressed the question of eliminating the legacy 
left by the justices that integrated the Supreme Court before democracy. This 
fact makes even more outstanding what occurred in 2006 regarding the right 
to prior hearing in expropriations. There have only twelve cases where their 
own justices have requested a modification of precedent. This chapter 
analyses one of them to assess the effects of rulings and precedents beyond 
the judicial arena.  
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6.2 Expropriation in Law and Practice 
Expropriation was an essential instrument in the construction of the 
authoritarian regime that ruled Mexico for seven decades. It was the legal 
institution the PRI administrations employed to nationalise complete sectors 
of the economy as well as for implementing an enduring land redistribution 
policy (called reparto agrario). In democratic Mexico it has also had a 
considerable salience for being linked to some of the most acute conflicts that 
have emerged in the country since alternation in the presidency began in 
2000. The impeachment of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Mexico City’s Head 
of Government in 2005, the unsuccessful construction of a new airport in 
Mexico City and the failed nationalisation of sugar mills, just to mention a few 
examples, all originated in expropriations.  
The symbolism around expropriation is such that every 18th of March 
children in primary schools commemorate the decision whereby the Mexican 
government nationalised the Oil Industry in 1938. Nonetheless, diffusion of 
power and political fragmentation both have translated into more difficult 
scenarios for public authorities to carry out expropriations. This legal 
procedure has been frequently depicted in public debate as an aggressive, 
undemocratic instrument, a legacy from the authoritarian period preventing 
economic development and the establishment of the rule of law (Del Duca, 
2003; Katz, 2001).  
This section provides an examination of expropriation in law and practice 
in order to set a framework to later explain why it has been relevant for the 
performance of the Supreme Court and, particularly, how the decisions of this 
decision body have produced effects beyond judicial boundaries. Accordingly, 
the legal aspects are first reviewed before an analysis of the three notable 
experiences that clearly illustrate why this legal instrument has been so 
salient in Mexico’s contemporary history is conducted.  
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The 1917 Constitution combines features typical of western 
constitutionalism such as individual rights, and a republican democratic 
system with an unorthodox approach to social rights inherited from the 
demands embraced by some sectors of the revolutionary movement, 
originating in 1910 and which culminated precisely in the promulgation of 
this charter (Diaz Diaz, 1997; Madrazo, 1985). The 1917 Constitution establish 
a bill of rights as well as the founding rules of the political regime, but it also 
created some norms that in practice constituted a political program inspired in 
the re-distributional aspirations of the regime that emerged from Revolution. 
There has been a latent but permanent tension between individual and social 
rights1 that, certainly, has conditioned the way the state has intervened in the 
economy (Carbonell, 2004).  
Article 27 of the Constitution set the foundations for property relations in 
the country. Under this article, the nation has original ownership over all 
lands, waters and natural resources in the country. The nation transfers this 
ownership to the state for its regulation and administration. The state must 
conduct this duty guaranteeing the observation of the ‘social function of 
property’ clause, promoting a fair distribution of wealth and guaranteeing that 
the public interest is to be held above private interest. On behalf of the nation, 
the state is entitled to establish different ‘modalities’ to allow property to be 
controlled by private parties. In practice, the notion of ‘property modalities’ 
derived from the constitution materialises in two different types of property 
regulation: individual, mostly included in civil codes and statutes, and 
collective, fundamentally established in the agrarian laws that differentiate 
between comunidades and ejidos property2 (Azuela and Cancino, 2006).  
1 Such social rights are mainly regulated in articles 3, 27 and 123; respectively about 
education, property and labour regulations.  
2 Communities are those groups whose ancient rights were recognised and protected by the 
1917 constitution. Ejido, on the other hand, is also a collective form of ownership but instead 
of having a historical nature, it was created by the state through a lasting program of land 
distribution.  
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Under the Mexican constitution, according to some commentators, 
individual rights are extremely weak while the state is overwhelmingly 
powerful (Del Duca, 2003; Elizondo Mayer-Serra, 2001; Katz, 2001). Other 
authors argue that, if any, the weakness of property rights lies in political 
practices and not in legal norms (Azuela, 1989; Herrera, 2006). Both positions, 
however, agree that in practice the government has played a leading role in 
the development of property relations in the country. The relevance of 
expropriation relies precisely on its connection to this point as one of the 
government’s favourite instruments to intervene in specific sectors of the 
economy, implement long-term policies and create clientelistic links to 
corporative organisations.  
As a legal figure intrinsically linked to property, the essential rules 
governing expropriations also derive from article 27. In particular, five 
features distinguish Mexican constitutional expropriation regulations: first, 
they are only authorised for reasons of public use (causa de utildad publica) 
and by means of economic compensation (mediante indemninzacion). Second, 
unlike other countries’ experiences, expropriations do not have to be paid 
before the consummation of expropriating acts, so administrative authorities 
can take control of an expropriated property and compensate the affected 
owner afterwards (Diaz Diaz, 1992; Lowenfeld, 1971). Third, compensations 
should be granted according to the values established in government land 
registries (catastros). Fourth, the constitution explicitly prohibits any kind of 
judicial adjudication different to compensation amounts3. Finally, there is no 
regulation addressing how the expropriation process must be followed and, 
therefore, in which stages the authorities have to respect what specific rights.  
For almost twenty years, in the absence of a secondary law, the 
government conducted expropriation only following constitutional rules. In 
3 The increased or decreased value of such private property due to improvements or 
depreciation, which occurred after such assessments, is the only portion of the value that 
shall be subject to the decision of experts and judicial proceedings. This same procedure 
shall be followed in the case of property whose value is not recorded in the tax offices”. 
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1936 the administration of Lazaro Cardenas successfully promoted the 
creation of a specific expropriation law. The main goal that this statute sought 
to accomplish was to establish a more detailed definition of ‘public use’, as 
well as creating specific proceedings for expropriations to be carried out.  The 
1936 Expropriation Law distinguished between two general categories of 
public use reasons: those concerning the provision of public services and 
others related to the re-distribution of wealth and development of companies 
(without clarifying whether they should be private or public). Moreover, this 
law formalised the use of expropriation exclusively by decree issued by 
administrative institutions (i.e. the presidency and governorships).  
As an instrument that contributed to the permanence of the authoritarian 
regime's power, the Expropriation Law remained essentially the same until 
1992, a year when in the context of the negotiations of the North-American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), article 27 suffered its major renovation. The 
1992 reform led to the termination of reparto agrario, the creation of a new 
federal agency for managing land titling, and to the elimination of a clause 
that explicitly prohibited collective owners -ejidos and comunidades- 
(Cornelius and Myhre, 1998).  
The counterparts of domestic reforms were the new rules established in 
the NAFTA. These rules implied, according to some commentators, that 
Mexican owners were to have less legal guarantees than foreigners (Puig 
2007). According to NAFTA’s article 1110, in expropriations cases the 
compensation must be of at least the commercial value, an amount that, unlike 
what the constitution determines, has to be paid in a single instalment 
without delay. Moreover, NAFTA’s provisions also differ from the 
constitution in the fact that they explicitly give investors the right to a prior 
hearing when facing expropriations.  
Certainly, the main source of change in expropriation matters came from 
an international disposition rather than domestic law. Under NAFTA foreign 
investment has broader guarantees against administrative decisions than 
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those the constitution grants to Mexican citizens, a condition that puts the 
latter, at least in formal terms, in a disadvantaged position. The literature 
regarding the use of expropriation has underlined that in developing countries 
legal institutions, instead of creating more security, frequently imply more 
risks for foreign capital4. In Mexico, the symbolism surrounding the 1938 Oil 
Industry Nationalisation has reinforced this perception, disregarding the 
effects of international regulation in the way expropriations are conducted in 
practice.  
From the extraction of oil to its trade, foreign companies dominated the 
oil industry since it was first established in Mexico. When the 1917 
Constitution was enacted, foreign investors observed that article 27 failed to 
provide enough protection to private capital, causing their investment to be at 
latent risk to what government authorities may do to them (Meyer 1995). Even 
though a tension existed after 1917, it wasn’t until 1937 that a labour 
controversy unleashed the conflict between foreign companies and the 
Mexican federal government (Del Duca, 2003).  
In 1937 the Oil Workers Union (Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores Petroleros) 
requested private companies to confirm an agreement invalidating all 
previous contracts they had signed with the small unions. Upon rejection by 
the industry, the Union Organised a ten-day strike and sued companies in the 
Federal Board of Arbitration and Conciliation, an administrative court in 
charge of labour related cases. In December of the same year, the Board 
rendered a decision condemning oil companies to compensate workers 26 
million pesos for lost wages, a decision that was ratified by the Supreme Court 
on April 1st, 1938.  
Since companies refused to comply with the judgements rendered by both 
organs, President Lazaro Cardenas himself held negotiations with their 
representatives requesting them to pay the compensation, promising that he 
4 See for example Minor (1994).  
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will convince the union to end the strike. Companies rejected the offer under 
the argument that no real guarantees existed assuring the unions would 
comply with their part of the agreement (Meyer and Aguilar Camin, 1990). 
Under the argument that the labour dispute had already produced harsh 
consequences in the country, on the 18th of April 1938 the Mexican 
government issued a decree declaring the expropriation of the 17 companies 
involved in the labour conflict.  
The consequences of this decision are well known: at the international 
level it provoked difficulties in diplomatic relations with the United States, 
United Kingdom and Netherlands, to which most of the companies belonged 
(Jayne 2000); at the domestic level it allowed Mexico to have control over a 
resource that from the 1980s contributed a large proportion of their federal 
expenses. The Oil Expropriation is paradigmatic for being a symbol of 
nationalism rather than for becoming the model of public-private relations in 
the country. Indeed, Mexico nationalised banks using expropriations (1982), 
but in the case of the electric industry (1960) the government employed an 
ordinary acquisition procedure. 
The relevance and most evident social effects of expropriation are the 
visible land policies implemented by Mexican governments since the 1930s. 
Expropriation was extensively used for taking land from private hands to be 
later re-distributed in the form of ejidos, a portion of land collectively owned 
intended to be mainly used for agricultural purposes (Warman, 2001). 
Nonetheless, as Mexico became a more urban country, the government began 
to expropriate land from ejidos, as a means to regularise the informality 
produced by the ban imposed on ejidatarios on selling their land (Jones and 
Pisa, 2000).  
Between 1968 and 2004 the federal government expropriated an extension 
of land equivalent to 25% of the area classified as urban, more than a half from 
ejidos y comunidades (Saavedra, 2006). As Varley (1998) points out in a text 
devoted to the study of the political uses of illegality in Mexico, the relevance 
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of expropriation was such that it contributed significantly to the stability of 
the authoritarian regime because it allowed the PRI to incorporate the urban 
poor in to the corporatist system originated in the 1930s.  
6.3 The Right to Prior Hearing in Expropriations  
Until 2006, the dominant interpretation of the right to prior hearing by federal 
courts was that it was inapplicable in cases originating in expropriations 
(Herrera, 2006). That year, however, the Supreme Court analysed two cases 
that led to the establishment of new precedents holding that all public 
authorities must concede and protect the right to prior hearing before taking 
property from private owners. This change required for the Supreme Court to 
first override a jurisprudencia and, later, to set a new precedent explicitly 
specifying that according to the constitution hearings must be held before 
expropriation decrees are formally issued. Why did the Supreme Court 
transform this long-lasting interpretation? The hypothesis proposed by this 
thesis is that legal change through the overriding of precedent occurred as a 
result of political fragmentation, changes in the Supreme Court’s composition 
and also in the decision of more experienced justices to more proactively seek 
to advance their policy preferences.  
In 1999 the Supreme Court published “The Right to Prior Hearing and 
Expropriation”, a volume compiling the debates, judgements and dissenting 
opinions related to the decision rendered to the amparo 1956/1994, the case 
wherein the Supreme Court created a jurisprudencia confirming the 
inapplicability of this right in expropriations. A publication like this is not a 
common practice by the Mexican Supreme Court, so it revealed the relevance 
that justices conceded to the ruling.  
The amparo filed as 1956/1994 challenged a decree issued by the federal 
government to expropriate for the regularisation of 68.5 hectares located in 
Mexico City. The demand submitted by Inmuebles Pridi, a real-estate company, 
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was not in itself particularly salient; it was an ordinary case similar to 
thousands filed every year before federal courts. Upon the expropriation by 
federal authorities, Inmuebles Pridi submitted an amparo petition that was 
denied by the district court in charge of its resolution. The plaintiff, 
represented then by Vicente Aguinaco Aleman who would be appointed Chief 
Justice two months later, presented an appeal in the Supreme Court in 
November 1994 just one month before the enactment of the 1994 judicial 
reform5. Under its new institutional design, the Supreme Court took more 
than two years to render a decision on the case.  
The final judgment, drafted by reporting justice Mariano Azuela, ratified 
the decision by the district court, through the unanimous vote of all justices en 
banc. But despite the agreement regarding the specific effects of the cases, the 
Supreme Court could not reach a consensus around the constitutionality of 
the right to prior hearing in expropriation. On one side, reporting justice 
Azuela along with Justices Castro, Diaz Romero, Ortiz Mayagoitia, Roman 
Palacios and Sanchez Cordero formed a coalition opposing the argument in 
favour of the right to prior hearing. This group of justices based its position in 
three arguments: a) the prior hearing is not a requirement included in article 
27; b) there is no contradiction between article 14 –which prohibits depriving 
a person of their own property without a trial- and 27 because the former is 
related to a subjective, individual right that is always subject to the authority 
of social rights like those included in article 27; c) expropriation must be 
undertaken only under urgent circumstances, so the action of judicial 
authorities can be required to define whether an expropriation decree 
complies with the social need requirement.  
On the other side, the justices in the minority -Aguirre Anguiano, 
Gongora Pimentel, Gudiño Pelayo and Silva Meza- drafted a dissenting 
5 It is proper to bear in mind that 1994’s judicial reform came in to force on the first day of 
1995. Given the nature of the reform the cases under its jurisdiction had to be analysed 
under the new rules of the time.   
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opinion defending the applicability of the right to prior hearing to 
expropriation. Their arguments can be summarised as follows: a) the right to 
prior hearing contributes to make expropriation more rational; b) some state 
expropriation laws do protect this right, condition that has produced no 
conflict with constitutional provisions; c) the NAFTA does grant this right to 
foreign investors, leaving Mexican citizens at a disadvantage.   
Albeit divided, the Supreme Court’s final judgement led to the creation of 
jurisprudencia holding that “the right to prior hearing does not rule on 
expropriations”. The Supreme Court did so by adapting a previous 
jurisprudencia determining that the right to hearing does not rule on 
expropriations. In other words, the Supreme Court introduced the concept of 
“prior” to begin eliminating rules permitting excessive discretion held by 
administrative authorities, the first step to the adoption of a completely 
different interpretation of the constitution.  
In 2006 the Supreme Court once more faced the question of the 
applicability of the right to prior hearing in expropriations. A combination of 
two rulings allowed the Supreme Court to override the 1997 precedent. It first 
overrode the precedent and in a second case established a new jurisprudencias 
holding that prior hearing does apply to expropriations. The overriding and 
establishment of a new precedent meant the culmination of the process of 
liberalisation that had started a decade before. This evidence is relevant in the 
context of this dissertation because it makes clear how political fragmentation 
and the experience justices gained a result of stability in the bench had both 
been determinant for the Supreme Court to actively engage in policy-making. 
Additionally, this change was also linked to the orientations justices have 
towards the relationship between supranational and domestic regulations.  
In September 2001, President Vicente Fox issued a decree expropriating 
the assets and facilities of 27 sugar mills in order to secure the provision of 
sugar in the country, a subject that the decree considered of public interest. 
The affected owners filed different amparo petitions requesting federal courts 
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to annul the measures implemented by the federal government. Among these 
judicial controversies the one submitted by Fomento Azucarero stood out for 
receiving positive responses from both district and circuit courts. The 
Secretary of Agriculture, on behalf of the federal executive, appealed in the 
Supreme Court the decisions by lower courts, requesting the Supreme Court 
to ratify the constitutionality of this expropriation.  
As explained in chapter 4, the Supreme Court has limited powers for 
controlling the docket but it has the capacity for discretion in managing the 
timing for resolving a case. In the Fomento Azucarero case, the Supreme Court 
waited until 2006, President Fox’s last year in office, to debate and render a 
final decision. Reporting justice Juan Diaz Romero circulated in January of 
that year a project proposing to confirm the constitutionality of the decree 
based on the application of the 1997 precedent. Under a different composition 
–three new justices had joined the Supreme Court- the Supreme Court 
rendered an 8/3 decision to override the precedent impeding the application of 
the right to prior hearing to expropriations, and therefore, to ratify the 
invalidation of the Sugar Mills decree.  
The decision rendered by Supreme Court was the product of a majority 
composed by: the four justices in the minority in 1997, plus justice Margarita 
Luna Ramos, who had been appointed in 2004, and, surprisingly, three justices 
that voted with the majority in 1997- Ortiz Mayagoitia, Sanchez Cordero and 
Azuela Güitron –the latter was reporting justice in the 1997 case. Certainly, 
Diaz Romero was the only member of the previous majority ratifying his 
previous position, this time joined in the minority by justices Cossio Diaz and 
Valls, who had come to the bench in 2003 and 2004 respectively.  
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Table 6.1 The Supreme Court and the right to prior hearing on expropriations 
 
1997 
Inmuebles Pridi 
(en banc)  
2006 
Fomento 
Azucarero 
(en banc) 
2006 
Jurisprudencia 
Second 
Chamber 
Aguinaco (1995-2003) Absent Cossio (2003-2018) DU - 
Aguirre (1995-2012) DO 
 
MO MO 
Azuela (1995-2009) MU** 
 
MO * - 
Castro (1995-2003) MU * Luna (2004-2019) MO MO 
Diaz (1995-2006) MU 
 
DU ** SU 
Gongora (1995-2009) DO 
 
MO MO ** 
Gudiño (1995-2015) DO 
 
MO - 
Ortiz (1995-2012) MU 
 
MO MO 
Roman (1995-2004) MU Valls (2004-2019) DU - 
Sanchez (1995-2015) MU 
 
MO - 
Silva (1995-2015) DO 
 
MO - 
Decision 6/4 MU  8/3 MO 4/1 MO 
Main Litigants 
Real Estate firm vs. 
PRI-Controlled 
Executive  
Sugar Industry vs. 
PAN-controlled 
Executive 
- 
Expropriated Property 68.5 hectares of urban land  
Facilities and assets of 
Sugar Mills - 
Concrete Effect 
Refuse 
amparo/Defendant 
Prevails  
Concede amparo/ 
Plaintiff prevails - 
Case law 
The right to prior 
hearing does not 
rule on 
expropriation 
 
Overrode but did not 
replace jurisprudencia 
The right to 
prior hearing 
does rule on 
expropriation 
Note: MU= majority to uphold; DO=dissent to override; MO=majority to override; DU=minority to 
uphold.   
(*)= Chief Justice; (**)=Reporting Justice 
 
What factors made this change possible? The composition of the Supreme 
Court was a first relevant factor. Three new justices had came into the bench 
at the moment the second was solved; two of the justices that composed the 
majority in the first case were among the three justices that left the court. The 
second one was political fragmentation. Political power was so much more 
diffused in 2006 than in 1997. When the Supreme Court rendered the 1997 
jurisprudencia the PRI was in power and still in control of both chambers of 
the Congress. Nine years later, the PAN was in control of the presidency and 
the congress had been with no single-party majority since September 1997. 
Political fragmentation has created incentives for justices to decide the 
cases at hand seeking to establish their policy preferences. Moreover, after a 
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decade in the bench, many of them gained an important amount of experience 
that caused them to be less reluctant to render decisions challenging for the 
other branches of government. In short: in 2006 justices were already 
completely aware of the political power entailed in their posts and were more 
eager to actively employ it to take part in the policy and law making process 
in the country.  
A third element involved in this legal change was the tension between 
NAFTA and domestic regulations. At least formally, the goal some justices 
sought to achieve was to attend to the weak position of Mexican owners to 
that of foreigners regarding expropriations. The arguments advanced by the 
justices that changed in the second case the position they adopted in the first 
one confirm that they did not only become less reluctant to transform 
interpretations inherited from the authoritarian era but also more eager to 
amend what they understood as contradictions between domestic and 
supranational regulations.  
One of the justices in the 2006 minority, who was interviewed for this 
dissertation, explained that his major concern when deciding that case was 
the declining capacity of state institutions to effectively regulate private 
interests, so his position was for preserving some basic rules allowing the 
state to continue effectively representing the public interest. Interviewee 3, a 
Mexican lawyer working for the World Bank in property regulation issues, 
claims that one of the most important concerns that encouraged overriding 
the 1997 precedent was not so much about adapting Mexican regulations to 
NAFTA but rather to impose harder requirements on expropriations, a 
condition that would be particularly important in the case of the eventual 
victory of leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in the 2006 presidential 
election.  
Certainly, the Supreme Court overrode a precedent but it did not establish 
a formal replacing rule: it just held the inapplicability of the right to prior 
hearing in expropriations should no longer be in force. Tracing what 
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happened afterwards shows that once the 2006 elections passed, the Second 
Chamber of the Supreme Court created a new jurisprudencia to formally 
establish as binding precedent the prior hearing rule on expropriations. Later 
on, the Supreme Court complemented this case law by including exceptions 
for allowing administrative authorities to expropriate without being required 
to hear the cases before formally issuing the corresponding decree.  
Elizondo endorses the ‘targeted overriding’ hypothesis and Perez de Acha 
(2010) in an article published in 2010. They considered that this decision was 
part of a group of initiatives that emerged in the context of the 2006 election 
intended to create limits for the eventual victory of left-wing party. So, were 
justices more sincere or were they acting as delegates of the coalition that was 
in power at the time? The evidence reviewed shows that the decision resulted 
from the convergence of both factors: some justices were mainly motivated by 
their understanding of the disadvantaged position of nationals in comparison 
to foreign owners; others endorsed this change to contribute to the 
establishment of stricter rules more protective of private interest. In any case, 
what this dissertation aims to underline is that the overriding of precedent has 
not been usual practice by the new Supreme Court. The next section analyses 
this aspect and provides evidence to show how the new political context 
permitted this new interpretation to generate effects in local expropriation 
regulations.  
6.4 The Effects of Jurisprudencia beyond Judicial 
Boundaries 
The purpose of this section is to show how, in democratic times, the Supreme 
Court’s judgements and precedents have become a source of legal change at 
subnational level, particularly encouraging state legislatures to adapt local 
regulations to new constitutional interpretations. This section therefore 
provides an account of the Supreme Court's activity related to the 
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establishment of case law (jurisprudencia), followed by a specific analysis of 
the evolution of the constitutional interpretation of the right to prior hearing 
in expropriations.  
In order to have a clear vision of the significance of the 2006 decision, this 
research carried out a review of the 47 precedents established by the Supreme 
Court from 1917 to 2012 on the subject, as well as of the 99 amendments to the 
subnational expropriation laws conducted in the same period. Regarding the 
first element it is important to note that, under the 1917 Constitution, the 
judiciary was explicitly prohibited from reviewing anything different to the 
compensation in cases emerging from expropriations.  
Nonetheless, as figure 6.2 reveals, the Supreme Court has constantly 
ignored such clauses by establishing different interpretations of the right to 
prior hearing in expropriation cases. The Supreme Court, which had already 
established some precedents, became more active in creating jurisprudencia in 
the 1930s, the decade when the secondary law was created (1936), but most 
importantly, a period when the government expropriated the oil industry 
from foreign investors.  
Figure 6.2 Expropriation state laws and case law, 1917-2012 
  
Source: Expropriation law and precedents dataset 1917-2011 (see Appendix I).  
Note: these calculations include both proper jurisprudencia as well as tesis aisladas. 
  
Among the claims the expropriated companies presented to challenge the 
constitutionality of the 1938 decree, was that the federal government did not 
comply with the right to a prior hearing that they were entitled to. The 
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Supreme Court at that time held that this right was inapplicable to 
expropriations. Before the enactment of the 1934 Expropriation Law –the 
secondary law at federal level- 7 out of 8 jurisprudencia authorised the right to 
prior hearing under specific circumstances, in cases involving ejidos for 
example. After the 1938 Oil Expropriation, the dominant constitutional 
interpretation on the subject essentially took the opposite stance, a feature 
that continued even after the renovation of the Supreme Court in 1994.   
Turning to subnational regulations, the great variance that exists among 
them is remarkable. In the state of Jalisco, for example, local expropriation law 
has been amended five times, but in states such as Hidalgo no change was 
made for more than seven decades until 2010. Indeed, in the states where 
there has been alternation in the governorship, the average length of a law 
has been 18.6 years, while in the states that have always been governed by the 
PRI this figure reaches 31.3 years. Since 1995 it is evident that there has been 
increasing legislative activity on the subject, but whilst before 2006 the link to 
the right to prior hearing was not particularly apparent, afterwards the 
relationship became very clear.  
The effect of democratisation on subnational expropriation regulations 
has been especially noticeable in the provisions related to the right to prior 
hearing. Before 1935 only the state of Jalisco required administrative 
authorities to comply with this right before conducting expropriations. By 
2006, the number of states conceding this right had increased only to seven; in 
the period 2007-2012 the states of Aguascalientes, Hidalgo, Michoacan, Puebla, 
San Luis Potosi, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, all passed amendments to 
introduce this right to their legal systems. In other words, eight out of the 
fifteen justices granting the right to prior hearing in expropriations 
incorporated this provision after the Supreme Court rendered in 2006 a 
decision establishing this rule.  
The Supreme Court, therefore, provoked the most substantial change on 
this matter since the Constitution was promulgated in 1917. This evidence 
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shows, first, that subnational authorities are aware of how the Supreme Court 
decisions may affect their performance. To put it another way, if subnational 
authorities adapt their local legal systems to the Supreme Court’s judgements 
and case law it is because they seek to avoid the legal costs of not complying 
with them as it may, for example, signify the start of an increasing number of 
cases demanding expropriations proceedings.  
The enactment of a federal expropriation law had a great impact on 
further legislative innovations and judicial interpretations. The incorporation 
of national level regulations accompanied by the landmark event that was the 
Oil Expropriation provoked the development of subnational expropriations 
regulations. Save some exceptions, state level laws mostly resembled federal 
ones, excluding a specific reference to the right to prior hearing. In contrast to 
the transformation that distinguished the authoritarian period, under 
increased pluralism the most important changes have been linked to the 
ratification of NAFTA, showing therefore the prominence gained by 
international law in domestic affairs. However, if there has been a noticeable 
change in the most recent years it was the emergence of the Supreme Court's 
precedents as a source of legal transformation on a national-scale.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was twofold: first, it sought to explain that 
precedent overrides are influenced by political factors, and, second, to show 
that in democratic conditions the effects of judicial rulings and precedents are 
expansive. In authoritarian times, the Supreme Court used to endorse highly 
salient presidential policies, a characteristic that did not automatically change 
with institutional enforcement resulting from the 1994 judicial reform. The 
key factor that allowed legal change was the emergence of a more plural and 
competitive political context, but also the experience gained by justices 
themselves. The Supreme Court has passed from a period of transition to a 
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period of consolidation that has led to the more active use of all of its policy-
making instruments.  
The evidence presented in this chapter makes clear that in recent years 
the Supreme Court has become a very important source of change in 
expropriations regulations. The Supreme Court has overridden precedent with 
the intention of producing effects in the political arena. In the case of 
expropriation the impact was not particularly related to the original intention 
but it nonetheless led to a relevant legal transformation. The Supreme Court 
has gradually gained the role of ultimate arbitrator that presidents used to 
play in the authoritarian period. Additionally, democratic times have also 
raised its influence as a source of nation-wide legal change. In short: the 
Supreme Court has become a more active political referee and a more effective 
legislator. 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
Over the last decades, countries of different regions of the world have 
witnessed the emergence of judicialisation and democratisation. On one hand, 
judicialisation meant the transference of an extraordinary amount of political 
power from executive and legislative institutions to courts (Tate and 
Vallinder, 1995). On the other, democratisation led to the emergence of 
genuine representative institutions in countries formerly governed under 
authoritarian rule (Huntington, 1991). In the countries where these processes 
have converged a substantial transformation in the policy-making processes 
has been produced. Paradoxically, as representative institutions became 
genuine sources of policy and law, an increasing volume of government 
actions and laws began to be ultimately defined inside the courtroom.  
Judicialisation has been linked to different factors, from the establishment 
of supra-national judicial bodies (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998) to the spread 
of human rights rhetoric (Epp, 1998; ten Kate and van Koppen, 1994). At the 
domestic level, however, the adoption of broader constitutional review powers 
has been underlined as a source of the empowerment judicialisation has 
implied (Couso et al., 2010; Epstein et al., 2001; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2003; 
Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008; Hirschl, 2008; Shapiro, 2002; Sieder et al., 2005; 
Stone Sweet, 2000). The literature on comparative judicial politics has in 
recent years asserted that authoritarian rulers have resorted to the 
incorporation of stronger forms of constitutional review as a method to 
preserve their hegemony in the case of their eventual demise (Ginsburg, 2003; 
Hirschl, 2004). However, even where such insurance policy/hegemonic 
preservation strategy has been employed, courts have gradually emerged as 
more relevant sources of law and policy.  
Why do courts established under authoritarian become effective policy-
makers in democracy? Drawing on both the scholarship on Latin American 
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judicial politics and the separation-of-powers approach for the study of courts 
(Epstein and Knight, 1998; Ferejohn, 2002; Ferejohn et al., 2004; Magaloni et 
al., 2011; Rios Figueroa, 2007), and by using Mexico as a case study, this thesis 
has, through the previous six chapters, argued that the emergence and 
consolidation of courts as policy-makers has occurred as a result of the 
convergence of three factors: institutional change, democratisation and 
stability in the bench.  
First, Mexico passed in 1994 an ambitious constitutional reform that 
adopted broader constitutional judicial review powers of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The reform substantially expanded the 
authority of this decision making body, virtually transforming it into a 
constitutional court but without removing its role as the last resort court 
within the federal judiciary. The institutional change implied in this reform 
meant the provision of veto power to the political actors that receive legal 
standing for submitting constitutional demands to the Supreme Court. The 
adoption of broader mechanisms of constitutional review created a new set of 
incentives for political actors to judicialise government action and legislation.  
Second, Mexico has undergone a process of democratisation in recent 
decades that has permitted opposition forces to gain an equally unprecedented 
influence over policy-making processes at national and subnational levels. 
Democratisation has led to a process of political fragmentation in a country 
that, up to the 1990s, was distinguished for being an authoritarian regime 
dominated by the combination of a strong presidencialismo with the 
hegemony of a single political party. Political fragmentation from 
democratisation substantially transformed policy-making processes, but also 
triggered the use of constitutional litigation by political actors and provided 
increasing incentives for the Supreme Court to more proactively engage in 
policy-making.  
Third, throughout Mexican history instability has ben one of the main 
features of the Supreme Court. Since the 1994 judicial reform came in to force, 
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the Supreme Court’s composition has gained an equally unprecedented 
stability creating a scenario for justices to become more experienced and 
aware of their political influence. Experience from stability has allowed 
justices to more proactively and strategically seek to engage in policy making 
in terms of arbitration and rule-making. In a more democratic context and 
with more effective tools, the Supreme Court emerged as an effective policy-
maker.  
The purpose of this final chapter is threefold: first, it presents a summary 
of the conclusions which emerged from the empirical analysis of Mexico as a 
case study; second, it provides a discussion of the contributions of this thesis 
to the corresponding literature; and third, it assesses both conclusions and 
implications in the light of future research.  The chapter is structured in five 
sections: the first re-assesses the theoretical foundations of this thesis and 
explains why the approach employed constitutes an insightful contribution 
for the empirical study of courts. The second examines the conclusions this 
dissertation arrived at regarding the relationship between judicialisation and 
democracy, explaining why policy-making by courts is essentially determined 
by the extent to which political actors delegate political power in judicial 
institutions. The third analyses the effects of political fragmentation and 
stability in policy-making by courts in terms of arbitration and rule-making, 
paying particular attention to the different institutional tools courts employ to 
produce effective policy outcomes. The fourth section focuses on the effects of 
judicial rulings on the crafting of policy and law beyond the judicial arena. 
Finally, the fifth section presents an examination of the paths that future 
research on the subject may follow. 
7.1 Courts as Policy-makers 
The empirical inquiry of courts from political science is based on a single but 
fundamental premise: courts are important because their decisions produce 
effects on society. The endeavour of researching the policy effects of courts 
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implies two particular challenges: first, it requires establishing the appropriate 
conceptualisation of policy to explain how courts can be considered as policy-
makers. Second, it involves defining what specific outcomes produced by 
courts can be regarded as policy decisions. The judicial politics scholarship 
has provided insightful contributions for the understanding of courts as 
policy-makers. However, due to the difficulty of researching the policy 
content in the highly technical texts, this scholarship has predominantly 
targeted decision-making as a proxy for explaining policy-making (McGuire et 
al., 2009) The emphasis made in explaining the process (decision-making) 
rather than the product of judicial decisions (policy-making) has not only been 
ironic but also problematic as it has led to a partial assessment of courts 
performance.  
The main purpose of this research was, by analysing in-depth the case of 
Mexico, to provide a comprehensive explanation of why courts established 
under authoritarian rule become effective policy-makers in democracy. This 
research faced the challenges of conceptualising policy-making by courts and 
operationalizing such conceptualisation in a plausible and objective way. The 
theoretical and methodological choices used in this thesis aimed to address 
such challenges by analysing the nature of adjudication in order to better 
apprehend the complexity implied in the rulings handed down in 
constitutional review cases. As a result, this thesis considered that a 
comprehensive account of policy-making by courts should not be based on an 
understanding of judicial rulings as sum-zero decisions, but on the awareness 
that they at the same time include elements that arbitrate political conflict and 
establish rules of general application.  
The lack of enforcement instruments has been regarded as the feature that 
determines the infeasibility of policy-making by courts. Having no formal 
abilities to make their decisions binding, some commentators claim, make 
courts largely depend on other institutions to enforce their rulings 
(Ronsenberg, 2008). Certainly, unlike executives and legislatives, courts do not 
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have direct control neither over the purse nor over the sword. Nonetheless, 
this dissertation has ascertained, this condition by no means implies that 
courts do not exercise political power when allocating political resources 
among the litigants that submit cases before their jurisdiction, and creating 
norms that produce effects beyond judicial boundaries.  
The dispositions courts establish in the rulings they render in 
constitutional review cases create a concrete, particular and retrospective rule 
that defines the party that prevails in a legal dispute. Furthermore, judicial 
rulings found such dispositions in a specific interpretation of the relevant law 
that establishes another rule, this of an abstract, general and prospective 
nature (Stone Sweet, 2002; Hansford and Spriggs, 2006). In other words, 
judicial rulings do make policies in terms of principles, or general views 
regarding how public issues should be conducted; policy lines, or strategies 
related public authorities have to deal with such public issues; and specific 
measures, or concrete instruments that display policy lines.  
Constitutional review allows courts to perform two policy-making roles: 
arbitrators through dispositions and rule-makers through the reasons 
founding such dispositions. To perform these policy-making roles, however, 
courts largely depend on the inputs litigants bring before their jurisdiction, as 
well as in the formal and informal rules determining the effects judicial 
rulings can produced within and beyond the judicial realm. Noticing the 
relevance of institutions, this thesis proposed that in the design of 
constitutional review there are four elements that particularly influence the 
capacity of courts to make policy: standing (how accessible is the court to 
different types of actors); jurisdiction (how centralised is constitutional review 
within an specific legal system); effects of rulings (what actors are bound to 
follow dispositions); and precedent (to what extent reasons founding 
dispositions constitute binding rules).  
Based on this analytical framework, this thesis claimed that up to the 1994 
judicial reform, the institutional design of constitutional review provided the 
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Mexican Supreme Court with limited tools that prevented its emergence as an 
effective policy-maker. Since the birth of Mexico as an independent nation in 
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court underwent a complex process of 
institutional consolidation. It acquired the power of constitutional review with 
the creation of amparo and later its rulings gained authority with the 
incorporation of jurisprudencia. However, the nature of these tools along with 
the emergence of an authoritarian regime prevented the development of a 
proactive Supreme Court in policy-making terms. The 1994 judicial reform 
constituted a revolution for the Supreme Court as it provided justices with 
unprecedented constitutional review powers. The establishment of centralised 
jurisdiction, standing to privileged actors, erga omnes effects and the 
reinforcement of jurisprudencia together, set a completely new institutional 
framework to be employed by the Supreme Court in an increasingly 
competitive political context.   
The literature on Mexican judicial politics has gradually developed since 
the 1994 judicial reform came in to force. This literature has particularly 
agreed in underlining the effects democratisation has produced on the 
Supreme Court’s performance. Nonetheless, this concurrence has not been 
accompanied by an agreement on partisan bias and autonomy. Moreover, little 
attention has been paid to the effects of the transformation lived within the 
Supreme Court on its own decision-making processes. Furthermore, in 
methodological terms there has been an understanding of judicial rulings as 
sum-zero outcomes that affect only the parties in conflict. Overall, the 
literature on Mexican judicial politics (Magaloni, 2003; Magaloni, 2008) has 
fallen in to the same paradox as the one analysing what occurs in other 
latitudes: it has researched the Supreme Court because it is important in 
policy terms, but has not provided an comprehensive account of its policy-
making role.  
The research design employed in this thesis constitutes an innovative 
approach for the study of courts since it concurrently examined policy-
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making in terms of arbitration and rule-making. As this thesis has argued, 
analysing decision-making without paying attention to the judicial outcomes 
and their effects results in a partial view of what is at stake in courts. The 
diachronic within case analysis of Mexico employed permitted this thesis to 
attain the objective of providing a comprehensive account of policy-making 
by courts. It did so not only by making an effort to clarify the complexity 
implied in judicial rulings, but also by considering the effects of the political 
environment and stability on the performance of courts.  
This approach contributed to the scholarship on Latin American judicial 
politics particularly by considering the role of non-institutional factors as 
determinants of the way courts engage in policy-making. A study sponsored 
by the Inter-American Development Bank shed light on this subject by 
proposing that in the region courts intervene in the policy-making process in 
four different ways: as referees, veto players, policy players and alternative 
social representatives (Sousa, 2010). The results of this dissertation 
contributed to explain that courts could simultaneously perform more than 
one of these roles. According to what has been claimed in this thesis, policy-
making by courts is concurrently displayed through its arbitration of conflict, 
but also by creating rules of general application. Therefore, a second 
contribution of this study was to provide an account of how courts make use 
of all the tools they have at hand to influence policy-making processes.  
7.2 Democracy and Judicialisation 
This thesis was particularly interested in examining the effects of the 
convergence of democratisation and judicialisation. In order to study in-depth 
how this convergence took place in Mexico and why it has influenced policy-
making by the Supreme Court, it aimed to explore the way political 
fragmentation from democratisation has fostered a process of judicialisation 
of politics whereby an increasing number of more complex cases have been 
brought into the courtroom. The importance of researching this in the context 
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of study devoted to elucidate why courts established under authoritarian rule 
become more effective policy-makers in democracy, relied on the premise that 
policy-making by courts is substantially determined by the inputs litigants 
bring to its jurisdiction. Therefore, clarifying how judicialisation has unfolded 
contributed to explain to what extent the dynamics of a democratic regime 
have affected the interaction amongst political actors so as to encourage them 
to resort to the Supreme Court, a traditionally discreet and limited political 
actor.  
Mexico has gone through a radical transformation in the last thirty years. 
Democratisation provoked this country to transit from an authoritarian 
hegemonic-party regime to a democratic regime with alternation in the 
presidency as well as in more than half of the 32 states. Political 
fragmentation has been one of the main features of this process of change to 
more democratic and plural conditions. At both national and subnational 
levels, it has transformed the way political parties interact both within and 
outside of legislative and executive arenas. In a context where the authorities 
from the three levels can all belong to different parties, having an institutional 
mechanism to process potential conflicts is fundamental to guarantee 
governability. Even if the president remains a highly influential player, in 
democratic times the holder of this position no longer plays the role of 
ultimate referee in disputes arising amongst actors from the different branches 
and levels of government.  
Democracy has resulted in more fragmentation and this in turn has led to 
a greater need for an effective arbitrator able to institutionally process and 
settle political disputes. It is in this context that, due to its constitutional 
review powers, the Supreme Court has appeared as the most qualified actor to 
undertake the arbitration of the conflicts of federal and republican systems. 
The procedures established by the 1994 judicial reform have been particularly 
determinant for the emergence of the Supreme Court as an effective policy-
maker. This transformation, however, resulted not from judicial activism but 
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from a process whereby the use of litigation by political actors has delegated 
an increasing amount of power to the Supreme Court.  
The political actors with access to the Supreme Court through the 
constitutional review procedures established by the 1994 judicial reform, the 
constitutional controversy and action of unconstitutionality, have regarded 
standing as a strategic tool for advancing their agendas and protecting their 
interests. In the case of constitutional controversy, procedure intended to 
process conflicts proper of federalism, judicialisation has emerged ‘from 
below’, that is, from low-ranked political actors suing decisions made by 
highly ranked ones. ‘Judicialisation from below’ shows that as political power 
has become less centralised political actors have become less reluctant to 
challenge more influential ones in institutional arenas. This path indicates a 
substantial transformation in the dynamics of political systems characterised 
by the centralisation of power and the resolution of conflicts through informal 
mechanisms.  
In the case of action of unconstitutionality, procedure meant to control 
the constitutionality of legislation passed at federal and state levels, the 
opposite has occurred: litigation has been predominantly employed by federal 
level authorities targeting the laws of sub-national and municipal application. 
This process of ‘judicialisation from above’ also reveals that as political power 
has become more fragmented the capacity of high-ranked federal actors to 
influence policy and law-making processes has declined. Certainly, as low-
level actors are more prone to judicialise conflict and high-ranked actors are 
also more to resort to litigation, legislation and government action has become 
increasingly re-centralised in the Supreme Court. The result of this process of 
delegation has been the progressive development of more proactive policy-
making decisions by the Supreme Court.  
This thesis has explained that the 1994 judicial reform set the institutional 
foundations for judicialisation to occur. Although a necessary condition, such 
institutional change itself did not completely explain the emergence of this 
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process. Political fragmentation from democratisation was the factor that 
decisively contributed to the judicialisation of Mexican politics. Interested in 
strengthening the understanding of judicialisation and democracy, this thesis 
explored whether higher degrees of political fragmentation necessarily lead to 
higher levels of constitutional litigation. The result of this analysis shows that 
the relationship between political fragmentation and litigation takes an 
inverse “U shaped” form; indicating that when the former reaches certain 
levels its effects on litigation reverse.  
This particular finding may constitute a contribution to the judicial 
politics literature as it provides evidence that shows that the effects of 
democracy on judicialisation are limited by the own dynamics of democracy. 
In other words, what this thesis has found is that democracy produces 
fragmentation and fragmentation fosters the use of litigation. However, when 
political fragmentation reaches high levels the use of litigation declines. 
Political actors have more incentives to litigate when they are excluded from 
decision-making processes. When fragmentation is high enough that a wide 
coalition is required to pass any piece of legislation political actors found 
fewer incentives to judicialise a decision in which they were probably 
involved. Still, further research is required on this matter in order to confirm 
or discard the conclusions provided by this thesis.  
This study provided specific insights regarding why certain actors more 
actively resort to the Supreme Court for advancing their agendas. As 
mentioned above, the relevance of this question relies on the limited 
explanations that on this matter characterise the Mexican judicial politics 
literature. The results of this thesis reveal that the current design of 
constitutional review has fostered, in democracy, a process of judicialisation 
commanded by political actors but not from other sort of players. This 
institutional design has not provided incentives enough to promote the 
development of strategic litigation by social organisations. The result of this 
231 
has been an essentially political form of judicialisation that has translated in 
the emergence of an essentially political Supreme Court.  
7.3 Arbitration and Rule-making 
Explaining why, under the institutional design established by the 1994 judicial 
reform, democratisation fostered the use of litigation by political actors 
constituted a decisive step to comprehend how the Supreme Court gradually 
turned into a more effective police-maker in the Mexican political system. 
Once such a goal was achieved, this thesis concentrated on providing an 
account of the way the Supreme Court displayed policy-making by arbitrating 
political conflict through the dispositions established in the rulings handed 
down in constitutional cases and creating generally applicable rules through 
precedents. Accordingly, this study performed a systematic and synchronized 
analysis of both policy-making functions, based on strike down decisions as 
the most plausible evidence of arbitration and jurisprudencias as the most 
effective measure of rule-making. This strategy was defined in order to attain 
the objective of comprehending the complexity judicial rulings imply.  
The 1994 judicial reform produced a significant change in the decision-
making process of the Supreme Court. It did not only mean the provision of 
new constitutional review powers but the need of creating the proceedings 
needed to deal with new types of cases. The Supreme Court went through a 
process whereby justices and their respective staff learnt how to deal with this 
volume of more complex cases. The structure of the Supreme Court’s 
decision-making process that emerged from the 1994 judicial reform certainly 
affected its performance as policy-maker. Although constitutional 
controversies and actions of unconstitutionality represent a minor 
contribution to the total caseload, cases originated in both procedures have 
unquestionably been part of the most salient cases the Supreme Court has 
adjudicated: 1 of every 5 cases decided by justices working ‘en banc’ has been 
either a constitutional controversy or an action of unconstitutionality.  
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The Supreme Court has actively employed the policy-making tools it has 
available. In the first years following the reform it made timid use of its 
capacity to strike down legislation but not in its recourse to the creation of 
case law, in part for filling procedural provisions that had been omitted in the 
legislation regulating constitutional cases, in part for making policy without 
requiring to use invalidations. Nonetheless, as the country turned into a more 
plural polity and the Supreme Court became a more stable and experienced 
decision-making body, justices became less reluctant to render strike down 
decisions.  
This thesis provided an assessment of the way the Supreme Court has 
transformed the use of its policy-making tools related to constitutional review 
according to four factors: political fragmentation, hierarchy and political 
affiliation of the parties involved in constitutional review cases, and the 
experience gained by justices as a result of stability in the composition of the 
Supreme Court. This analysis demonstrated, first, that political fragmentation 
is positively related with the number of strike down decisions rendered by the 
Supreme Court. This finding implies that as political power became less 
centralised –particularly in the presidency- the Supreme Court became more 
prone to proactively use their power to invalidate decisions by public 
authorities.  
Second, hierarchy has been a decisive factor affecting arbitration and rule-
making but only in constitutional controversies. In other words, in cases 
resulting from disputes proper of federalism, the Supreme Court has 
consistently been inclined to rule in favour of the highest-ranked authority. 
This finding means that ‘judicialisation from above’ has produced limited 
effects for low-ranked authorities using litigation, but also that the Supreme 
Court has been strategic in their decision-making process. Certainly, the 
Supreme Court has avoided engaging in political struggles with more 
influential and powerful authorities through strike down decisions but it has 
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resorted to jurisprudencia as a method for creating rules affecting such 
authorities.  
Third, with political affiliation has occurred the opposite of that with 
hierarchy: it has affected the actions of unconstitutionality but not 
constitutional controversies. In the years that followed the 1994 judicial 
reform, the Supreme Court was less prone to strike down decisions made by 
authorities affiliated to the most relevant political parties (i.e. PRI and PAN) 
and less inclined to create jurisprudencias in cases involving the declining 
hegemonic PRI. Nonetheless, as political power became more diffused, the 
Supreme Court became more inclined to invalidate cases regardless of political 
affiliation of the parties involved.    
Fourth, the stability in the Supreme Court’s composition has translated 
into a decision making body integrated by more experienced justices. The 
analysis regarding experience from stability shows that it has produced an 
effect in arbitration but not in rule-making, in both actions of 
unconstitutionality and constitutional controversies. Justices have been more 
prone to declare the unconstitutionality of legislation and government action 
as they have become more experienced and work under a more stable 
composition. This conclusion implies that the unprecedented stability that has 
existed in the bench has resulted in higher degrees of autonomy and this in 
increasing incentives for judges to more proactively employ the tools they 
have available. Moreover, this finding provides evidence that questions the 
conclusion by Magaloni and Sanchez (2006) that claims that after alternation 
the Supreme Court has remained biased in favour of the PRI.  
The systematic analysis of these four factors varying across the time has 
certainly demonstrated the emergence and consolidation of the Supreme 
Court as an effective arbitration body. Under more plural conditions the 
Supreme Court has gradually filled part of the space a declining presidency 
has left. Political fragmentation has expanded the incentives political actors 
have for resorting to a third party –the Supreme Court- to protect or advance 
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their interests. Litigation, political fragmentation and stability have fostered 
the development of an autonomous court that has been gradually developing 
its own agenda. Since strike down decisions have an impact on the parties but 
not necessarily in the normative structure, the Supreme Court has employed 
case law as the preferred means for making law. This thesis showed that the 
Supreme Court has been strategic when deciding constitutional cases. The 
statistical analysis provided makes it clear that political variables have played 
a major role. The Supreme Court has decided according to the capacity it has 
to react to the actors implied in the cases before its jurisdiction. This capacity 
to influence has been reflected in both the hierarchy of the different political 
actors in the federal system, as well as the affiliation they have to the different 
political parties.  
7.4 Effects of Policy-making  
One of this thesis’ main goals was to provide an in-depth account of policy-
making by courts. In doing so, it not only focussed on the decisions rendered 
by the court but also on their impact beyond the judicial realm. As 
Kapiszewski and Taylor (2008) have underlined, the literature on Latin 
American judicial politics still lacks research devoted to the analysis of the 
aftermath of judicial decisions. Hence, demonstrating that the Supreme 
Court’s policy outcomes indeed produce effects on the activity of executive 
and legislative institutions. This is one of the most important contributions of 
this study. 
A major challenge this thesis faced was constructing the appropriate 
approach to study judicial effects from an objective, unbiased perspective. The 
response to this challenge was to select two policy areas –abortion and 
expropriation- rather than seeking to conduct a large-n systematic account of 
more than two-thousand constitutional cases presented before the Supreme 
Court in the period 1995-2010.  These policy areas were selected because of 
their political salience and, most importantly, because of the different 
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trajectories they both have followed in the judiciary. The constitutionality of 
induced abortion is a question which until recently remained outside the 
courtroom. The first case where the Supreme Court was forced rule upon its 
constitutionality was submitted only in 2000. Expropriation on the other hand 
has a long tradition as a matter that has been regularly subject to the 
adjudication of federal courts. The combination of this approach sought to 
avoid selection bias and thus to permit this dissertation to arrive at objective 
conclusions.   
In the first place, regarding the legal status of induced abortion, this thesis 
demonstrated that the Supreme Court has been strategic while rendering its 
rulings. The Supreme Court has avoided confronting the legislatures that 
passed more permissive regulations, but sought to advance the policy 
preferences of the majority of justices through the creation of case law. 
Certainly, in both cases analysed on abortion matters, the Supreme Court did 
not declare any invalidation but established jurisprudencias that produced 
effects on the development of further regulations. The first decision holding 
that the protection of the right to life was protected from conception, among 
other consequences, provided litigants with legal arguments to contest the 
constitutionality of the subsequent reform that legalised abortion on request 
in Mexico City. In the second decision the Supreme Court again held the 
reform as constitutional, but determined that regulating the interruption of 
pregnancies fell under the jurisdiction of subnational legislators and not 
within the jurisdiction of the judiciary. This second decision produced a 
backlash of more than half of the Mexican states passing stricter abortion 
regulations.  
  Second, in relation to expropriation regulations, the Supreme Court was 
confronted with rulings whether governments are allowed to employ this 
legal figure without protecting the right to prior hearing. In a first case, the 
Supreme Court determined that this right was inapplicable to expropriations, 
as judicial precedents had consistently established. Nonetheless, in the case 
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the Supreme Court adjudicated under more democratic conditions, the 
majority of justices advanced a different argument: they determined and 
established as binding precedent that public authorities are bound to protect 
the right to prior hearing in all expropriations. In the case of expropriation, 
the new precedent provoked eight states reforming the local regulations to 
adapt them to the new constitutional interpretations.  
The emergence of this sort of ‘dialogue’ between the different authorities 
with capacity to shape legal contents is not uncommon in democratic systems 
(Barnes, 2004; Roach, 2006). In the United States, for example, after the 
Supreme Court held in Kelo v. City of New London that the use of eminent 
domain is permitted to transfer property from a private owner to another 
private owner for the purpose of promoting economic development forty-
three states enacted legislation establishing stricter eminent domain rules 
(Somin, 2008). Judicial decisions in both the United States and Mexico have 
been authoritative enough as to led to a massive backlash. In the case of the 
former the Supreme Court has traditionally been an influential policy-making 
actor. In Mexico on the other hand, the backlash resulted from the abortion 
decisions and the effects produced by expropriation jurisprudencias do 
constitute outstanding evidence that does not correspond to the discreet role it 
has played through the country’s history.  
7.5 Implications and Future research 
The analysis developed in this thesis has contributed to comprehend the 
relevance of courts in recent democracies. In contrast to what has 
distinguished Latin American history, constitutional and supreme courts have 
in recent years confronted questions of the utmost relevance for their 
respective political systems, producing effects that have decisively and 
extensively affected societies and the dynamics of political systems. To 
conclude this study, this section provides a brief discussion of the most 
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relevant implications implied in the results of study about policy-making by 
the Supreme Court of Mexico.  
In first place, the results of this thesis demonstrate that institutions 
matter. The institutional change implied in broadening the scope of 
constitutional judicial review gradually transformed the performance of an 
institution traditionally characterised for its subordination to political power. 
Moreover, this thesis made clear that increasing the capacity of courts to 
check public authorities does not only affect the organ holding this power but 
the behaviour of those actors receiving the power of standing. Therefore, as 
the access to courts shape the behaviour of political actors and influences the 
performance of such judicial organs, any reform of the design of 
constitutional review requires considering that its effects will not be 
circumscribed to the judicial sphere. Therefore, it is fundamental to emphasise 
the importance of conducting more comparative research about the effects of 
standing on the development of different types of court.   
Second, the conclusions of this study demonstrated that the political 
environment is decisive for the success or failure of a given institutional 
change. In particular, as it has been asserted in this text, the fragmentation of 
power in democracy is determinant not only for courts to conduct their 
function with independence but also for political actors to resort to litigation. 
Certainly, democracy activates litigants and litigants then activate courts. The 
regular use of constitutional litigation indicates, therefore, the emergence of 
courts as arenas where political conflict is institutionally processed. This 
thesis focused on the innovations in the constitutional review framework 
produced by a specific institutional change. As a result it did not address the 
question of whether democratic politics transforms the performance of 
judicial institutions in the absence of institutional change. Further research on 
this topic is needed to clarify to what extent the emergence of policy-making 
by courts is possible under static institutional designs.  
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Third, this thesis provided interesting insights regarding the effects of 
stability on the performance of courts. Under stability judges gain experience 
and become less reluctant to proactively use the tools they have to advance 
their policy goals. This conclusion highlights the importance of establishing 
and guaranteeing prolonged tenure terms in order to enhance independence. 
However, as this conclusion is based only on the results of the Mexican case, 
more comparative research on this matter would be important to better 
comprehend the extent to which tenure and experience transform the 
performance of judges.  
Fourth, while stressing the impact of non-legal factors on decision and 
policy-making by courts, this study provided empirical evidence regarding the 
essentially indeterminate nature of law. Certainly, judges do have a fair 
amount of discretion to decide upon the cases they have at hand. This means 
that law does not provide a unique response to a legal dilemma; instead, it 
permits different interpretations that allow the people in charge of 
adjudication to decide in different directions. The field of judicial politics has 
consistently demonstrated that non-legal factors determine judicial decisions. 
However, the discussions of the theoretical implications this field has 
provided are insufficient and sometimes superficial. Therefore, further 
research is needed to overcome the weakness of the link between empirical 
work and theoretical implications that distinguishes the field. 
Finally, in the emergence of policy-making by courts is implied a more 
independent performance of the judicial function. More independent and 
proactive judges are required, as are the rest of the public officers in charge of 
creating policies, to be more accountable to society. One of the most relevant 
challenges that face courts in the era of judicialisation is to strengthen their 
social links. Accountability and transparency are two elements that could 
substantially contribute to achieving such goals. In countries like Mexico, 
authoritarian rulers empowered courts as a means to preserve their 
hegemony. The advent of more democratic and competitive conditions, 
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however, has allowed courts to gradually gain an unprecedented capacity to 
make policy and law. At this stage of the process the challenge is not to 
debilitate judges but to shape the institutional design in order to make them 
perform in a more transparent, accountable fashion.  
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Appendix I. Datasets 
Constitutional Review Judgements Dataset 1995-2011 
The Constitutional Review Judgements Dataset registers the 2001 judgements 
the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice handed down to constitutional 
controversies and actions of unconstitutionality in the period 1995-2011. 
Three main sources of information were employed in its integration:  
a) The official information published by the Supreme Court on its Judicial 
Statistics Website  @lex, which, at the time it was consulted in the first 
semester of 2012, included information for every constitutional 
controversy and action of unconstitutionality case filed from the 
moment the 1994 judicial reform came in to force on the first day of 
1995 to December 2011. @lex registers information for all “original, 
complete and closed files”, excluding those incomplete and/or unclosed 
ones. @lex registers general identification data for every case, including 
date of submission, date of resolution, claiming party (specific for every 
file as well as a typology according to the dispositions of the 105 
constitutional article), defendant party (both specific and the type of 
party according to the disposition of the 105 constitutional article), 
political affiliation of the parties involved, reporting justice, legal 
matter, type of resolution, articles of the constitution referred  in the 
claiming party’s demand, among other.  
b) The 2011 edition of IUS, is an electronic compilation published by the 
Supreme Court of Justice that compiles every unit of case law created 
by the Supreme Court since the promulgation of the 1917 Constitution. 
In particular, for the integration of the Constitutional Review 
Judgements Dataset were employed all case law units (tesis aisladas y 
jurisprudencias) originated from constitutional controversies and 
actions of unconstitutionality decisions.  
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c) The Local Congresses Dataset (CIDAC, 2008), electronic tool, created by 
Mexico City-based thin-thank Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo, 
that provides information regarding the composition of state 
congresses from 1980s to 2008.  
The following procedure was employed for the integration of this data:  
1) it was first downloaded standardized the information from @lex;  
2) it was captured and also standardized the information from IUS:  
3) it was selected the data from CIDAC’s dataset according to the needs 
of the one in process of construction;  
4) it was cross-referenced with the information from IUS with the data 
selected from @lex dataset in order to have a registry compiling not 
only the information regarding judgements but also of the precedents 
(case law) which emerged from them; 
5) it was then cross-referenced with the integrated information from 
@lex and IUS with those previously organised from CIDAC’s dataset 
with the purpose of incorporating data to depict more precisely the 
affiliation and fragmentation features of the actors taking part in 
constitutional judicial review procedures; 
6) as the information from CIDAC was incomplete for the period of study 
(1995-2011), it was later compiled with information from Lujambio 
(2000) as well as from both state congresses and state electoral bodies’ 
websites to complete missing data; 
7) finally, with information complete for every case, a process for 
deriving variables analytically relevant for this thesis’ purposes was 
undertaken. 
The Constitutional Judgements Dataset consists of 2001 observation units 
classified according to thirty different variables. These variables are: 
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ID 
Description: consecutive number ordered according to the date of submission. 
Values: 1 to 2001 
Source: @lex 
 
File 
Description: identification code as determined by the Supreme Court.  
Values: Consists of 10 alphanumeric codes, 2 for the type of file (CC for 
constitutional controversies and AI for actions of unconstitutionality), 4 for the 
consecutive number of case submitted in a given year, and 4 for the year of 
submission. 
Source: @lex 
  
File type 
Description: the type of procedure originating the case.  
Values: “1” for constitutional controversies and “2” for actions of 
unconstitutionality.  
 
Date of submission 
Description: the date the case was submitted to the Supreme Court. 
Values: day-month-year 
Source: @lex 
 
Date of resolution 
Description: the date the judgement to the case was handed down by the Supreme 
Court.  
Values: day-month-year 
Source: @lex 
 
Length 
Description: the number of days that passed between the date of submission and 
the date of resolution. 
Values: 0 to 3224 
Source: @lex 
  
Claiming party 
Description: the specific public authority or party filing the case.  
Values: textual reference to the claiming party as mentioned in @lex 
Source: @lex 
 
Claiming party jurisdiction 
Description: the jurisdiction to what the claiming party belongs to. 
Values: “1” for national, “2” for subnational, “3” for municipal. 
Source: @lex 
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Claiming party territorial origin  
Description: the territorial origin to which the claiming party belongs.  
Values: “0” for national and 1 to 32 in alphabetical order for every state composing 
Mexico’s federation (Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, 
Campeche, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Colima, Distrito Federal, Durango, 
Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Nayarit, 
Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, 
Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatan and Zacatecas). 
Source: @lex 
  
Claiming party branch  
Description: branch to which the claiming party belongs.  
Values:  “1” for executive, “2” legislative, “3” judicial and “0” for others.  
Source: @lex 
 
Type of claiming party 
Description: the type of claiming party according to the Mexican Constitution's 
article 105.  
Values: In the case of constitutional controversies: “1” for federal executive 
authorities, “2” for federal legislative authorities, “3” for state executive authorities, 
“4” for state legislative authorities”, “5” for state judicial authorities”, “6” for 
municipal authorities.” For actions of unconstitutionality: “6” for Attorney General, 
“7” federal legislative minorities, “8” for state legislative minorities”, “9” for national 
political parties, “10” for state political parties, “11” federal human rights 
commission, “12” for state human rights commissions”, “13” for others.  
Source: @lex 
 
Claiming party political affiliation 
Description: political party to what the claiming party was affiliated at the time of 
submission.  
Values: 1 for “PRI”, “2” for PAN, “3” for PRD, “4” for others, “5” for no affiliation.  
Source: @lex, CIDAC’s dataset and information from the websites of state level 
electoral and legislative authorities.  
 
Defendant 
Description: the specific public challenged through the case 
Values: textual reference to the claiming party as mentioned in @lex 
Source: @lex 
 
Defendant jurisdiction 
Description: the jurisdiction to what the defendant belongs to. 
Values: “1” for national, “2” for subnational, “3” for municipal. 
Source: @lex 
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Defendant territorial origin  
Description: the territorial origin to which defendant belongs to.  
Values: “0” for national and 1 to 32 in alphabetical order for every state composing 
the Mexico’s federation (Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, 
Campeche, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Colima, Distrito Federal, Durango, 
Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Nayarit, 
Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, 
Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatan and Zacatecas). 
Source: @lex 
  
Defendant branch  
Description: branch to what the defendant belongs to.  
Values:  “1” for executive, “2” legislative, “3” judicial and “0” for others.  
Source: @lex 
 
Type of defendant party 
Description: the type of defendant according to the Mexican Constitution's article 
105.  
Values: In the case of constitutional controversies: “1” for federal executive 
authorities, “2” for federal legislative authorities, “3” for state executive authorities, 
“4” for state legislative authorities”, “5” for state judicial authorities”, “6” for 
municipal authorities.” For actions of unconstitutionality: “6” for federal congress, 
“7” for state congresses and “8” for others.  
Source: @lex 
 
Defendant political affiliation 
Description: political party to what the defendant was affiliated at the time of 
submission.  
Values: 1 for “PRI”, “2” for PAN, “3” for PRD, “4” for others, “5” for no affiliation.  
Source: @lex, CIDAC’s dataset and information from the websites of state level 
electoral and legislative authorities.  
 
Type of conflict 
Description: categorisation about whether the case involves parties from the same 
or different jurisdiction/origin.  
Values: “1” for horizontal (same jurisdiction) and “2” for “vertical” (different 
jurisdiction.  
Source: own definition taking into account defending and claiming parties 
jurisdiction of origin.  
 
Same party 
Description: cases involving parties with the same political affiliation.  
Values: “1” for same affiliation, “0” otherwise.  
Source: own determination considering defending and claiming parties affiliation. 
 
Jurisdiction of the challenged act or law 
Description: categorisation about the jurisdiction where the challenged action or 
law is to be applied.  
Values: “1” for national, “2” for subnational, “3” for municipal. 
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Legal matter 
Description: legal matter of the challenged law or action.  
Values: “1” electoral, “2” fiscal, “3” other.  
Source: @lex 
 
On the merits  
Description: reference to the type of decision rendered by the Supreme Court.  
Values: “1” for the decisions ‘on the merits’, “0” otherwise.  
Source: own definition.  
 
Strike down 
Description: definition about whether the Supreme Court invalidated at least one 
component of the norms or actions challenged in the case.  
Values: “1” for strike down, “0” otherwise.  
Source: @lex 
 
Suspension 
Description: definition about whether the Supreme Court granted a ‘suspension’ in 
the case (only for constitutional controversies).  
Values: “1” for ‘suspension’, “0” otherwise.  
Source: @lex.  
 
Jurisprudencias 
Description: count of the number of case law units emerged from the case.  
Values: 0 to 39.  
Source: IUS 2011.  
 
Challenged articles 
Description: count of the number of different articles of the Constitution that the 
claiming party considered infringed.  
Values: 0 to 24.  
Source: @lex 
 
Fundamental rights articles 
Description: reference to whether the articles considered as infringed by the 
claiming party referred to fundamental rights or not.  
Values: “1” when at least one article referred to fundamental rights, “0” otherwise. 
Source: own’ definition with information from @alex.  
 
SCJN stability 
Description: mean average count of days (logged) seating justices have passed in 
the Supreme Court at the moment the case was decided. 
Values: 0.72 to 11.28 
Source: own calculation.  
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ENP deputies 
Description: effective number of legislative parties in the Chamber of Deputies at 
the moment the case was decided. 
Values: 2.28 to 3.56 
Source: own calculation with data from the Chamber of Deputies historic 
compositions. 
 
State/year Constitutional Litigation Dataset 
The State/Year Constitutional Litigation Dataset compiles political and 
litigation-related variables for every one of the 32 states of the Mexican 
federation in the period of this study 1995-2010. The elaboration of this 
dataset was based on information provided by the Constitutional Review 
Judgements Dataset 1995-2011, and was complemented with information from 
Mexico’s National Geography and Statistics Institute (INEGI for its Spanish 
abbreviation), as well as with data from the Federal Electoral Institute’s, 
CIDAC’s dataset and Lujambio (2000) and state electoral institutions.  
The following procedure was followed for the integration of the dataset:  
1) it was created as a longitudinal format (panel) to register political and 
judicial information for every year for each state; 
2) the information Constitutional Review Judgements Dataset 1995-2011 
was arranged to determine the count of cases filed by either emerging 
or demanding state and municipal level actors (cases involving only 
federal actors were excluded from the analysis);  
The State/Year Constitutional Litigation Dataset consists of 512 
observations, 16 for each of the 32 states composing Mexico’s federation. The 
variables included in the dataset are:  
ID 
Description: consecutive number ordered according alphabetically (states) and 
chronologically (year). 
Values: 1 to 512.  
Source: own definition 
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State 
Description: name of the state.  
Values: 1 to 32 in alphabetical order for every state composing Mexico’s federation 
(Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chiapas, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Colima, Distrito Federal, Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, 
Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, 
Puebla, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, 
Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatan and Zacatecas). 
Source: Mexican states names.  
 
Year 
Description: year.  
Values: 1995 to 2010.  
Source: years in the period of study.  
 
Actions of unconstitutionality 
Description: count of actions of unconstitutionality filed by year in every given 
state. 
Values: 0 to 62.  
Source: Constitutional Review Judgements Dataset 1995-2011.  
 
Constitutional controversies 
Description: count of constitutional controversies filed by year in every given state. 
Values: 0 to 42.  
Source: Constitutional Review Judgements Dataset 1995-2011.  
 
Governor 
Description: political affiliation of the governor.  
Values: “1” for “PRI”, “2” for PAN, “3” for PRD, “4” for other. 
Source: CIDAC’s dataset and state electoral institutes.  
 
Local Congress Affiliation 
Description: name of the party controlling the majority in state congress.  
Values: “1” for “PRI”, “2” for PAN, “3” for PRD, “4” for no single party majority 
Source: CIDAC’s dataset and state electoral institutes. 
 
Local Effective Number of Parties 
Description: effective number of legislative parties in the state congress the year 
the case was submitted. 
Values: 1.4 to 5.  
Source: own calculation.  
 
ENP deputies 
Description: effective number of legislative parties in the Chamber of Deputies the 
year the case was submitted. 
Values: 2.28 to 3.56 
Source: own calculation with data from the Chamber of Deputies historic 
compositions. 
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Population  
Description: population in the state for every year.  
Values:  373,636 (Baja California 1995) to 15,031,728 to Mexico state (2010).  
Source: INEGI.  
 
Participaciones 
Description: Non-targeted resources transferred from the federal government to 
states.  
Values: 285,680,000 pesos (Baja California 1995) to 53,802,437,100 pesos (Mexico 
state 2010), at constant values of 2003.  
Source: INEGI.  
 
Mexico Supreme Court Justices Dataset 1917-2011 
The Mexico Supreme Court Justices Dataset 1917-2011 registers information 
of appointments and career paths of the 212 people appointed as justices to 
the Supreme Court in the period 1917-2011. For the elaboration of this three 
sources of information were employed: the biographical compilation 
published by the Supreme Court (SCJN, 2011b); the information regarding 
judicial appointments included in Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996); and the 
data registered in Mexican Political Biographies 1935-2009 (Camp, 2011). 
The variables included in the dataset are:  
Name 
Description: name of the justice appointed to the Supreme Court.  
Values: complete name of the person.   
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011).  
 
State of origin 
Description: state where the justice was born.  
Values: Values: 1 to 32 in alphabetical order for every state composing Mexico’s 
federation (Aguascalientes, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, 
Chiapas, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Colima, Distrito Federal, Durango, Guanajuato, 
Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, 
Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, 
Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatan and Zacatecas). 
Source: Mexican states names.  
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Year of birth 
Description: year when the justice was born.  
Values: 1855 to 1960.  
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011).  
 
Year of appointment 
Description: year when the justice was born.  
Values: 1917 to 2011. 
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011).  
 
Year of retirement 
Description: year when the justice left the Supreme Court.  
Values: 1919-to 2009.  
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011).  
 
Year of death 
Description: year the justice died  (23 missing values). 
Values: 1919-to 2007.  
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011).  
 
Nominating President 
Description: the surname of the President that nominated the justice.  
Values: “0” Congress (1917-1927), “1” Portes Gil, “2” Ortiz Rubio, “3” Cardenas, “4” 
Avila Camacho, “5” Aleman”, “6” Ruiz Cortinez, “7”Lopez Mateos, “8” Diaz Ordaz, 
“9” Echeverria, “10” Lopez Portillo, “11” De la Madrid, “12” Salinas de Gortari, “13” 
Zedillo, “14” Fox Quesada, “15” Calderon.  
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011). 
 
Judicial career 
Description: previous judicial experience in either state or federal level bodies.  
Values: “1” if the justice had judicial experience, “0” otherwise.  
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011). 
 
Political career  
Description: previous or posterior experience in either state or federal executive or 
legislative branches.  
Values: “1” if the justice had or followed a political career either before or after the 
nomination, “0” otherwise.  
Source: SCJN 2011b, Fix Zamudio and Cossio Diaz (1996), Camp (2011). 
 
 
State Expropriation Laws and Precedents Dataset 1917-2011 
The State Expropriation Laws and Precedents Dataset 1917-2011 registers 
every law passed by the legislature in every state of the federation, as well as 
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every precedent established by the Supreme Court. The information included 
in this dataset has its origins in two sources: in the case of the legal 
disposition it is based on a revision of the state-level reforms as secondary 
sources; while the data regarding judicial precedents relies on the compilation 
elaborated by Herrera (2006). 
For the integration of this data was employed the following procedure:  
1) It was first designed in a structure using years as the units of 
observation (period 1917-2011);  
2) It was then transformed in the compilation by Herrera (2006) in 
order to determine the count of jurisprudencias created by the 
Supreme Court per year in expropriation matters, distinguishing 
between those that mentioned the right to prior hearing from those 
which did not; 
3) It was complemented with the data obtained from Herrera (2006) 
with information from IUS, in order to have complete information 
regarding the case law activity by the Supreme Court on 
expropriation matters;  
4) In order to gather the information related to the evolution of 
expropriation law at state level it was constructed as a sub-dataset 
that registered data for every law on this subject enacted or 
reformed in the period of the study. The source of information 
employed in this step was the National and International Legal 
Compilation published by the Supreme Court on its website.   
5) The information included in that sub-dataset was then transformed 
in order to determine the count of laws enacted and reformed per 
year, distinguishing between those that mentioned the right to 
prior hearing from those which did not.  
The variables included in the dataset are:  
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Year 
Description: year in the period of the study (1917-2011)  
Values: 1917-2011  
Source: Herrera (2006), IUS, and National and International Law Compilation.  
 
Expropriation jurisprudencias 
Description: count of jurisprudencias on expropriation matters for in every given 
year.  
Values: 0 to 5.  
Source: Herrera (2006) and IUS.  
 
Expropriation jurisprudencias mentioning the right to prior hearing 
Description: count of jurisprudencias on expropriation matters mentioning the 
right to prior hearing in every given year.  
Values: 0 to 3.  
Source: Herrera (2006) and IUS.  
 
Expropriation laws 
Description: count of state expropriation laws enacted or reformed in every given 
year.  
Values: 0 to 5.  
Source: National and International Law Compilation. 
 
Expropriation laws mentioning the right to prior hearing 
Description: count of state expropriation laws enacted or reformed in every given 
year.  
Values: 0 to 3.  
Source: National and International Law Compilation.  
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Output for statistical analyses  
Chapter 3 
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Chapter 4 
Actions of unconstitutionality Constitutional controversies 
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Appendix II. Interviews 
The in-depth open-ended interviews for this thesis were conducted on three 
different fieldtrips, all of them in Mexico City, Mexico. The first one was 
undertaken between the 14th of April and the 2nd of May of 2008; the second 
between 29th of September and 17th of October also of 2008; and the third one 
between the 9th and the 20th of March of 2009. Additionally, one more 
interview was carried out on the 1st of March of 2010.  
The objective of the interviews was to gather information regarding the 
Supreme Court of Justice and the effects of its resolution in order to provide a 
more accurate analysis of its performance in policy-making terms. 
Accordingly, this research sought to interview all of the eleven justices to the 
Supreme Court or high-ranked officers within their corresponding staffs. As 
the reader will notice, interviews were conducted with at least one person 
from the staff of eight out of the eleven justices composing the Supreme 
Court. Additionally, former justices and high-ranked judicial officers were 
interviewed during the three fieldtrips.  
In order to avoid bias in the elite-interviewing sample this research also 
aimed to undertake interviews with key actors outside of the Federal 
Judiciary. For this reason, interviews with members and high-ranked officers 
in the Federal Congress were made, along with some others to political party 
leaders and strategic decision-makers in the Attorney General’s Office.  
The next table provides a full list of the interviewees with the date when 
the corresponding interview was conducted. For confidentiality issues, in all 
cases the name of the person is omitted but not their position at the moment 
of the interview.  
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Table A.1. List of Interviewees 
Interviewee Position Date 
Interviewee 01 Law Clerk to Justice Juan N. Silva Meza 05/10/2008 
Interviewee 02 Law Clerk in the Second Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of Justice 
06/10/2008 
Interviewee 03 Mexican Lawyer. Legal Associate to the World 
Bank’s Law and Development Program. 
05/05/2008 
Interviewee 04 President to the Social Democratic Party 13/10/2008 
Interviewee 05 Legal Counsellor to Mexico City's Head of 
Government 
04/10/2008 
Interviewee 06 Former Justice to the Supreme Court of Justice 
(1995-2003) 
16/03/2009 
Interviewee 07 Director of the Official Bulletin of the Chamber 
of Deputies (Gaceta Parlamentaria) 
17/03/2009 
Interviewee 08 Justice to the Supreme Court of Justice 25/04/2008 
Interviewee 09 Law Clerk to Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero de 
Garcia Villegas 
02/10/2008 
Interviewee 10 Former Director of the Unit of Constitutional 
Controversies and Actions of Unconstitutionality 
08/10/2008 
Interviewee 11 Former Justice to the Supreme Court of Justice 
(1995-2006) 
08/10/2008 
Interviewee 12 Assistant to the Head of the Administrative 
Office of the Supreme Court of Justice  
03/10/2008 
Interviewee 13 Director of Legal Affair at the Chamber of 
Deputies 
17/03/2009 
Interviewee 14 Senator (2006-2012) 20/03/2009 
Interviewee 15 Deputy. Leader of the PRD in the Chamber of 
Deputies (2006-2009) 
17/03/2009 
Interviewee 16 Law Clerk to Justice Jesus Gudiño Pelayo  06/10/2008 
Interviewee 17 Feminist. Founder of the Information Group on 
Reproductive Choice (GIRE).  
30/09/2008 
Interviewee 18 Law Clerk to Justice Jose Ramon Cossio 04/10/2008 
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Interviewee 19 Law Clerk to Justice Juan N. Silva Meza 07/10/2008 
Interviewee 20 Professor of Law. Litigant in constitutional 
matters in the Supreme Court of Justice.  
24/04/2008 
Interviewee 21 Judicial officer. Deputy Director at the Legal 
Planning Office of the Supreme Court of Justice 
25/04/2008 
Interviewee 22 Law Clerk to Justice Jose Ramon Cossio 07/10/2008 
Interviewee 23 Director of Constitutional Affairs at the Attorney 
General's Office 
15/04/2008 
Interviewee 24 Mexican politician. Former Secretary of the 
Interior (1994-1995) 
18/03/2009 
Interviewee 25 Former Director of the Unit of Constitutional 
Controversies and Actions of Unconstitutionality 
10/10/2008 
Interviewee 26 Judicial officer at the Judicial Statistics Office of 
the Supreme Court of Justice 
13/03/2008 
Interviewee 27 Law Clerk to Justice Jose Ramon Cossio 04/10/2008 
Interviewee 28 Law Clerk to Justice Jose Ramon Cossio 13/03/2009 
Interviewee 29 Law Clerk to Justice Jose Ramon Cossio 06/10/2008 
Interviewee 30 Former Justice to the Supreme Court of Justice 
(1985-1994) 
01/03/2010 
Interviewee 31 Law Clerk to Justice Margarita Luna Ramos 09/10/2008 
Interviewee 32 Law Clerk to Justice Genaro Gongora Pimentel 09/10/2008 
Interviewee 33 Deputy (2006-2009). 17/03/2009 
Interviewee 34 Law Clerk to Justice Fernando Franco 09/10/2008 
Interviewee 35 Law Clerk to Justice Sergio Salvador Aguirre 
Anguiano 
05/10/2008 
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